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“No new light has been thrown on the reason why poor countries are poor and rich 
countries are rich.” 
 – Paul Samuelson (1976), Illogic of Neo-Marxian Doctrine, p. 107. 
 
Abstract 
The thesis revisits the debate over the relative contribution of root causes 
(institutions, geography, trade openness, religion and culture, and knowledge) in economic 
growth. The results show that institutions, market proximity, malaria and Catholicism have 
direct effects on economic progress. Catholicism is associated with poor institutions and is 
not good for trade. Malaria is the most important factor for Africa. The Africa result is 
explained by an overlapping generations model which shows that high malaria incidence 
encourages households to consume more at the current period and save less for the future 
which leads to a poverty trap. Among institutions, ‘market creating institutions’ and 
‘market stabilising institutions’ are important. Strong ‘market creating institutions’ 
characterized by the adequate protection of private property and contract enforcement are 
growth enhancing. ‘Market stabilizing institutions’ that ensures macroeconomic stability 
and does not undertake distortionary policies boosts investor confidence and are also good 
for growth. I notice that there is a growth maximizing level of ‘market regulation’ beyond 
which it increases red tape and kills the incentive for investment. The effect of ‘market 
legitimizing institutions’ is statistically insignificant. 
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“Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the Indian economy 
to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what, exactly? If not, what is it about the ‘nature 
of India’ that makes it so? The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like 
these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about 
anything else.” – Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1988), On the Mechanics of Economic 
Development, p. 5.    
Hidaya Mohamed is a fifth grade student. She dreams of going to the Benjamin 
Mkapa Secondary School, one of the better government schools in her town. But no one in 
her family has received secondary education before. Her older brother does not go to school 
and her sister is in a government primary school. Her mother, a single parent, earns a living 
selling maandazi (traditional buns) which is not enough to finance Hidaya’s dream. “I don’t 
think I can go there,” reflects Hidaya. “My mother can’t pay her contribution and I don’t 
know who can help me.”1  
Hidaya’s family resides in Tanzania.  The income per capita in Tanzania today is 
$490, which is one-hundredth of what it is for Luxembourg, the richest nation in the 
world.2 Tanzania is poor in spite of its rich natural resource endowments of diamonds, 
gold, iron ore, coal, natural gas and nickel. Tanzanian soil is suitable for coffee, cotton and 
clove plantation. In spite of all this, Tanzanian development record is disappointing. A 
colonial history marred with slave trade reveals a very sad tale of exploitation and 
underdevelopment. Even after independence in 1961 things didn’t change by much. Almost 
all of the small and big development initiatives of the government in independent Tanzania 
culminated into disastrous failures. One of the better known accounts of disaster is that of 
the Morogoro Shoe Factory. The Morogoro Shoe Factory was established in Tanzania with 
                                                 
1 Hidaya’s story is quoted from an article titled “All these children want is a decent education” by 
Sakina Zainul Datoo published in the October 2003 edition of the journal “Africawoman” in page 3. The 
online source of this article is the following. 
http://www.africawoman.net/newsdetails.php?NewsID=182&AuthorID=53&CountryID=12&NewsTypeID=6&IssueID=24
2 These are figures for 2000 expressed in current “international” dollars adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (PPP) differences. The source is the Penn World Table 6.1 (Heston et al. 2002). 
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the help of the World Bank in the 1970s. It was endowed with labour, machinery and the 
latest shoe-making technology. But it hardly produced any shoes, only utilising 4% of its 
capacity, largely due to the absence of production incentives for the firm (Easterly 2001). 
The plant was not well designed either. It had aluminium walls and no ventilation system, 
which was unsuitable for the Tanzanian conditions. After two decades of struggle, 
production finally stopped in 1990.3 Tanzania now stands as one of the poorest in the world 
struggling with poverty, high infant mortality, HIV/AIDS and malaria. By 2001, Tanzania 
accumulated external debt worth $6.7 billion which was cancelled under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Program.4 The Tanzanian economy at its current state 
cannot generate enough wealth to ensure a decent living standard for someone like Hidaya. 
Hidaya’s story is not unique. There are many more like Hidaya in the poor tropics and sub-
tropics whose minimum aspirations cannot be fulfilled because their respective economies 
fail to generate enough wealth for them.  
The obvious question that follows is the most common yet crucial in the field of 
economic development. Why is there 100-fold difference in income per capita between 
Luxembourg and Tanzania? The question is common because it has been addressed by 
economists and scholars on numerous occasions over the last fifty years. It is crucial 
because it has the potential to improve living standards and reduce the proportion of people 
who are suffering from starvation, poverty and deprivation.  
                                                 
3 The story of the Morogoro Shoe Factory is quoted from Easterly (2001), pp.68. 
4 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program was established in 1996 as a joint 
collaboration between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The aim of the program is 
to reduce the excessive debt burdens faced by the world’s poorest nations. In 1999, the international 
community endorsed enhancements to the HIPC initiative allowing more countries to qualify for HIPC 
assistance, accelerating and deepening the delivery of relief, and strengthening the link between debt relief 
and poverty reduction. As of September 2004, twenty seven countries are receiving debt relief under the 
initiative.   
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In the past, the main focus of the literature was to discover and evaluate proximate 
causes (physical capital accumulation, technological progress etc.). In recent years, 
however, economists have stressed the importance of root causes (institutions, human 
capital, religion and culture, openness to trade, and geography) in their quest for growth. 
Some recent studies of an empirical as well as a theoretical nature reports link between 
long-run economic progress and institutions. Rodrik et al. (2004) using the level regression 
model5 show that institutions dominate the influence of both trade and geography as the 
fundamental determinant of long-run economic development. The title of their paper 
captures their conclusion: ‘Institutions Rule’. Their result build on the findings of 
Acemolgu et al. (2001) which demonstrates the strong impact of institutions on economic 
development without claiming dominance. In this thesis I show that institutions don’t rule. 
Malaria, market proximity, and Catholicism have direct effects on development. Malaria 
also explains the lack of development in Africa. One explanation of this can be that high 
incidence of malaria prevents African households from saving for the uncertain future. This 
proves costly for future growth and leads to a low level equilibrium trap. Among 
institutions I show that strong ‘market creating institutions’ characterized by the adequate 
protection of private property and contract enforcement are growth enhancing. The ‘market 
stabilising institutions’ that ensures macroeconomic stability and does not undertake 
distortionary policies boosts investor confidence and are also good for growth. I notice that 
there is a growth maximizing level of ‘market regulation’ beyond which it increases red 
tape and kills the incentive for investment. The effect of ‘market legitimising institutions’ is 
statistically insignificant. I also show that the ‘instrumental variable estimation of a level 
                                                 
5 Rodrik et al. (2004) uses log per capita GDP in 1995 as the dependent variable and measures of 
institutions, geography, and trade openness as explanatory variables. 
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regression model’ approach adopted by the existing studies suffer from identification 
problems and omitted variable bias.    
The analysis proceeds in six stages. In chapter 2, I trace out the transformation of 
the growth literature from ‘factor accumulation’ to ‘deep structural determinants.’ I start off 
with a brief illustration of the standard neoclassical growth model and derive the growth 
regression from it. I review the empirical literature that tests one of the major predictions of 
the growth model- ‘given technology and initial income factor accumulation alone can 
explain all the variation in growth.’ The key finding of all these studies is that factor 
accumulation explains only a small fraction of the variation. The general reaction to this is 
twofold. First, is an ad hoc expansion in the set of correlates to account for the residual 
variation. Second, is a move towards more structured growth empirics. I conclude this 
chapter by describing the broad theoretical basis behind the latter.  
Chapter 3 reviews the theories of deep structural determinants. I critically review 
some of the prominent political economy models and theories of institutions. I also review 
works on trade openness, geography, religion and culture, and human capital. 
In chapter 4, I discuss the empirics of deep structural determinants. I describe the 
existing levels empirical strategy and point out some of the major shortcomings of this 
approach. I show that this approach suffers from omitted variable bias and identification 
problems. I propose an alternative strategy of growth regression which reduces the omitted 
variable bias problem. I also control for school enrolment ratio in 1900 to tackle the 
identification problem. The key results from estimating an extended model are: a) log GDP 
per capita in 1820, 1870, 1900, 1950 and 1960 are statistically significant indicating that 
there is transitional dynamics which is neglected by the existing levels model; b) 
institutions, market proximity, disease and Catholicism have direct effects on development; 
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c) Catholicism is associated with poor institutions and is not good for trade; and d) malaria 
is the most important factor for the low income economies. 
In chapter 5, I ask the question, ‘Is Africa different?’ The reason I ask this question 
is the unique history and geography of the continent. Slavery, high variability in rainfall, 
and deadly malaria are some of the unique structural features of Africa. Therefore, learning 
about the relative impact of these structural features on economic development has to be a 
substantial part of any answer to our question. The key result of this exercise is that malaria 
continues to influence African living standards. I find no evidence of slave trade 
influencing current development. The positive relationship between slave trade and current 
institutions as reported by Nunn (2004) is not supported by my results.  
In chapter 6, I summarise the empirical evidence. I discuss some of the imminent 
causality issues related to the evidence and try to interpret them using a unifying structure. 
The structure describes the trajectory of capitalist development in Western Europe. I 
compare and contrast the Western European trajectory with the trajectories of Africa, 
China, India, and the Americas and try to find out what deep structural factors are behind 
the development or lack of development of these regions. The African case is also 
illustrated by an overlapping generations model where I show that high incidence of 
malaria has an adverse effect on household savings which dampens growth. I conclude this 
chapter with an attempt to relate these observations with the empirical evidence that I report 
in chapters 4 & 5. 
The results in chapters 4 and 5 indicate the importance of institutions and malaria. 
In chapter 7, I look more closely at the contributions of institutions. The institutions and 
economic development literature including chapters 4 and 5 use a broad definition of 
institutions measured by the rule of law index. However, institutions can be classified into 
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the following four categories based on ‘first-order economic principles’6- market creating 
institutions, market regulating institutions, market stabilising institutions, and market 
legitimising institutions. Market creating institutions protect property rights and enforce 
contracts; market regulating institutions deal with externalities, economies of scale, and 
imperfect information; market stabilising institutions ensure low inflation and 
macroeconomic stability; and market legitimising institutions manage redistribution and 
minimise social conflict. Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) is perhaps the first to classify 
institutions into these four different categories in the essay entitled, ‘The Primacy of 
Institutions and what this does and does not mean.’ I adopt this framework and estimate the 
relative contribution of each of these institutions using the dynamic panel data estimation 
method. The findings are – a) strong ‘market creating institutions’ improves growth; b) 
‘market stabilising institutions’ that ensures macroeconomic stability and does not 
undertake distortionary policies boosts investor confidence and are also good for growth; c) 
there is a growth maximizing level of ‘market regulation’ beyond which it increases red 
tape and kills the incentive for investment; and d) the effect of ‘market legitimising 
institutions’ is statistically insignificant.    
Finally, chapter 8 concludes the analysis with some implications. The results 
strongly suggest that malaria is one of the major barriers to growth in Africa. The 
overlapping generations model show that one explanation of this result is a low level 
equilibrium trap. This does make a strong case for aid to eradicate malaria from the 
continent. However, designing a “Big Push” style aid strategy may not work. Easterly 
(2006) points out that the “Big Push” strategy overlooks the unsolvable information and 
incentive problems associated with any large scale planning exercise and, therefore, are 
                                                 
6‘First-order economic principles’ are - protection of property rights, contract enforcement, effective 
regulation, sound money, rule of law and democracy and so on. The contribution of these principles is 
illustrated in Rodrik (2003).   
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likely to fail. In that case a more micro approach towards provisioning of aid may work 
better.  
The empirical results in chapter 7 indicate that strengthening ‘market creating 
institutions’ and ‘market stabilising institutions’ have high dividends. However, one has to 
keep in mind that these numbers are only indicative of the average. We are correct on the 
average which does not necessarily mean that the same will follow for each individual 
observation. In other words, devising a ‘Washington Consensus’ style policy based on 
these results may not work for each and every country in the sample. Policies should be 
based on the first order economic principles and should also recognise the institutional 
history which may differ across countries. A perfect example is the development 
experiences of India and China. The world’s largest democracy India’s institutions are very 
much different from the institutions of communist China. However, both types of 
institutions yield high growth dividends – around 6-7% annually in India and 9-10% 
annually in China. 
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CHAPTER 2  
IN SEARCH OF ANSWERS:  
FROM FACTOR ACCUMULATION TO DEEP STRUCTURAL 
DETERMINANTS 
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One of the major predictions of the neoclassical growth model is that given the level 
of technology and income at a particular point in time, and a common growth rate of 
technology, a country accumulating more physical and human capital grows faster than a 
country accumulating less of the same.   Empirical evidence suggests that this is only a part 
of the story. In a simple regression model with two factors of production, physical and 
human capital and log initial income as an additional control, a large fraction of the cross-
national growth variance remains unexplained. This leads to two types of reaction. First, a 
mad search for additional correlates of growth with the majority of the correlates having 
none or very little connection with theoretical models of optimizing behaviour. Second, a 
move towards more structured growth empirics with the primary objective of teasing out 
causality. The second approach is relatively recent and has gained a fair amount of 
acceptance of late. However, it remains a question how the literature has moved in this 
direction. To find an answer, we need to trace out the origin and the evolution of the growth 
regression. This is exactly what I seek to do in this chapter. 
2.1 The Neoclassical Growth Model 
I start off with an illustration of the standard neoclassical growth model and show 
how the growth regression emerges from it. An earlier version of this model was 
independently developed by Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956) which only 
focused on physical capital accumulation. This version is developed by Mankiw et al. 
(1992) who augment the original version with human capital to accommodate the ideas of 
knowledge based growth proposed and formalised by Paul Romer in the 1980s. The model 
is as follows.    
The model considers an economy at a particular point in time t with the following 
constant returns to scale production technology producing income Y: 
 10 
 
                              1( , , )t t t t t t tY F K H E K H E
α β α β− −= =                                   (2.1) 
Where Kt and Ht are the stock of physical and human capital respectively, 
is effective labour growing at the aggregate rate of exogenous population growth 
n plus technological progress g. 
t tE A L= t
Dividing both sides by Et and suppressing the time subscript t, I can rewrite the 
production function in per capita terms as follows. 
                             y k hα β=                                                                          (2.1a) 
Where k and h are stocks of physical and human capital per efficiency unit of 
labour. It is assumed that a fixed proportion sk and sh of the per capita output y are invested 
in physical and human capital respectively. The evolution of the economy is determined by 
the following equations of motion. Both physical and human capital depreciates at an 
exogenous rate δ. 
                             (kk s y n g k)δ= − + +                                                        (2.2) 
                             (hh s y n g h)δ= − + +                                                        (2.3) 
At steady state  and the long run steady state equilibrium values of per 
capita physical capital, human capital and output are given by 
0k h= = 
      
1/11
* k hs sk
n g
α ββ β
δ
− −−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 ,
1/11
* k hs sh
n g
α βα α
δ
− −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
, & 
1/1
*
( )
k hs sy
n g
α βα β
α βδ
− −
+
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
(2.4)  
The unique steady state value is ensured by the Cobb- Douglas technology which 
guarantees that the Inada conditions are satisfied. By linearising around the steady state 
using the first order Taylor expansion and integrating, one can derive the following 
expression for country i: 
 1 2 3ˆ lniT it iTy yγ γ γ= + + X  (2.5) 
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Where 1ˆ ln iTiT
it
yy
T y
⎡ ⎤≡ ⎢⎣ ⎦⎥
 and the vector includes the investment rates in physical 
and human capital, rate of depreciation of capital, and the rate of growth of population. It 
follows from the model that the lower the level of initial output of a country, the higher will 
be its growth rate for a given value of . In other words, all other factors remaining 
unchanged poor countries grow faster than the rich countries. Therefore the sign of 
iTX
iTX
2γ  is 
negative. This is known as “conditional convergence” in the literature. 
Therefore, the theory predicts that a part of the variation in cross-national income 
can be explained by the variation in investment rates in physical and human capital. In 
other words, the central problem in economic development is to understand the process of 
factor accumulation. This leaves us with an empirical question to answer. Is the prediction 
made by the theoretical model supported by the data? This is what motivated the expansion 
of the now voluminous empirical growth literature, which I discuss next.  
2.2 Growth, Factor Accumulation, and the Measure of Our Ignorance 
One can test the steady state properties of the neoclassical growth model by 
estimating equation 2.5 using regression techniques. In order to do that equation 2.5 is 
rewritten as follows:                           
                       1 2 3ˆ lniT it iT iTy yγ γ γ= + + +X ε                         (2.5a) 
Where εiT is the unobserved residual. Many empirical growth studies estimate this 
model using a variety of techniques. Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995), Caselli et al. 
(1996), King and Levine (1994), Hall and Jones (1999), and Easterly and Levine (2001) are 
among the most cited ones. The final conclusion however is loud and clear. The residual 
rather than factor accumulation accounts for most of the growth differences across nations. 
This leads to two types of research strategy in the literature.  
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The first strategy is to increase the number of regressors to account for the omitted 
factors which explains the variance. The inevitable fallout of this line of research is a never 
ending list of regressors. This is useful if the regressors are derived from models of 
optimizing behaviour indicating the possibility of a strong causal relationship. 
Unfortunately this is not the case. The majority of the regressors are chosen on an ad hoc 
basis. As a result one can identify correlates but not causal relationships. The list of 
correlates includes physical capital investment, human capital accumulation, low income 
inequality, being located further from the tropics, less tropical diseases, low fertility, less 
government spending, trade policy openness, political freedom, British legal origin, rule of 
law, foreign direct investment, foreign aid, ethno linguistic fractionalisation etc. The list is 
growing over time and it is far from being exhaustive.  
The second strategy is to look at the deep structural features of the economy. The 
idea is that the deep structural features influence proximate causes (factor accumulation) 
over the long horizon and shapes the long run economic performance of the economy. To 
put it more formally the ‘proximate causes’ are functions of ‘deep determinants.’ Following 
is the relationship in mathematical terms.    
                                          ( )iT iT≡X F Z                                      (2.6)  
Where is a vector of ‘deep determinants.’ Sachs and Warner (1997a) and 
Bhattacharyya (2004) use this structure in their models. The ‘deep structural determinants’ 
are trade, institutions, geography, religion and culture, and knowledge. The listing of 
knowledge and human capital as a ‘deep determinant’ however is debatable. Rodrik et al. 
(2004), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Bhattacharyya (2004) identify human capital as a 
proximate determinant. Glaeser et al. (2004) in the empirical literature and Mokyr (1990) in 
the economic history literature identify knowledge as a deep determinant. Given the weight 
iTZ
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of evidence in some of the recent research, it is perhaps appropriate to classify it as a ‘deep 
determinant.’ Nevertheless, it is still open to question.  
Therefore, one can rewrite (2.5a) as a reduced form regression: 
                                       ˆ lniT it iT iTy yα γ ε= + +Z                                  (2.7)                       
A standard way of estimating this equation is to regress on exogenous historical 
variables which may have influenced in the past and use the predicted value of from 
this regression to estimate (2.7). It may appear that this two-step procedure is a handy way 
to circumvent endogeneity problems however it has its own problems.
itZ
itZ itZ
7 I will discuss more 
about this in chapter 4. This allows researchers to estimate the direct effect of ‘deep 
structural determinants’ on current growth.  
The advantage of the structured growth empirics is that it is closer to theory and it 
gives us useful insights into the establishment of causality. This is perhaps one of the major 
reasons behind the majority of the recently published research taking up this approach. 
However, further work needs to be done to identify the chain of causation and supporting it 
with a general equilibrium model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
7The two-step procedure applied to levels regression suffers from identification problem.  
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In this chapter I review the theories and empirics of deep structural determinants of 
economic progress. This provides a background for the empirical research reported in 
chapter 4. Theories of institutions, religion and culture, geography, trade and human capital 
and knowledge are reviewed. I include human capital and knowledge in this list in order to 
review the theories that strongly argue knowledge is an even deeper determinant than 
institutions or trade. 
3.1 The Institutions Theory 
“Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest 
barbarism, but peace, easy taxes and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being 
brought about by the natural course of things” – Adam Smith (cited in Jones 1981, pp.253). 
This is what Adam Smith had to say about the role of institutions in economic 
development. Even though many scholars have referred to the role of institutions time and 
again in their work, institution theory perhaps is most strongly associated with Nobel 
laureate Douglass North. According to North (1994), “institutions are humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction.” He adds that they are made up of formal and 
informal constraints and they depend on the enforcement characteristic of these constraints. 
All these taken together form the incentive structure of the society. North (1989) argues 
that the long run economic performance of a society is shaped by its incentive structure. In 
this study, he looks at the effects of the United States Constitution, the British Common 
Law and the centralised enforcement mechanism of Spain on economic performance and 
argues that institutional differences do have economic consequences. The recent long-run 
growth empirics literature endorse this view (Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; 
Rodrik et al. 2004). This explains why in the recent past the institutional view has received 
so much attention in the growth literature. Empirical studies on growth use the instrumental 
variable approach in order to estimate the relationship. This is essential in order to take 
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account of the possibility of reverse causality. In other words, as better institutions 
influence growth positively, it is also possible that faster growing economies can afford to 
develop better institutions.  
Knack and Keefer (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999) are among the first to use 
institutions as one of the explanators of economic progress.  They argue that Western 
Europeans are historically associated with high quality institutions characterised by 
protected property rights and efficient enforcement of contracts. Western Europeans also 
migrated and settled in large numbers in similar temperate climates. When they migrated, 
they carried these values and institutions with them. Therefore, it can be argued that more 
temperate the climate the better is the institutional quality. This allows Hall and Jones 
(1999) to use distance from the equator as an instrument for institutional quality. They also 
use the fraction of the population speaking English and the fraction of population speaking 
other Western European languages as alternative instruments for institutions. A high 
proportion of the population speaking English and other Western European languages is 
indicative of a significant presence of Western Europeans in that country and hence better 
institutional quality. Their study reports a strong positive effect of institutions on income 
per capita.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) put forward a strong argument in favour of the proposition 
that institutional quality is the fundamental determinant of economic development. They 
use European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality. They argue that 
Europeans resorted to different style of colonisation depending on the feasibility of 
settlement. In a tropical environment the settlers had to deal with the killer malaria and 
yellow fever and hence a high mortality rate. This prevented colonisers from settling in a 
tropical environment and resource extraction became the most important if not the only 
activity in tropical colonies. In order to support these activities, the colonisers in the tropics 
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and the sub-tropics erected institutions which were extractive in nature. On the other hand, 
in temperate conditions European settlers felt more at home and decided to settle. In these 
places they erected institutions characterised by strong protection of property rights and 
efficient enforcement of contracts. These institutions created by the colonizers have 
persisted in the colonies even after independence. Therefore, they look at the extent of 
European settler mortality in the past in order to use it as an instrument of the current 
quality of institutions. In a subsequent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that the 
settlement decision of European settlers also depended on the rate of urbanisation prior to 
1500, the start of the period of colonisation, and hence it can be used as an alternative 
instrument for institutions. According to this argument, a high density of population in the 
colonies ruled out any possibility of settlement for the settlers and they used the natives to 
erect extractive institutions without bothering about the overall protection of private 
property in the society. On the other hand, a low rate of urbanisation and low population 
density in the colonies encouraged the settlers to settle in large numbers and build 
institutions to protect property rights. They use the urbanisation rate in 1500 measured by 
the then density of population, as an instrument for institutions in this study. In both the 
cases they report strong effects of institutions on development.  
Rodrik et al. (2004) also report strong effects of institutions on economic 
development. In a cross country regression with the level of income per capita as the 
dependent variable, they control for institutions, trade openness and geography and 
institutions comes out to be the only variable having a statistically significant relationship 
with income. In a similar exercise, Easterly and Levine (2003) report no direct effect of 
geography and policy on economic performance if institutional quality is present as a 
control. They find that the only channel through which geography affects income is 
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institutional quality. They use geographic endowment measures as their geography 
variable. 
Many more including the abovementioned empirical studies identify institutions as 
one of the important correlates of growth. This is perhaps convincing enough to say that 
institutions matter. However, the question that still remains is how institutions affect 
economic performance. I discuss three important papers that deal with this issue. They are 
as follows.  
One of the early works on this issue is by Engerman and Sokoloff (2001). In their 
study they trace the origins of the contrasting growth experiences of the North and the 
South Americas. They argue that the settlement colonies of the North and the South 
Americas differed significantly in terms of factor endowments creating incongruous initial 
conditions. The initial conditions have influenced the growth path of these two continents 
that ensued via economic and political institutions. The incongruity in the initial conditions 
thus explains the variability in their growth performance.  
Engerman and Sokoloff (2001) write, “…a hemispheric perspective across the range 
of European colonies in the New World indicates that although there were many influences, 
the factor endowment or initial conditions more generally had profound and enduring 
impacts on the evolution of economic institutions, on the structure of the colonial 
economies, and ultimately on their long-run paths of institutional and economic 
development. While all began with an abundance of land and other resources relative to 
labour, at least after the initial depopulation, other aspects of their factor endowments 
varied – contributing to extreme differences in the distributions of land holdings, wealth, 
and of political power.”   
They argue that the climatic conditions of the North were favourable to mixed 
farming of grains and livestock which exhibited limited economies of scale in production. 
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This encouraged the development of small family-size farms and a relatively homogeneous 
population in terms of the distribution of wealth and political power. The result was better 
institutions favouring broader access to economic opportunities, more extensive domestic 
markets, and better overall growth. The South and the Caribbean in contrast were endowed 
with vast mining resources and climates and soil conditions conducive to commercial crops 
like sugar, tobacco, and cotton. To exploit these resources which exhibit large economies of 
scale it was efficient on the part of the colonizers to set up large mining firms and 
plantations run with cheap slave labour. This led to the establishment of a society where a 
large section of the population remained impoverished with no political or economic rights 
whatsoever, whereas a small section, the political and economic elite, took control of all the 
wealth. The high level of inequality in the distribution of wealth and political power created 
institutions which are extractive, exploitative and extremely unjust. These institutions 
persisted over time causing persistent inequality and lack of growth. The highly 
concentrated landholdings and extreme inequality in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru during 
the colonial period are supportive of their story. 
In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2004) formalise some of the ideas of Engerman 
and Sokoloff’s (2001) using a schematic model. Following is a discussion of that model. 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that a nation’s economic and political institutions are 
broadly endogenous. They are at least in part determined by the society or a segment of it. 
They distinguish between two components of political power – de jure and de facto. They 
define de jure political power as the power that originates from formal political institutions 
in the society – for example: the Monarch, Democracy, Autocracy or Dictatorship etc. De 
facto political power on the other hand originates from informal political institutions which 
often challenge the formal ones – for example: economic and social interest groups etc. 
They assert that the existing political institutions at the current period determine the 
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distribution of de jure and de facto political power in the society. The strength of de facto 
political power also depends upon the distribution of resources in that period. This shapes 
economic institutions of that period and political institutions of the future. Current 
economic institutions influence current economic performance and the future distribution of 
resources. Future distribution of resources and future political institutions in turn influence 
subsequent distribution of political power, economic institutions, and economic 
performance. The following schematic diagram summarizes the link. 
                                       (3.1) 1
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In another related paper Acemoglu et al. (2005) explore the origin of capitalist 
institutions in early modern Europe which can be cited as further evidence to the hypothesis 
that economic and political institutions influence economic performance and vice versa. 
They describe the interactive role of trade and institutional development in stimulating 
economic growth in certain Western European countries from the sixteenth century 
onwards.  They assert that Atlantic trade and colonial activity enriched and strengthened 
commercial interests groups both economically and politically in these countries (most 
notably Britain and the Netherlands), which then demanded and obtained institutional 
reforms to protect their property rights, which enabled them to trade and invest more, 
triggering a circular and cumulative pattern of economic growth. However, this was not the 
case with some of the early starters in the colonization process notably Portugal and Spain. 
Even though they managed to expand their trading and ransom seeking activities rapidly by 
exploiting their early mover advantage, their growth was not sustainable. A major part of 
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the explanation is the traders failing to secure their rights from the Monarch. The Monarch 
and the clergy in Portugal and Spain remained firmly in control of the activities of the 
trading companies never allowing them to accumulate de facto political power to challenge 
the existing institutions. As a result the incentive to undertake investments in physical and 
human capital eroded fast and the growth was short lived. 
A further extension of the political power theory is presented by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000). Their argument is akin to the Marxist theory of capitalist-workers class 
struggle. Marx argued that capital accumulation and the associated decline of the surplus of 
capitalists would intensify exploitation of the workers which would lead to intense class 
struggle between the capitalists and the workers that would eventually terminate the class 
society.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) accepts the basic premise of this theory and argue 
that social and political reforms in Western Europe during the nineteenth century were an 
outcome of deliberate concessions made by the elite designed to avert political instability, 
expropriation, and possibly a revolution. As a result of these concessions inequality reduced 
in the western society which created the necessary precondition for the development of 
property rights institutions protecting private property which translated into faster economic 
growth in the periods that followed. However this theory is not free from its critiques. 
Galor and Moav (2006) come up with an alternative model to explain the termination of the 
class society. They argue that it was not class struggle but human capital and knowledge 
that brought about the demise. I discuss the findings of this study in detail in section 3.5.    
3.2 The Religion and Culture Theory 
“Respect the altar of every belief. Spanish America, limited to Catholicism to the exclusion 
of any other religion, resembles a solitary and silent convent of nuns…To exclude different 
religions in South America is to exclude the English, the Germans, the Swiss, the North 
Americans, which is to say the very people this continent most needs. To bring them without 
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their religion is to bring them without the agent that makes them what they are.”- Juan 
Bautista Alberdi (cited in Landes 2000, p.5)       
Juan Bautista Alberdi, a distinguished Argentine of the nineteenth century, believed 
that religion and culture plays the most significant role in shaping the economic destiny of a 
nation. This is what he wrote in 1852, half a century before Max Weber’s remarkable work 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  
In this section I discuss some of the notable theories that link religion, culture, and 
economic performance. I classify the religion and culture theory into four broad categories. 
I name them as follows: the Protestant work ethic view, the religious intolerance view, the 
collective belief view and the trust view.  
The Protestant work ethic view is due to Max Weber and it goes back to the early 
20th century when he published his thesis titled The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism. Weber (1930) argues that the epoch-making Protestant Reformation changed 
societal outlook and sowed the seeds of modern capitalism. Protestantism’s emphasis on 
industry, thrift and frugality along with its moral approval of risk taking and financial self-
development created a social environment conducive to investment and the accumulation of 
private capital. This became an inspirational force in transforming traditional societies into 
modern capitalist ones. Catholicism on the other hand considered trade and accumulating 
riches to be sinful, an attitude which was quite inimical to economic progress. Samuelsson 
(1993) points out that Weber’s theory hardly applies to Lutheranism, which retained the 
traditional attitudes of Catholicism towards trade and commerce at least at the time of its 
inception. But, it undoubtedly applies to Calvinism which supports trade and commerce. 
One of the central themes of Calvinism is predestination. According to this belief, some 
individuals are chosen and saved by God while the others are not. This process of selection 
by God is predestined and unalterable. Calvin in his discourses did not mention who had 
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been chosen. Therefore, the only practical way for the followers of Calvin to breed hope of 
attaining salvation is by performing intense worldly activities. Weber (1930, pp.69), also 
cited in Acemoglu et al. (2004, pp.15), states that, “however useless good works might be 
as a means of attaining salvation, they are indispensable as a sign of election. They are the 
technical means, not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation.” 
Calvin’s doctrine encourages economic activity but condemns enjoying the fruits of such 
activity by means of leisure. The followers of Calvin consider morality to be a virtue not 
because it can bring salvation but because it helps in acquiring moral credit. All these 
characters of Calvinism are essential preconditions for economic progress and this is how, 
according to Weber (1930), Calvinism influences economic performance. Given the 
provocative nature of Weber’s thesis, it is not hard to understand that it fails to achieve 
universal acceptance. In an influential study on religion and growth, Tawney (1926) rejects 
Weber’s view. He argues that the English economy took off in the 16th century when the 
religious influence in the society was replaced by secular attitudes.  
The religious intolerance view is due to Landes (1998) which adds another 
dimension to the theory that links religion and economic performance. In his book The 
Wealth and Poverty of Nations, he argues that the profit motive of the entrepreneurial class 
coupled with invention and productivity gain is the core in achieving material progress. 
Therefore, it is crucial for religious beliefs and practices within the society to encourage 
hard work and not inhibit rational and scientific thought and profit making. He uses the 
example of 18th century Britain to illustrate the effect of Protestant work ethics and values 
on economic performance. According to his thesis, Britain’s numerous scientific successes 
after the industrial revolution were made possible due to the supportive and tolerant role 
played by the church. In contrast, the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church in Portugal and the 
culture of intolerance diffused by the Catholic Church in Spain and Italy strangulated 
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scientific thinking and halted progress even though they were the first to make significant 
progress in cartography and ocean navigation. The infamous “Roman Inquisition” in the 
16th century Europe is a testimony of religious intolerance and orthodoxy of the Catholic 
Church which virtually stalled the European renaissance. To summarise, Landes (1998) 
maintains that the culture of intolerance in Catholicism and Islam limits the potential of a 
country to grow. Protestantism, on the other hand, facilitates economic growth by 
encouraging hard work and showing a more tolerant attitude towards scientific research. 
The collective belief view is due to Avner Grief. Grief (1994) holds that different 
cultures and religions generate different sets of beliefs about how people behave and 
people’s behaviour has a direct role in shaping economic performance. According to his 
argument, this can generate different growth equilibria across the globe even with the same 
set of institutions. These beliefs can also influence institutional quality in the long run and 
affect economic performance indirectly.  
Finally, the trust view is due to Putnam (1993). He holds that the Catholic tradition 
emphasizes vertical bonds with the Church which tends to undermine horizontal bonds with 
fellow citizens. This reduces the level of trust in the society and increases the transaction 
costs of economic exchange. Therefore, Catholicism has a negative effect on institutions 
and hence a negative effect on growth. Trust also has a direct impact on creditworthiness. 
Lack of trust in the society creates a creditor unfriendly environment that limits economic 
progress. The creditor unfriendly environment is also due to the anti-usury culture 
prominent in the Catholic tradition (Stulz and Williamson 2001). 
3.3 The Geography Theory 
“…the striking differences between the long-term histories of peoples of the different 
continents have been due not to innate differences in the peoples themselves but to 
differences in their environments…if the populations of Aboriginal Australia and Eurasia 
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could have been interchanged during the Late Pleistocene, the original Aboriginal 
Australians would now be the ones occupying most of the Americas and Australia, as well 
as Eurasia, while the original Aboriginal Eurasians would be the ones now reduced to 
downtrodden population fragments in Australia.” – Jared Diamond (1997), Guns, Germs 
and Steel, p.405.            
In this section I discuss the theories that link geography with development. I 
classify the existing theories of geography into five different categories. They are as 
follows: the climate view, the agriculture view, the market proximity view, the disease 
view, and the sophisticated geography view.  
The climate view holds that the population in the tropics is not industrious enough 
largely due to the energy sapping heat. Natural availability of food in abundance also 
makes tropical people idle. This has a direct and negative effect on human productivity and 
hence economic growth (Montesquieu 1748). In a recent study, Parker (2000) supports 
Montesquieu’s argument. According to his thesis, an individual’s desire to maximize utility 
is dependent on motivation, homeostasis and neural, autonomic, and hormonal adjustments. 
These physiological factors are governed by the hypothalamus. The activity of the 
hypothalamus is heavily dependent on thermodynamics. In hot conditions, the 
hypothalamus secretes hormones which negatively affect motivation and enterprise; 
whereas in the cold climate individuals are naturally hard working. These tendencies affect 
the steady state level of income in these two regions. The average steady state income in 
the cold climate is naturally higher than the average steady state in the hot climate. Hence, 
climate explains two thirds of the per capita income differences between the tropics and the 
temperate. Economists are reluctant to pick up this view perhaps because of its racist 
undertone (Easterly and Levine 2003).  
The agriculture view is due to Gallup and Sachs (2000). This view maintains that 
high relative humidity and high night time temperature in the tropics cause high plant 
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respiration and slows down plant growth. They argue that the deficiency in plant growth in 
the tropics is also related to the lack of nutrients in tropical soil. Humid tropical soils 
(alfisols, oxisols and ultisols) are typically low in nutrients and organic matters. This limits 
plant growth and also causes soil erosion and acidification. In addition the lack of frost 
allows a greater number of pests to survive and breed. These factors have a debilitating 
impact on agricultural productivity and inhibit economic progress. In addition to this, an 
alternative and sophisticated agriculture view exists due to Diamond (1997). According to 
this view, prior to the period of colonization, Europeans used technology which was 
specifically designed to suit the temperate conditions. In the late 18th and early 19th century, 
when the Europeans embarked on a colonisation drive, they introduced these technologies 
in the colonies. They worked well in the colonies with temperate conditions but failed to 
deliver the same goods in the tropical environment. This explains the low productivity of 
tropical agriculture and hence slow economic progress. 
The market proximity view is due to Sachs and Warner (1995b), Sachs and Warner 
(1997b), and Gallup et al. (1998). There is no disagreement within the economics 
community that trade and commerce generates wealth and prosperity (Smith 1776). One of 
the important preconditions for trade is easy access to major markets. According to the 
market proximity view, unfavourable geographic location characterised by no or limited 
access to ports or ocean navigable waterways, being landlocked, is a major impediment to 
trade and commerce. Access to port or major markets in this situation often involves 
crossing international boundaries which makes the cost of transportation relatively high and 
limits international trade. Absence of international trade in these economies confines all 
commercial activities into small internal markets. This causes an inefficient division of 
labour and underdevelopment. If one looks at inland Africa which is also one of the poorest 
areas in the world, it is quite evident that most of the countries of this region are 
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landlocked. This prevents these countries from effectively participating in international 
trade because transport costs are too high (Sachs and Warner 1997b).       
The disease view is due to Gallup and Sachs (2001), Bloom and Sachs (1998) and 
Gallup et al. (1998). According to this view, infectious malaria has a debilitating effect on 
human productivity and directly affects economic performance. Gallup and Sachs (2001) 
point out that the countries with intensive malaria grow 1.3 percentage point slower per 
person per year than countries without malaria and a 10 percentage point reduction in 
malaria might result in a 0.3 percentage point increase in annual per capita income growth. 
Bloom and Sachs (1998) also claim that the high incidence of malaria in sub-Saharan 
Africa reduces the annual growth rate by 1.3 percentage point a year. In other words, 
eradication of malaria in 1950 would have resulted in a doubling of current per capita 
income. Sachs (2003a) and Batten and Martina (2005), in their empirical studies report 
strong and negative effect of malaria on economic progress even after controlling for 
institutions and openness. 
Finally, the sophisticated geography view is due to Jared Diamond (1997). Diamond 
in his book entitled ‘Guns, Germs and Steel’ asks the question: why did history unfold so 
differently on different continents? He argues that geography and biogeography moulded 
the contrasting fates of human lives in different continents. In summary his hypothesis is as 
follows.  
He argues that geography has endowed mankind with different sources of food and 
livestock. The Eurasian climate, especially south west Asia which he calls the ‘Fertile 
Crescent’8, was best suited for the growth of maximum number of edible wild grains and 
large mammals. Early hunter-gatherers living in this region domesticated these wild grains 
                                                 
8The Fertile Crescent spans a part of the modern day Israel, Palestine, and Jordan valley. For further 
reference see map in Diamond (1997) p. 135. 
 28 
 
and adopted a sedentary agriculture based lifestyle. They domesticated the large mammals 
for meat, milk and muscle power which they could use in farming. The use of large 
mammals in agriculture immensely improved farm productivity yielding more and more 
food surplus. This technology and knowledge spread all across Eurasia along the same 
latitude. Close contact with the large mammals also led to frequent outbreaks of epidemic 
diseases among the human population in this region. This helped Eurasians to develop 
immunity to many of these diseases over the long run. The gift of food surplus and a 
sedentary lifestyle allowed them to invest more time into the development of guns, steel 
swords, ocean going ships etc. The societal structure became hierarchical and far more 
complex than the hunter-gatherers.  
This however was not the case in other continents. In places like New Guinea 
humans were left with very limited choice of food. No wild grains or large mammals were 
available for domestication. So humans in the New Guinea remained hunter-gatherers. In 
the Americas corn was the major grain that was domesticated. Other grains were not 
available. The continent also lacked large mammals for domestication. The only available 
option was the llama which is weak and yields less meat and milk than cow, goat or sheep. 
The indigenous American population were also not familiar with horses and they lacked 
immunity from the fatal Eurasian diseases. As a result the Europeans faced little or no 
resistance from the indigenous American population in their colonial conquest. The Aztecs, 
the Incas, and the Mayas were fighting an unequal battle with the Europeans powered with 
guns, steel swords, horses, and germs. More than two thirds of the population were wiped 
out by a smallpox epidemic when they first came into contact with the Europeans. Riding 
on the power of guns, germs and steel the Europeans colonized most of the known world 
getting access to a large pool of resources which helped them to develop an advanced 
industrialised society. The Americas, Australia, and New Zealand gained from European 
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migration and the migration of European technology along with them. The rest of the world 
remained largely impoverished and the gap widened over time with the development of 
more and more advanced technology in the west.           
3.4 The Trade Openness Theory 
“The greatest improvement in the productive power of labour, and the greater part of the 
skill, dexterity, and judgement with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have 
been the effects of the division of labour…This division of labour, from which so many 
advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees 
and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though 
very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in 
view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another” – Adam Smith [1776 (1960)],  Wealth of Nations, Chapters I & II, pp.7 &17. 
The openness view of development at least goes back to Adam Smith. Smith (1776) 
argues that openness to trade increases the size of the market which raises the possibility of 
greater division of labour. Division of labour in turn improves productivity and productivity 
improvement induces faster economic growth.9  
The neo-classical theory however holds a slightly different view. According to this 
theory, reduction in trade barriers opens up the possibility of a more efficient exploitation 
of comparative advantage through reallocation of factors. Labour and capital move towards 
their highest valued uses improving overall productivity and the welfare of the economy. 
Growth takes place in the economy due to transitional dynamics. In other words, growth 
lasts only for the duration of the transitional period and stops after the economy reaches its 
new steady state levels of capital and output per worker.  
Another significant theory in the openness and growth literature is the technology 
transfer view. According to the closed economy neo-classical growth models, given the 
                                                 
9 Yang and Borland (1991) uses a growth model to formalise Adam Smith’s notion of division of 
labour.   
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technology level at a particular point in time a country accumulating more physical and 
human capital grows faster than a country accumulating less of the same but all of them 
converge to the same long run steady state equilibrium rate of growth (Solow 1956; Swan 
1956; Mankiw et al. 1992). In this model, income per capita can grow in the long run only 
when there is exogenous technological progress. In real life we hardly observe convergence 
of income. In contrast, what we notice is that the rich economies are growing faster than the 
poor ones and the gap between the rich and the poor is widening over time.10 Coe and 
Helpman (1995) points out that this gap is due to variable rate of technological progress. 
They find evidence that technology catch up or R&D spillover bridges this gap. Dowrick 
and Rogers (2002), on the other hand, reports that the gap is due to variable rates of capital 
accumulation as well as technological progress. Howitt (2000) builds a theoretical model to 
show that because of technology transfer, R&D performing countries converge to parallel 
growth paths whereas others stagnate. Several others including Coe and Helpman (1995) 
identify trade openness as a medium of technology transfer. In other words, what these 
studies argue is that the follower economies adopt technology and knowledge developed in 
the advanced economies and the transfer takes place largely through international trade. 
Therefore, effective participation in international trade and opening up by reducing trade 
restrictions exposes economies to new knowledge and new technology which helps them to 
grow in the long run.  
Other influential studies in the openness and growth literature are Sachs and Warner 
(1995a) and Frankel and Romer (1999).  
Sachs and Warner (1995a) use the growth accounting approach to show that trade 
openness is the key determinant of growth. They calculate trade openness using 
                                                 
10 This is disputed by many if we consider the last 50 years. World income distribution has increased 
over the last 50 years especially with the impressive growth performances of India and china over the last two 
to three decades. But the diverging trend certainly holds over a longer period.  
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information on average tariff levels, non-tariff barriers, black market premium, state 
monopoly on major exports etc. Their regression results suggest, on the average, “open” 
economies grow somewhere between 2 to 3 percentage point faster than “closed” 
economies.11 Their study however is not free from criticism. Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000) 
show that the Sachs and Warner measure of openness suffers from over reliance on the 
black market premium and state monopoly on major exports criterion.     
Frankel and Romer (1999), on the other hand resort to level accounting using 
instrumental variable regressions to conclude that trade openness is a key factor influencing 
economic development. They construct an instrument by separating out the influences of 
income, population size and land area which they call the constructed openness. This 
variable they claim yields more accurate estimates of the relationship between openness 
and per capita income. They report a strong and positive effect of openness on income per 
capita.  
Even though there has been a fair bit of agreement about trade openness’ 
association with growth for at least the last couple of decades, recently these results have 
come under fire from a series of papers. These papers argue that trade openness loses 
importance once institutional quality is introduced as a control in a regression framework. 
Rodrik et al. (2004) reach a similar conclusion which we have discussed before. One 
possible explanation is openness enhancing institutional development. Therefore, a 
regression model with openness and institutions as controls is not picking up any individual 
effect of openness on income as it is operating through the institution channel. This view is 
supported by Wei (2000) who suggest that more open countries face greater losses from 
corruption than less open ones as the loss from corruption is higher in  case of foreign 
                                                 
11 Wacziarg and Welch (2003) improve the Sachs and Warner (1995a) measure and extend it to the 
1990s. Their measure however is not free from the basic criticisms of Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000).  
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transactions. Therefore, open countries have a higher incentive to develop better 
institutions. Another explanation comes from Dollar and Kraay (2003). They argue that 
cross-country regressions of log-level per capita GDP on instruments of institutions and 
openness do not reflect the relative importance of these variables in the long run. The high 
correlation between institutions and openness does not allow regression models to estimate 
the actual relationship. According to their analysis, regression of changes in decadal growth 
rates on instrumented changes in trade and changes in institutional quality shows a 
significant effect of trade openness on growth. They report that trade openness and 
institutions are important for economic growth in the very long run, but trade has a 
relatively larger role over institutions in the short run. They do not control for geography, 
religion and culture. Also, their study explains changes in growth rates rather than growth 
itself and growth accelerations are hard to observe in the long run (Jones 1995). This also 
brings about the question whether the spurt in growth rate that comes out of changes in 
institutions and openness is a mere impulse which tapers off in the long run or something 
that is sustainable.            
3.5 The Knowledge and Human Capital Theory 
“Technological progress predated capitalism and credit by many centuries, and may well 
outlive capitalism by at least as long.” - Joel Mokyr (1990), The Lever of Riches, p. 6. 
The knowledge and human capital theory of development is due to Joseph A. 
Schumpeter. In his book entitled The Theory of Economic Development he describes the 
notion of ‘creative destruction’ and how it is central to the process of economic 
development. He argues that the entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy are constantly 
looking for new ideas which will render their rivals’ ideas obsolete. A product developed 
from the new idea will be able to capture the entire market and allow the firm to enjoy 
monopoly profit. This continuous process of ‘creative destruction’ raises a firm’s output. 
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The possibility of enjoying monopoly profits creates an incentive for rival firms to invest in 
R&D and innovate and the process continues. The increase in R&D activities in the 
economy creates positive externalities and reduces the cost of R&D for an individual firm. 
The economy grows powered by the increase in knowledge capital and R&D. 
Even though Schumpeter (1934) talks about R&D, he focuses mainly on the role of 
innovation rather than invention. Joel Mokyr (1990) on the other hand argues that 
inventions and innovations are complements and both play an important role in economic 
development. In his book entitled The Lever of Riches he defines invention as, “an 
increment in the set of the total technological knowledge of a given society, which is the 
union of all sets of individual technological knowledge” (Mokyr 1990, p. 10). He argues 
that invention in itself may not be a meaningful concept, but without it, it is impossible to 
develop an application which has immediate commercial usage. On the other extreme, 
without innovation, an inventor will have little economic incentive to pursue new ideas.  
In part III of his book he goes on to argue that the complementarity between 
invention and innovation explains why many societies failed to be technologically creative. 
Invention requires individual brilliance and an inventor expects social recognition of her 
work. Therefore, a society more receptive to new ideas and willing to reward human 
inquiry is more likely to produce more scientists and researchers. Innovation, on the other 
hand, requires interaction with other individuals and an in depth knowledge of the market. 
Hence, it is more of a social and economic nature. Therefore, a society willing to encourage 
business enterprise is more likely to produce more innovations. However, either of them 
cannot survive independently in the long run. A society has to fulfil multiple conditions to 
generate both invention and innovation.  He supports his argument using evidence from the 
Chinese and the European history of technology.  
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Even though China entered the early modern era as a technology leader of the 
world, soon afterwards it lost its advantage to Europe and suffered a technological 
slowdown. Europe, on the other hand, acquired most of the early technologies from China 
and the east through direct and indirect means and went on to develop them further which 
led to the industrial revolution. Mokyr asks the question why does this happen? His 
explanations are as follows. First, social groups trying to sabotage and block new 
technology were far less powerful in Europe than in China. Second, a market for 
technology developed fairly rapidly in early modern Europe which created an economic as 
well as socially rewarding environment for the scientists and innovators. This encouraged 
private initiatives in the development of new technology. Therefore, the change in the 
character of the state did not affect investments in technology by much. Even if it did, it led 
to a decline of that state in the European economic hierarchy. This made every state or 
monarch in early modern Europe conscious of the costs of conformism. In contrast, 
Chinese scientific activities and technology development were largely state sponsored. This 
prevented the development of private initiatives and hence a technology market. A change 
in the character of the state often led to hostile behaviour towards innovation and 
nonconformism. The abrupt ending of the famous Cheng Ho voyages in 1433 is a classic 
illustration. A change in the ruler and internal power structure in the Ming Dynasty in 1433 
led to the closing down of shipyards and production of ocean-going junks. The continuous 
threat to potential innovators from rival power groups had perhaps forced them to shy away 
from novel ideas.  
Even though Mokyr identifies technology and knowledge as the central factor, he 
does not rule out the role of culture and institutions in shaping technology. I will discuss 
this further in chapter 4. 
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Glaeser et al. (2004) goes even further to claim that human capital is more 
fundamental than institutions. They challenge the Acemoglu et al. (2001) institutions theory 
which says that in temperate conditions European settlers felt more at home and decided to 
settle. In these colonies they brought Western values and institutions along with them when 
they migrated which are favourable to capitalism. In contrast, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue 
that the decision to settle in temperate conditions does not tell us anything definitive about 
what the Europeans brought with them when they migrated. It can well be human capital 
and ideas and not institutions. In other words, they argue that institutions have only a 
second order effect on economic performance and the first order effect comes from human 
and social capital which shape both institutional and productive capacities of a society. 
They call this the ‘Lipset-Przeworski-Barro’ view of the world. 
Another strong supporter of the human capital view is Galor and Moav (2006). 
They provide a counterargument to the political power and institutions theory of Acemoglu 
et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).12 Galor and Moav (2006) argue that it 
wasn’t concessions by the elite that lead to the demise of the class society. It was the 
investments in human capital by the capitalists to sustain their profit rates that caused the 
gradual dismantling of the class society.  
Their version of the story goes as follows. After the industrial revolution in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe, production was heavily dependent on 
capital and labour. The ownership of capital was with the capitalists whereas the ownership 
of labour was with the workers. This created the class society characterised by a social 
division in line with the ownership of the factors of production. However in the later half of 
the nineteenth century the character of capitalist production experienced a change. 
                                                 
12 I have discussed the political power and institutions theory of Acemoglu et al. (2004) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) in section 3.1. 
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Capitalists started realising the increasing importance of technology and human capital in 
production. They noticed that the productivity of a skilled worker is three or four times 
more than an average unskilled worker. Therefore investments in human capital and 
technology became crucial for the sustenance of profit rates of the capitalists. These 
investments in mass schooling by the Capitalists paid dividends in the long-run by 
generating positive externalities for R&D and faster economic growth.  
Galor and Moav (2006) also provide empirical evidence in favour of their theory 
using the voting patterns of the legislators on England’s education reform, the Balfour Act 
of 1902. This bill was meant to create a publicly supported secondary school system. They 
show that legislators’ support for this bill is positively correlated with the industrial skill-
intensity level of the counties. Legislators representing counties with high industrial skill-
intensity level overwhelmingly supported this bill whereas the others didn’t. By assuming 
that the legislators received financial backing from the industrialists of their respective 
counties, they argue that this result reflects the eagerness of the capitalists owning skill 
intensive industries to invest in human capital.              
Many others debate this view. Both Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) 
put human capital in their list of proximate determinants rather than a fundamental 
determinant of economic progress. The literature however is yet to arrive at a consensus. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICS OF DEEP STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS 
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In this chapter I start off in section 1 by introducing the standard levels model that 
has been used in the empirical literature lately. I point out that this model suffers from an 
identification problem and omitted variable bias. The way I define the identification 
problem here is quite different from the generic definition of the same in econometrics. The 
instrumental variable estimation in Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) makes 
use of more exogenous instruments and exogenous variables than suspected endogenous 
variables making it an overidentified system. However their claim that the correlation 
between current institutions and log setter mortality instrument can be described by a 
unique story lacks support. Log setter mortality turns out to be correlated with current 
schooling and the relationship is independent of the correlation between log setter mortality 
and institutions. This is what I refer to as the identification problem. In section 2, I propose 
an alternative empirical model to tackle the omitted variable bias and identification 
problem. I call this the ‘modified level regression model.’ I estimate this model using the 
standard instrumental variable method. The major findings are; 1) Malaria explains a 
significant proportion of the variation in the steady state level of income across countries; 
2) Malaria dominates over institutions in a sample of low income economies (LIEs). In 
section 3, I show that the LIE result is driven by the African economies.  Section 4 
concludes. 
4.1 Limitations of the Existing Empirical Literature 
The levels framework adopted by Rodrik et al. (2004) and other recent papers13 
centers on a cross-country regression where the dependent variable is the current level of 
economic development, typically measured by the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita, lnyiT, where i indexes countries and T indicates the year.  The explanatory variables 
                                                 
13 Examples of papers using the levels approach are Acemoglu et al. (2001),  Glaeser et al. (2004) and 
Sachs (2003a). 
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consist of a measure of the ‘quality’ of contemporary institutions, IiT, and a vector of other 
explanatory variables, WiT. The other explanatory variables include log trade share in the 
current period and latitude:  
 ln iT iT iT iy Iη ε= + +ΦW  (4.1) 
It is apparent that this model which is known as the levels regression model is nested 
within the growth specification reported in (2.7)14, since it can be rewritten as: 
 ln (1 ) lniT it iT i iy T y I τα η εΦ= + + + W +  (4.2) 
Where  , [ ]γ η= Φ iTI⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦iTiT WZ , and 1 0Tα+ = . The null hypothesis, H0: (1+αT) = 0, 
reduces (4.2) to the levels regression, whilst rejection of the null favours the growth 
specification. 
The economic intuition behind this test is that the levels regression is implicitly 
explaining the steady state distribution of income levels.  This assumption is explicit in the 
augmented Solow-Swan model derived by Mankiw et al. (1992) who use investment rates 
as the proximate determinants of the neo-classical steady state.  Mankiw et al. (1992) go on 
to show that if economies are not in their steady states, the transitional dynamics of the neo-
classical model are captured by the addition of the ‘initial’ income level in a growth 
regression.15 If economies actually are in steady-state, as explained by the right-hand-side 
variables in equation (4.1), then the addition of the lagged dependent variable, as in 
equation (4.2), should add no explanatory power. 
I test the null hypothesis by adding an initial income term into Rodrik et al.’s (2001) 
levels specification. The results are reported in Table 4.1. In all the four regressions using 
                                                 
14 The growth specification is ˆ lniT it iT iTy yα γ ε= + +Z  where 1ˆ [ln ln ]iT iT ity yT≡ − y .      
15 A similar point has been made by Caselli et al. (1996) and by Sachs (2003). 
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1820, 1870, 1900, and 1950 level of log per capita GDP as initial income16 I observe that 
the initial income term is statistically significant. This indicates that the standard levels 
framework neglects the role of transitional dynamics and the coefficient estimates suffer 
from omitted variable bias.  
Table 4.1. Omitted Variable Test: OLS Regressions 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000 Dependent Variable 
OLS 
obs=44 
OLS 
 obs=52 
OLS 
obs=35 
OLS 
obs= 108 
Log Initial Income 
(1820) 
Log Initial Income 
(1870) 
Log Initial Income 
(1900) 
Log Initial Income 
(1950) 
Rule of Law (2001) 
 
Average Log Trade 
Share 
 
Latitude 
 
 
R2
0.35** 
(0.1599) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.78*** 
(0.0780) 
-0.043 
(0.1150) 
 
-0.003 
(0.0046) 
 
0.8303 
 
 
0.36** 
(0.1949) 
 
 
 
 
0.60*** 
(0.1345) 
0.043 
(0.1376) 
 
0.001 
(0.0053) 
 
0.7522 
 
 
 
 
0.46** 
(0.1705) 
 
 
0.399*** 
(0.1325) 
-0.133 
(0.1526) 
 
0.006 
(0.0070) 
 
0.7992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.598*** 
(0.0858) 
0.49*** 
(0.0936) 
0.15* 
(0.1013) 
 
0.01** 
(0.0040) 
 
0.8181 
Notes: ***,  ** and * indicates significance level of 1%,  5% and 10% level respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The standard errors reported in the 
regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. 
 
The levels framework also suffers from more fundamental problems. It ignores the 
process of development.  This failing is obscured by the fact that Rodrik et al. (2004) 
follow Acemoglu et al. (2001) in using a plausible historical story to motivate the use of an 
historical variable – the mortality rate amongst European colonial clergy and military in the 
18th and 19th centuries – to act as an instrumental variable in estimating the impact of 
current institutions on the current level of development. A short version of the story is as 
follows.    
                                                 
16 The data on GDP per capita in 1820, 1870, 1900, and 1950 are from Maddison (2004). For more 
details see Data Appendix.  
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Europeans chose to settle in colonies where the climate was relatively hospitable, 
bringing with them traditions and expectations of European institutions, particularly in 
relation to property rights (at least the property rights of the settlers).  These expectations 
were conducive to ‘good’ institutions being established and continued throughout the 
colonial and post-colonial periods. On the other hand, where mortality was high, Europeans 
would not settle, and the colonial authorities would impose authoritarian rule and set up 
extractive institutions which continued to have an influence through the institutions of post-
colonial society. A more detailed version of the story is presented in section 3.1.  
This is a plausible story.  It provides an explanation why settler mortality might be 
correlated with current institutional quality in countries which were subjected to European 
colonisation.  But it may not be a historical explanation for the huge differences that we 
observe in current levels of development. In order to establish a causal relationship between 
settler mortality and current institutions, one has to show at the least that the settler 
mortality variable is not correlated with any of the other probable deep factors. If this is not 
the case, then one can put forward another story to justify the correlation which leads to a 
problem of identification. This is what I observe when I put Rodrik et al.’s (2004) model 
(equation 4.1) to test. 
 I start off by re-estimating the levels model and I observe that Rodrik et al.’s (2004) 
claim of ‘institutions rule’ is supported by the regression results. This is reported as Model 
(1) in Table 4.2A. Then I replace one of the explanatory variables Rule of Law in 2000 by 
Total Years of Schooling in 2000 and re-estimate the model using the instrumental variable 
method with the same set of instruments as Rodrik et al. (2004). This yields a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate for Total Years of Schooling in 2000. The 
results are reported in Panel A, Table 4.2A. 
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Table 4.2A:  Identification Problems in Levels Specification of Rodrik et al. (2004) 
Dependent Variable Log per Capita GDP in 2000 
Model (1) Model (2) Estimation Method 
and Sample Size OLS 
obs=111  
2SLS 
obs=65 
OLS 
obs=89 
2SLS 
obs=53 
 
Panel A: OLS and Second Stage 2SLS Results 
Rule of Law (2001) 
 
Total Years of 
Schooling (2000) 
 
Average Log Trade 
Share 
 
Latitude 
 
 
R2 
 
Hausman test  
(p-value) 
0.802*** 
(0.092) 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.119) 
 
0.013** 
(0.0055) 
 
0.7313 
 
0.000 
1.45*** 
(0.238) 
 
 
 
-0.487 
(0.276) 
 
-0.01 
(0.0132) 
 
 
0.271*** 
(0.0923) 
 
0.067 
(0.093) 
 
0.017*** 
(0.0037) 
 
0.8261 
 
0.019 
 
 
0.329*** 
(0.0257) 
 
0.078 
(0.156) 
 
0.012** 
(0.0058) 
Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
Total Years of Schooling (2000) 
 
Dependent Variables Rule of Law (2001) 
obs=76 
Average Log Trade Share 
obs=76 
obs=56 obs=56 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
  
ENGFRAC 
 
 EURFRAC 
 
CONST 
 
Latitude 
 
Rule of Law (2001) 
 
R2
-0.25*** 
(0.1039) 
 
0.95*** 
(0.3311) 
0.18 
(0.2197) 
0.008 
(0.0057) 
0.02** 
(0.0088) 
 
 
0.5472 
-0.072 
(0.0727) 
 
0.41** 
(0.2299) 
-0.22 
(0.1540) 
0.024*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.005 
(0.0056) 
 
 
0.4488     
-1.32*** 
(0.2243) 
 
2.05** 
(0.8444) 
1.44** 
(0.5645) 
0.002 
(0.0164) 
0.014 
(0.0199) 
 
 
0.7311 
-0.83*** 
(0.1923) 
 
1.1* 
(0.6263) 
1.33*** 
(0.4949) 
-0.026* 
(0.0141) 
-0.01 
(0.0200) 
1.29*** 
(0.2949) 
0.8061 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. The instruments 
used for the Hausman test17 are Log Settler Mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC and CONST.   
 
                                                 
17 For a detailed discussion of Hausman test, see Technical Appendix TA3, p. 174. 
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This implies that the instrumental variables used in Rodrik et al. (2004) do not 
uniquely identify Rule of Law. The first stage regression results provide further evidence 
which is reported in Panel B of the table. The instrumental variables (log settler mortality, 
ENGFRAC, and EURFRAC) which are meant to serve as instruments for Rule of Law are 
also correlated with Total Years of Schooling in 2000. The regression estimates reported in 
Column 4 of Panel B shows that log settler mortality is negatively associated and 
ENGFRAC & EURFRAC are positively associated with the dependent variable Total 
Years of Schooling in 2000. One may argue that this association is due to the positive 
correlation between Rule of Law and Total Years of Schooling. In other words, countries 
with strong rule of law are expected to have a better educated population and hence high 
level of schooling. This claim is not supported by the regression reported in column 4 of 
Panel B. The negative relationship between log settler mortality and total years of schooling 
remains unaffected when we add rule of law as an additional control into the model in 
column 3. The partial R2 calculations reveal that 36% of the variation in total years of 
schooling is explained by log settler mortality whereas 27% is explained by rule of law. 
This implies that the relationship between log settler mortality and Total Years of 
Schooling is independent and even stronger than the correlation between Total Years of 
Schooling and Rule of Law. One can very well argue in favour of the Glaeser et al. (2004) 
story based on this result which says that the important factor that European settlers took 
with them was human capital when they migrated and not institutions.  
A similar problem is observed in another influential work, Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
Table 4.2B provides an illustration of the problem. 
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Table 4.2B:  Identification Problems in Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Log per Capita GDP in 1995 Dependent Variable 
Original Model 
obs = 65 
Model with Schooling 
obs = 57 
Panel A: 2SLS Results  
Average Protection 
against 
Expropriation  
 
Total Years of 
Schooling (1995) 
 
Latitude 
 
0.96*** 
(0.2227) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.0128) 
 
 
 
 
0.341*** 
(0.0326) 
 
0.009 
(0.0068) 
Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
Total Years of Schooling (1995) Dependent Variables Average Protection against Expropriation  
obs=67 
 obs=57 obs=51 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
 
Latitude 
 
Average Protection 
against 
Expropriation  
 
R2
-0.47*** 
(0.1448) 
 
0.02 
(0.0155) 
 
 
 
 
0.2553 
-1.69*** 
(0.2229) 
 
0.02 
(0.0231) 
 
 
 
 
0.6129 
-1.29*** 
(0.2379) 
 
0.005 
(0.0214) 
0.658*** 
(0.1831) 
 
 
0.6970 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. All the regressions reported above 
are carried out with an intercept. Log Settler Mortality is used as an instrument for Average Protection against 
Expropriation. 
  
When I replace the Average Protection against Expropriation measure in the 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) specification by Total Years of Schooling in 1995 and re-estimate 
the model using an instrumental variable method18 , I observe that the coefficient on Total 
Years of Schooling in 1995 is positive and statistically significant. The results are reported 
in Panel A of Table 4.2B. This implies that like Rodrik et al. (2004) the instrumental 
variables used in Acemoglu et al. (2001) do not uniquely identify the measure of Average 
Protection against Expropriation. The first stage regression results provide further evidence 
which is reported in Panel B of the table. The log settler mortality variable, which is meant 
to serve as an instrument for the Average Protection against Expropriation measure, is also 
                                                 
18 The set of instruments used are the same as the original paper. 
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correlated with Total Years of Schooling in 1995. The regression estimates reported in 
Panel B shows that log settler mortality is negatively associated with Total Years of 
Schooling in 1995. One may argue that this association is due to the positive correlation 
between Average Protection against Expropriation measure and Total Years of Schooling. 
However, this claim is not supported by the regression reported in column 3 of Panel B. 
The negative relationship between log settler mortality and Total Years of Schooling 
remains unaffected when I add Average Protection against Expropriation measure as an 
additional control into the first stage regression. This implies that the relationship between 
log settler mortality and Total Years of Schooling is independent of the correlation between 
Total Years of Schooling and Average Protection against Expropriation measure. 
Therefore, it is apparent that the levels regression suffers from an identification 
problem. This is partly due to its neglect of the dynamics. The ‘modified level regression’ 
model which I introduce in the following section can serve as an alternative. This model 
recognises the role of the initial condition in explaining the dynamics. I also control for 
human capital to tackle the identification problem of the levels framework. However, it 
does not answer all the questions about dynamics. More detailed empirics using time series 
data is perhaps the way to go in the future.       
4.2 Modified Level Regression Model and the Empirics 
This section deals with the model and the empirics. I introduce the model first and 
then follow it up with a discussion on the data, the estimation strategy, and the results. 
4.2.1 The Model 
I estimate the growth specification outlined in equation (4.2) by using the following 
regression model.  
    LOGGDPPCi= α1+α2 Y0i + α3 INSi+ α4 INTi+ α5GEOi + α6 RELi + α6 ERi + εi        (4.3)  
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Where LOGGDPPC, Y0, INS, INT, GEO, REL, and ER are log per capita GDP in 
2000, log initial income (1960), institutions, openness, geography, religion, and human 
capital variables respectively. I call this a ‘modified level regression’ model.19
The ‘modified level regression’ takes into account the role of ‘transitional 
dynamics’ by controlling for initial income (1960). This reduces the degree of omitted 
variable bias on the coefficients of deep factors. The model also tackles the identification 
problem of the levels framework by taking into account the independent role of past levels 
of human capital in explaining the differences in current pre capita GDP.    
4.2.2 The Dataset 
The analysis is based on a dataset which consists of per capita GDP levels, measure 
of institutions, measures of geography, a measure of openness, measures of religion, and a 
measure of human capital in (up to) 180 countries. Since I am combining data from 
different sources, I have to deal with different numbers of observations for different 
variables. In some cases, the regressions cover as few as 10 observations. The data typically 
also come from different years. In case of institutional measures I use averages in order to 
capture the long run effect. The definitions and sources of all the variables are summarised 
in the Data Appendix. Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics of these measures. 
I divide the dataset into seven major parts depending upon the variable that they are 
measuring. They are as follows: measures of economic development, measure of 
institutions, measures of geography, measures of religion, measures of openness and trade, 
measure of human capital, and the instruments. Following is a brief outline of each of them. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19It is also a growth model.  
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Table 4.3. Summary Statistics 
Variables Number of 
obs. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Measure of Institutions 
Rule of Law Index 171 0.0015 0.9441 -2.19 2.37 
Measures of Geography 
Distance 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Yellow Fever Risk 
 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
Soil Suitability 
 
Land Area within 100km 
of Ocean or Ocean-
Navigable River 
178 
 
160 
 
154           
 
146 
 
154        
 
 
146     
19.6293 
 
0.3678 
 
0.1262     
 
0.4991 
 
13.3965     
 
 
46.0343      
17.0873 
 
0.4390 
 
0.2271        
 
0.4779 
 
9.8512        
 
 
37.604        
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0         
63.89 
 
1 
 
0.65 
 
1 
 
55.07 
 
 
100 
Measures of Religion 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
174  
 
174     
31.3805  
 
22.0817       
36.1243 
 
34.749        
0 
 
0        
97.3 
 
99.8          
Measure of Openness and Trade 
Log of Trade Share 146 4.0914 0.6384 2.58 5.76 
Measure of Human Capital 
Enrolment Ratio in 1900  88 32.34 26.37 0.1 95 
Measures of Economic Development 
Log Initial Income 
(1820) 
Log Initial Income 
(1870) 
Log Initial Income 
(1900) 
Log Initial Income 
(1950) 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Log per Capita GDP in 
2000   
50 
 
60 
 
39 
 
136 
 
115  
 
147         
6.58 
 
6.88 
 
7.46 
 
7.29 
 
6.3153 
 
8.588     
0.3893 
 
0.5668 
 
0.6096 
 
0.9446 
 
0.8647 
 
1.1177    
5.98 
 
5.98 
 
6.30 
 
5.67 
 
4.72 
 
6.19    
7.52 
 
8.09 
 
8.41 
 
10.32 
 
8.23   
 
10.799        
Instruments for Institutions 
Log Settler Mortality 
 
ENGFRAC 
 
EURFRAC 
 
Log Population Density 
in 1500 
79 
 
148 
 
148 
 
96 
 
4.6818 
 
0.0967 
 
0.2726 
 
0.4639 
 
1.2070 
 
0.2697 
 
0.4064 
 
1.5163 
 
2.15 
 
0 
 
0 
 
-3.83 
 
7.99 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4.61 
Instrument for Geography 
Malaria Ecology 160     3.8682     6.6141        0     31.55 
Instrument for Openness 
Constructed Openness 146     27.0440     28.9076       2.3      281.29 
Notes: For a detailed discussion of the definition and source of these variables, see Data Appendix. 
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Economic development is measured by the level of per capita GDP in 2000. I also 
use the level of GDP per capita in 1960 as the initial level of development.   
The average rule of law index is a measure of institutional quality. In particular, it 
measures the overall institutional quality and the quality of governance in a particular 
country. The range of this index varies from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values implying better 
institutional quality. I use average value of this index from 1998 through to 2000 for each 
of the 171 countries as the measure. The data show that Somalia has the weakest 
institutions in the world and Singapore has the strongest institutions.  
In case of geography, I use five different measures: distance, malaria risk, land area 
within tropics, soil suitability and land area within 100km of ocean or ocean-navigable 
river. 
Distance is a measure of the distance from the equator. Following the argument of 
Sachs (2003a) I use this as a measure of climate. The greater the distance from the equator, 
the further the country is from the tropics and more temperate or cold it is. I exploit data 
from 178 countries. 
Malaria risk measures the share of population at risk from malaria in 160 countries 
in the year 1997. I use this as a measure of disease burden. A higher value indicates greater 
risk for the population. Typically, tropical and sub-tropical countries register higher risk of 
malaria and the risk of malaria declines in the temperate climates. 
Land area within the geographical tropics is used as a measure of the effects of 
geography on agricultural productivity. This is calculated as a proportion. A higher value 
implying that a higher proportion of the countries land is tropical in nature and therefore, 
the country’s agriculture is expected to have tropical characteristics marked by slow and 
low plant growth. I use soil suitability as an additional measure of agriculture. Ukraine 
registers as the country with highest proportion of suitable soil.    
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Finally, I use land area within 100km of ocean or ocean-navigable river as a 
measure of market proximity. The higher the proportion of land within 100km of ocean or 
ocean-navigable river, the greater is the chance of an economy to participate in maritime 
trade and have more access to larger markets. A bulk of the sub-Saharan economies is 
observed to be landlocked.  
In measuring religion I use the proportion of population following Catholicism and 
Islam in the year 1980 as a measure of the same respectively. The data shows Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and the most of Latin America to be predominantly Catholic and the 
Middle East, Indonesia, Pakistan and some of the ex-Soviet republics to be predominantly 
Islamic.  
I measure openness to trade by using the log value of the actual trade share from 
Frankel and Romer (1999). They calculate the actual trade share by taking the percentage 
of imports plus exports to GDP in 1985 from 146 countries. The higher the trade share, the 
more open is the economy. Singapore is observed to be the most open economy in the 
world and Myanmar is the most closed. 
The human capital measure is from Benavot and Riddle (1988). They record data on 
the primary school enrolment ratio in 1900. I use this as proxy measure of historical human 
capital attainment. The data shows that in the United States 95% of the relevant school 
going population were enrolled in primary school in 1900 whereas in Equatorial Guinea the 
same number was as low as 0.1%.  
I also use four instruments for institutions and one each for openness and the 
disease measure of geography.20 Log settler mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, and log 
population density in 1500 are used as instruments for average rule of law index. Malaria 
ecology is used as an instrument for malaria risk and constructed openness is used as an 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed discussion of the instruments, see section 4.2.4.  
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instrument for the openness measure. Data on settler mortality is restricted to 79 countries; 
all of them are former European colonies. Mali, Gambia and Nigeria were among the 
countries with very high European settler mortality whereas Canada, Australia and the 
United States were among the countries with low settler mortality. This is an extended 
version of the original Acemoglu et al. (2001) sample which has 64 observations. The 
extended version is also compiled by Acemoglu et al. (2001).   
The pairwise correlations are reported in Table 4.4. It shows that better institutions, 
less disease, better agriculture and soil conditions, more trade and higher initial income are 
all positively associated with development. This is also revealed in the scatter plots (Figure 
1A-I). 
Figure 1A. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Log Initial Income 
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Figure 1B. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Rule of Law 
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Figure 1C. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Malaria Risk 
ALB
DZA
ARG
ARM
AUSAUT
ZE
BGD
BLR
BEL
BLZ
BEN
BOL
BWABRABGR
BFA
BDI
KHM
CMR
CAN
CAFT D
CHL
CHN
COL
COG
CRI
CIV
HRV
CZE
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGYSLV
GNQEST
ETH
FINFRA
GAB
GMB
GEO
GER
HA
GRC
GTM
GIN
GNB
GUY
HTIHND
HKG
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRN
R
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KOR
KGZ
LVA
LBN
LSO
TU
LUX
MKD
MDGMWI
MYS
MLI
MRT
MUS
MEX
MDA
MA
MOZ
NAM
NPL
NLD
NZL
NIC
NERNGA
NOR
PAK
PAN
PNG
PRY PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRI
ROM
RUS
RWA
SEN
SLE
SGP
SVK
SVN
ZAF
ESP
LKA
SWZ
SWE
HE
SY R
TWN
TJK
TZA
THA
TGO
TTO
TUN TUR
UGA
UKR
B
U Y
USA
VE
Y EM
ZMB
ZWE
6
7
8
9
10
11
Fi
tte
d 
va
lu
es
/P
er
 C
ap
ita
 G
D
P
 in
 2
00
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Malaria Risk
    
 
 
 
 52 
 
Figure 1D. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Distance 
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Figure 1E. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Land Area within 100km of Ocean 
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Figure 1F. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Land Area within Tropics 
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Figure 1G. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Log Trade Share 
 
DZA
ARG
AUS AUT
BGD
BRB
BEL
BLZ
BEN
BOL
BWABRA BGR
BFA
BDI
CMR
CAN
CPV
CAFT D
CHL
CHN
COL
COM
COG
CRI
CIV
DNK
DMA
DOM
ECU
EGYSLV
EST
FINFRA
GAB
GMBGHA
GRC
GRD
GTM
GIN
GNB
GUY
HTI HND
HKG
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KEN
KOR
LSO
LUX
MDG MWI
MYS
MLI
MRT
MUS
MEX
MAR
MOZ
NAM
NPL
NLD
NZL
NIC
NERNGA
NOR
PAK
PAN
PNG
PRYPER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRI
ROM
RUS
RWA
SEN
SY C
SLE
SGP
ZAF
ESP
LKA
LCA
VCT
SWZ
SWE
CHE
SY R
TWN
TZA
THA
TGO
TTO
TUNTUR
UGA
GBR
URY
USA
VEN
Y EM
ZMB
ZWE
6
7
8
9
10
11
Fi
tte
d 
va
lu
es
/P
er
 C
ap
ita
 G
D
P
 in
 2
00
0
2 3 4 5 6
Natural log of trade share
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 
 
55 
Figure 1H. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Catholicism 
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Figure 1I. Log per Capita GDP in 2000 and Enrolment Ratio in 1900 
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Table 4.4. Pairwise Correlation of the Major Variables (obs=99) 
 
 Log per 
Capita 
GDP in 
2000   
Log Initial 
Income 
(1960) 
 
Average 
Rule of 
Law 
Index 
 
Distance 
 
Malaria 
Risk 
 
Land Area 
within 
Tropics 
 
Land Area 
within 
100km of 
Ocean or 
Ocean-
Navigable 
River 
Log of 
Trade Share 
 
Primary 
Enrolment 
Ratio in 
1900 
Catholicism Islam 
Log per Capita 
GDP in 2000   
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
 
Average Rule of 
Law Index 
 
Distance 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
 
Land Area within 
100km of Ocean 
or Ocean-
Navigable River 
 
Log of Trade 
Share 
 
Enrolment Ratio 
in 1900 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
 1.0000 
 
 0.8182             1.0000 
 
 
 0.8439             0.7387             1.0000 
 
 
 0.6931             0.6298             0.6837         1.0000 
 
-0.8299           -0.6265            -0.6551        -0.6647     1.0000 
 
-0.6210           -0.4975            -0.5993        -0.8956     0.6493      1.0000 
 
 
 
 0.4758            0.3431              0.3896         0.2096    -0.3874     -0.0854              1.0000 
 
 
 
 0.2573            0.1629              0.3310          0.0907   -0.1831       0.0101              0.3128             1.0000 
 
 
0.7073            0.7783              0.7613          0.6522    -0.4504       -0.5681              0.2025             0.1415                1.0000 
 
 0.1331           0.2374             -0.0160         -0.0857    -0.1445       0.1473             0.1417             -0.1382                0.0208            1.0000 
 
-0.3178         -0.3310              -0.2768        -0.0500      0.2190      -0.0458            -0.2145            -0.0062                -0.3452          -0.5104     1.0000 
 
 
4.2.3 The Problem of Endogeneity in Estimating the Model   
One of the most important issues in a regression model is the issue of endogeneity 
or two way causality. Coefficient estimates of a regression model with an endogeneity 
problem are biased. The ‘modified level regression’ model (equation 4.3) is not free from 
this problem. One cannot rule out the possibility of two way causality between the 
dependent variable and institutions, openness, and geography if malaria is used as a 
measure of geography in the model. In addition, there is also the issue of two way causality 
between institutions and integration, and institutions and malaria. It is also possible that a 
third factor is driving the changes in both the dependent as well as the explanatory variable. 
This section discusses more about these problems. 
As I have mentioned in the previous section, the average rule of law index is used as 
a measure of institutions. This measure is expected to be endogenous. The overall rule of 
law situation in an economy may be better due to higher per capita income rather than the 
other way round (Rodrik et al. 2004). Higher income may allow this economy to spend 
more on policing and law and order enforcement. Hence, economic development becomes a 
cause of institutional development rather than an effect. Better institutions also allow the 
economy to be open and effectively participate in international trade (Rodrik et al. 2004).      
Religion, on the other hand, can be considered as exogenous even though North 
(1994) talks about economic progress influencing informal rules and culture of a society in 
the future. The religion variable is measured in 1980 and the per capita GDP is measured in 
2000. Therefore, following North’s argument we can suggest that it is less likely that the 
per capita GDP in 2000 will affect religious memberships of 1980. But religion does have 
direct effects on institutions and openness. Religion influences institutional quality through 
its effect on social capital (Grief 1994). Influence of a religion on trade works through the 
attitude of that particular religion towards trade and commerce. Certain religious cultures 
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may breed xenophobia and are hostile to market and trade in general as opposed to the 
more sympathetic position taken by the others. According to this theory, a country 
dominated by a more open religious belief is expected to trade more compared to a country 
which is dominated by a religion which preaches isolation from the rest of the world 
(Landes 1998). Religious intolerance can also strangulate research in science and 
technology which has a direct and negative impact on economic progress (Landes 1998).   
Almost all the measures of geography that I use can be considered as exogenous 
except malaria risk (Rodrik et al. 2004). Distance, which affects climate, may have a direct 
effect on development through its impact on morbidity and the ability to work 
(Montesquieu 1748). On the other hand, land area within the geographical tropics and soil 
suitability, which are measures of agriculture, may affect economic progress through their 
direct impact on agricultural productivity. The market proximity measure can impact 
economic performance directly by reducing the cost of transport. It can also positively 
influence growth performance by increasing the opportunity to trade which translates into 
productivity gains through the process of the division of labour. In addition to the direct 
effects of geography on growth and openness, the economic history literature emphasizes 
that geography also influences institutional quality. Geographical endowment of natural 
resources may create a situation of extreme inequality within the society which stalls the 
development of institutions which promote investments and growth (Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1994; Easterly and Levine 1997). The only possible candidate for endogeneity is 
malaria risk. One of the arguments that favour reverse causality is as follows. The rich 
economies can afford to invest in the research and development of drugs that cures or 
minimises the effect of diseases. They can also afford to invest in preventive measures such 
as drainage, mosquito nets etc. This holds independent of the debilitating effect of malaria 
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on human productivity. Therefore, one cannot consider disease as an exogenous factor 
affecting development, but in fact it can be the effect of lack of development. 
The measure of openness is also a suspect of two way causality. It is not only the 
case that the open economies are more prosperous than the closed ones; prosperous 
economies are observed to be more open (Frankel and Romer 1999). A commonly used 
argument for reverse causality in this case is the following. In poor countries, tax on trade is 
perhaps the easiest and the fastest source of revenue for the government. Therefore, they 
tend to be closed. Whereas, in rich countries there are alternative sources of revenue for the 
government and therefore the government tend to impose less tax on trade.  
Trade openness also affects institutional quality. Krueger (1974) shows how trade 
openness affects institutional quality by reducing rent seeking and corruption. 
Finally, the school enrolment ratio in 1900, the proxy measure of human capital as a 
deep determinant can be treated as exogenous since one would expect the reverse causality 
problem between current per capita GDP and the enrolment ratio in 1900 to be 
insignificant.    
I use formal statistical tests following Hausman (1978) to check for the endogeneity 
of these variables. This test compares OLS and 2SLS estimates of a model. In the presence 
of endogeneity the difference between the 2SLS estimates and the OLS estimates are 
significantly different in statistical terms and the test concludes that the OLS specification 
is biased and 2SLS is the way to go. If the difference is not statistically significant then the 
test fails to reject the null of exogeneity and concludes that given the model specification 
OLS is not biased.21 Even though it appears to be an ideal statistical method to determine 
whether a specification suffers from endogeneity or not, the test actually has several 
shortcomings. The small sample properties of this test are poor as this is a large sample test 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed description of the test consult Technical Appendix TA3, p. 174. 
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which relies on asymptotic properties and in a small sample the test outcome is often 
biased. The test also depends on the quality of instruments. In the presence of weak 
instruments, the test is biased and is likely to fail to reject the null. The reason is quite 
intuitive. With weak instruments, the 2SLS estimates are not likely to be significantly 
different from their OLS counterparts and the test always fails to reject the null. This may 
lead to the erroneous conclusion that the explanatory variables of the model are not 
endogenous. Therefore the test results should be treated with caution.  
4.2.4 Tackling the Endogeneity Problem by using Instruments 
The endogeneity issues discussed in the previous section can be tackled empirically 
by using the instrumental variable technique. In an instrumental variable estimation, 
endogenous explanatory variables are replaced by their predicted values using suitable 
instruments. These instruments have to be correlated with the endogenous variables but 
uncorrelated with the error term of the primary regression. This technique of using 
instruments in a regression model yields consistent estimates. The first stage equations, 
when malaria risk is used as the geography variable are as follows. 
             INSi=β1+β2 INIi +β3 CONSTi + β4 MEi + β5 RELi + β6 ERi + β7 Y0i + ε1       (4.4)      
 INTi=θ1+θ2 CONSTi +θ3 INIi + θ4 MEi + θ5 RELi + θ6 ERi + θ7 Y0i + ε2        (4.5) 
 GEOi= λ1+λ2 MEi + λ3 INIi + λ4 CONSTi + λ5 RELi + λ6ERi + λ7Y0i + ε3      (4.6) 
Where INIi refers to the instruments of institutions, CONSTi refers to constructed 
openness and MEi refers to the malaria ecology for country i. They are used as instruments 
for institution, openness and malaria risk respectively. In the above case the GEO variable 
is in fact malaria. 
As I have stated earlier in section 4.2.2, I use four instruments for institutions. They 
are as follows: log settler mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, and log population density in 
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1500. I have already outlined the rationale for using these variables as instruments for 
institutional quality in section 3.1 of chapter 3. 
Following Sachs (2003a) I use malaria ecology as the instrument for malaria risk. 
Rodrik et al. (2004) expresses serious concerns about the endogeneity of this instrument. 
They argue that the original source of the index (Kiszewski et al. 2004) is written for a 
public health audience and has no discussion of exogeneity. However, according to Sachs 
(2003a), malaria ecology is ecologically based and built upon climatology and vector 
conditions on a country by country basis, and is therefore exogenous to public health 
interventions and economic conditions. Hence, it can serve as a valid instrument for malaria 
risk. 
I use constructed openness as an instrument for openness to trade. Constructed 
openness is the natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed by Frankel and Romer 
(1999) from a bilateral trade equation involving pure geography variables. According to 
their study, a country’s geographic characteristics are a powerful determinant of its ability 
to trade which are also independent of its wealth. Therefore, it is free from influences of 
government policies and income. 
Finally, I perform formal tests to check the strengths of these instruments following 
Hausman (1978) and Stock and Yogo (2002). Hausman (1978) uses the ‘overidentification 
test’ and Stock and Yogo (2002) uses an F test. The F test statistic is described in Technical 
Appendix. I also report the partial R2 of the instruments and other explanatory variables in 
the first stage regressions. This tells us how much of the variation in the suspected 
endogenous variable is explained by the instruments and other exogenous variables. 
4.2.5 Regression Results 
I estimate equation 4.3 using OLS and instrumental variable methods. The results 
are as follows. 
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The OLS estimates reported in Table 4.5 indicate that institutions have positive and 
statistically significant impact on per capita GDP in 2000. This is reflected in all the model 
specifications that I report in Table 4.5. Among the geography variables distance (which is 
a measure of climate) and land area within tropics (which is a measure of agriculture) 
register positive effects on current per capita GDP but are only weakly significant at the 
10% level. Land area within 100km of ocean and ocean navigable waterways (which is a 
market proximity measure) is also positively related to current per capita GDP and the 
relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level. Malaria (which is a measure of 
diseases) on the other hand has a statistically significant (at the 1% level) negative 
relationship with the current per capita GDP. Trade openness, primary school enrolment in 
1900, and religion appear to have effects which are insignificantly different from zero. The 
regressions also yield statistically significant coefficient estimates for the initial income 
variable which are positive and less than 1 in magnitude. This shows that there is evidence 
of ‘transitional dynamics’ in the data. However, there is a caveat to all this. The OLS 
estimates may not reveal the true picture due to obvious problems of endogeneity. But one 
can comment depending on these numbers that the results are far from Rodrik et al.’s 
(2004) claim, “The Institutions Rule.” It is not only institutions but market proximity, land 
area within tropics, and malaria; all can explain the differences in current level of 
development. However, this may not hold if the estimates are biased. To check, one needs 
to look at the instrumental variable estimates.                   
I re-estimate the model using 2SLS which is reported in Table 4.6. I also report the 
first stage information of these regressions and partial R2 between the suspected 
endogenous variables and their instruments in Tables 4.6A and 4.6B respectively. 
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Table 4.5. Determinants of the Level of Development: OLS Estimates 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000   Dependent Variable 
Model (1) 
obs= 66 
Model (1a) 
obs= 66 
Model (2) 
obs= 65 
Model (2a) 
obs= 65 
Model (3) 
obs=63 
Model (3a) 
obs= 63 
Model (3b) 
obs= 63 
Model (4) 
obs= 63 
Model (4a) 
obs= 63 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Average Rule of Law 
Index 
 
Distance 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
 
Soil Suitability 
 
Land Area within 
100km of Ocean or 
Ocean-Navigable 
River 
 
Log of Trade Share 
 
 
Enrolment Ratio in 
1900 
 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
 
R2
F test (p value) 
0.58*** 
(0.1619) 
0.40*** 
(0.1589) 
 
0.01* 
 (0.0061) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
(0.1341) 
 
3e-04 
(0.0038) 
 
0.002 
(0.0015) 
 
 
0.7924 
0.0000 
0.62*** 
(0.1683) 
0.38*** 
(0.1611) 
 
0.01* 
(0.0060) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
(0.1356) 
 
1e-05 
(0.0039) 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.0031) 
0.7892 
0.0000 
  0.40*** 
(0.1524) 
0.45*** 
(0.0947) 
 
 
 
-1.03*** 
(0.1839) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.0938) 
 
3e-04 
(0.0029) 
 
-2e-04 
(0.0012) 
 
 
0.8833 
0.0000 
 0.40*** 
(0.1578) 
0.45*** 
(0.0935) 
 
 
 
-1.03*** 
(0.1855) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.0932) 
 
3e-04 
(0.0029) 
 
 
 
-3e-04 
(0.0023) 
0.8833 
0.0000 
 0.58***   
(0.1587) 
0.50*** 
(0.1529) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.35* 
(0.2274) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
(0.1350) 
 
-0.003 
(0.0035) 
 
0.002 
(0.0015) 
 
 
0.8145 
0.0000    
 0.61*** 
(0.1645) 
0.46*** 
(0.1559) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.36* 
(0.2392) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
(0.1367) 
 
-0.003 
(0.0036) 
 
 
 
-0.002     
(0.0033) 
0.8127 
0.0000 
 0.60*** 
(0.1566) 
0.54*** 
(0.1356) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.0060) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.1166) 
 
-4e-04 
(0.0031) 
 
0.001 
(0.0015) 
 
 
0.8139 
0.0000 
 0.62*** 
(0.1283) 
0.56*** 
(0.1255) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003** 
(0.0018) 
 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.1353) 
 
-0.002 
(0.0031) 
 
7e-04 
(0.0016) 
 
 
0.8116 
0.0000 
 0.64*** 
(0.1367) 
0.54*** 
(0.1259) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003** 
(0.0018) 
 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.1331) 
 
-0.002 
(0.0033) 
 
 
 
3e-04 
(0.0038) 
0.8112 
0.0000 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a one sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard 
errors. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 4.6 uses distance as a measure of geography. Institutional quality 
is instrumented by log settler mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, and log population 
density in 1500 and log trade share is instrumented by Frankel and Romer (1999) 
constructed trade share (CONST) instrument. Institutional quality and Catholicism has 
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates in this model. The coefficient on 
institutions is significant at 5% level whereas the coefficient on Catholicism is only 
significant at 10% level.  The coefficients on distance, initial income, primary enrolment 
ratio in 1900, and trade openness are insignificantly different from zero. One standard 
deviation increase in the rule of law index (which is 0.9) keeping other factors unchanged 
increases the steady state level of per capita GDP of an average country approximately by 
2.5 fold. One standard deviation increase in Catholicism (which is 36%) keeping other 
factors unchanged on the other hand increases the steady state level of per capita GDP of an 
average country approximately by 1.2 fold.    
This model appears to be the closest to Rodrik et al.’s (2004) ‘core specification.’ 
Rodrik’s specification only includes institutions, distance, and log trade share. But here I 
also include initial income, Catholicism, and primary school enrolment ratio in 1900 as 
additional controls.  The coefficient estimate on institutions in Rodrik’s model is 
significantly different from the same in Model 1. Rodrik reports a coefficient estimate of 
1.98 whereas the Model 1 reports it as 1.03. This indicates that there is significant upward 
bias in Rodrik’s estimate, because of a positive correlation between the institutions measure 
and his omitted variables namely log initial income and primary school enrolment ratio in 
1900. I also conduct a simple t-test to check whether our estimate is significantly different 
from Rodrik et al. (2004). The test rejects the null that they are identical at the 5% level of 
significance against a two sided alternative. As we have mentioned earlier, the coefficient 
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estimate of Catholicism is positive and statistically significant in Model 1. Therefore, the 
findings do not support Rodrik et al.’s (2004) conclusion that “The Institutions Rule.” 
Model 2 uses malaria as a measure of geography instead of distance.22 Institutions 
and log trade share are instrumented by the same instruments as in case of Model 1. 
Malaria is instrumented by malaria ecology which is a vector based measure and does not 
depend on public policy. The coefficient estimates on initial income and institutions are 
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on malaria on the other hand is 
negative and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in institutional 
quality (which is 0.9) keeping other things fixed increases the steady state level of per 
capita GDP by 2.2 fold. A one standard deviation decline in malaria (which is 0.44) 
keeping other things fixed increases the steady state level of per capita GDP by twofold. 
Therefore, the steady state effects of institutions and malaria have a similar degree of 
explanatory power in the data. This is something worth noting as it says it is not only 
institutions but it is also malaria which can do a lot of explaining. I will get into the roots of 
this malaria result later in this chapter.  
Model 3 uses land area within tropics (agriculture measure) as a measure of 
geography. This measure is treated as exogenous and institutions and log trade share are the 
only variables that are instrumented. The coefficients on initial income, institutions, and 
Catholicism are positive and statistically significant in this case. The rest are insignificantly 
different from zero. The impact of one standard deviation increase in institutional quality is 
about 3.1 fold in this case. I also use soil suitability as an alternative measure of agriculture 
but the coefficient estimate on this variable is insignificantly different from zero.   
                                                 
22 The robustness and sensitivity analysis of Model 2 which is the preferred specification is dealt 
with in the Technical Appendix TA1 (p. 172). 
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Finally, Model 4 uses land area within 100km of ocean or ocean navigable 
waterways (measure of market proximity) as a measure of geography. This variable is also 
treated as exogenous. In this case the coefficients on institutions, initial income, and 
Catholicism are the only statistically significant ones. The standardised coefficient of 
institutions increases to 3.14 in this case.    
The coefficients on trade openness in all the models reported in Table 4.6 are 
statistically insignificant and in six out of nine cases they have a negative sign. Therefore it 
is fair to conclude that there is no direct effect of trade on per capita GDP when it is pitted 
against institutions, geography, religion, and human capital.  
Catholicism registers a statistically significant and positive effect in case of Models 
1, 3, & 4. This is in sharp contrast with the Weber (1930) and Landes (1998) views. But, 
there is enough factual evidence to support the positive relationship. Huntington (1991) 
explains that the Catholic Church in the 1960s switched from being a powerful force 
against liberalism to a powerful force in favour of democratisation. In the last 30 years, 
most of the countries that have democratised including Portugal, Spain, Poland, Hungary, 
the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are Catholics.23 One of the major 
contributions of the Second Vatican Council also known as the Vatican II, which took place 
in 1962, is to open up dialogues with other religious denominations. The Church also 
became more tolerant and sympathetic towards women’s rights. These efforts presumably 
reduced the overall level of socio-religious intolerance (which is dubbed as a source of poor 
culture and hence harmful to economic progress by David Landes) and improved the 
overall level of trust in these countries. This in turn generated a positive effect on the 
                                                 
23 Exception to this is the democratisation in Africa in the 1990s which are not associated with 
Catholicism.   
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overall economy. However, it is worth mentioning that this effect is not robust to all 
specifications. 
The impact of Islam is observed to be insignificantly different from zero. Therefore, 
no consistent empirical evidence is found favouring the Landes (1998) view.24  
Log initial income is statistically significant in six out of the nine specifications 
indicating that ‘transitional dynamics’ are important. This is further evidence that the 
standard levels approach suffers from omitted variable problem. The evidence however is 
not robust across all specifications. 
The Enrolment ratio in 1900 is statistically insignificant in all the specifications and 
hence it is fair to conclude that human capital gets trumped by institutions and geography 
variables. 
In Table 4.6A I report the first stage regressions of the 2SLS estimates.  
The first stage regressions of Model 1 shows that other things remaining unchanged 
log settler mortality is negatively associated with current institutions and the relationship is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. It also shows that countries that were richer in 1960 
have better current institutions; countries that are open to trade due to their geography and 
demography have better institutions; countries that are further from the tropics have better 
institutions; and countries that are predominantly Catholic have poor institutions. All these 
relationships are statistically significant. There is also a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between constructed openness and trade and a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between log settler mortality and trade. 
 
 
24 Consult section 3.2 for a review of the David Landes view. 
Table 4.6. Determinants of the Level of Development: 2SLS Estimates 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000   Dependent Variable 
Model (1) 
obs= 39 
Model (1a) 
obs= 39 
Model (2) 
obs= 39 
Model (2a) 
obs= 39 
Model (3) 
obs=38 
Model (3a) 
obs= 38 
Model (3b) 
obs= 38 
Model (4) 
obs= 38 
Model (4a) 
obs= 38 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Average Rule of Law 
Index 
 
Distance 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
 
Soil Suitability 
 
Land Area within 100km 
of Ocean or Ocean-
Navigable River 
Log of Trade Share 
 
 
Enrolment Ratio in 1900 
 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
 
Endogeneity test (p) 
Overidentification test(p) 
0.26 
(0.3942) 
1.03** 
(0.4981) 
 
0.003 
(0.0162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
(0.2627) 
 
-0.004 
(0.0067) 
0.006* 
(0.0038) 
 
 
0.0052 
0.5531 
0.23 
(0.6157) 
1.67** 
(0.8124) 
 
-0.02 
(0.0319) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.24 
(0.4367) 
 
-0.01 
(0.0139) 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.0087) 
0.0049 
0.4261 
0.29* 
(0.1879) 
0.89*** 
(0.3173) 
 
 
 
-1.61*** 
(0.3238) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.08 
(0.1685) 
 
0.004 
(0.0049) 
0.004 
(0.0032) 
 
 
0.0089 
0.5406 
0.27* 
(0.1832) 
0.86*** 
(0.3178) 
 
 
 
-1.70*** 
(0.3310) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.11 
(0.1617) 
 
0.001 
(0.0057) 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.0035) 
0.0061 
0.3930 
0.38** 
(0.187) 
1.25*** 
(0.4614) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.06 
(0.4801) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03 
(0.3375) 
 
-0.005 
(0.0081) 
0.007* 
(0.0048) 
 
 
0.0204 
0.3150 
0.53*** 
(0.1922) 
1.06*** 
(0.3684) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.81 
(0.8541) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.54 
(0.5830) 
 
-0.02 
(0.0174) 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.0115) 
0.0362 
0.3262 
0.31 
(0.3203) 
1.13*** 
(0.3986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.0074) 
 
 
 
-0.27 
(0.2623) 
 
0.001 
(0.0077) 
0.003 
(0.0040) 
 
 
0.0322 
0.4120 
0.41** 
(0.2125) 
1.27*** 
(0.4514) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.0052) 
 
0.07 
(0.3912) 
 
-0.005 
(0.0077) 
0.007* 
(0.0047) 
 
 
0.0051 
0.6523 
0.45** 
(0.2098) 
1.50** 
(0.6131) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.0049) 
 
-0.33 
(0.4202) 
 
-0.01 
(0.0097) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.0074) 
0.0086 
0.5842 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a one sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard 
errors. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. The p-values of the endogeneity test and the overidentification test is also reported. All the regressions reported 
above are carried out with an intercept. The instruments used for Models (1), (2), (3) & (4) are log settler mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, log population density in 
1500 and Constructed openness. Rule of law, Malaria Risk, and Log Trade Share are treated to be endogenous. For Model (2) additional instrument ‘malaria ecology’ is 
used.  
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Table 4.6A. Determinants of the Level of Development: 2SLS Estimates (First Stage Information) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Average 
Rule of 
Law Index 
Log of 
Trade 
Share 
Average 
Rule of 
Law Index 
Malaria Risk 
 
Log of 
Trade Share 
Average 
Rule of Law 
Index 
Log of 
Trade Share 
Average 
Rule of Law 
Index 
Log of 
Trade Share 
Dependent 
Variables 
obs=41 obs=42 obs=41 obs=41 obs=41 obs=40 obs=40 obs=40 obs=40 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
Constructed 
Openness 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Distance 
 
Catholicism 
 
Malaria Ecology 
 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
Land Area within 
100km of Ocean 
or Ocean-
Navigable River 
 
Enrolment Ratio 
in 1900 
F value 
R2
-0.18** 
(0.1083) 
0.011* 
(0.0073) 
0.42** 
(0.2355) 
0.02** 
(0.0117) 
-0.004** 
(0.0025) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.0057) 
39.61a
0.7191 
-0.23** 
(0.1005) 
0.034*** 
(0.0056) 
-0.03 
(0.2424) 
-0.003 
(0.0074) 
-0.002 
(0.0021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.0047) 
9.98 
0.5155 
-0.26** 
(0.1384) 
0.006 
(0.0075) 
0.57*** 
(0.2281) 
 
 
-0.005** 
(0.0027) 
0.01 
(0.0186) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.0060) 
31.90a
0.6998 
0.13** 
(0.0789) 
-0.004 
(0.0041) 
-0.30** 
(0.1427) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.0016) 
0.026** 
(0.0110) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.0039) 
35.10a
0.6027 
-0.13 
(0.1133) 
0.04*** 
(0.0065) 
0.02 
(0.2144) 
 
 
-0.003** 
(0.0018) 
-0.03* 
(0.0191) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.0043) 
9.6 
0.5185 
-0.23** 
(0.1117) 
0.013** 
(0.0074) 
0.41** 
(0.2453) 
 
 
-0.005* 
(0.0029) 
 
 
-0.29 
(0.3362) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.0059) 
35.97a
0.7245 
-0.22** 
(0.1019) 
0.035*** 
(0.0063) 
0.08 
(0.2505) 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.0024) 
 
 
0.17 
(0.2407) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.0046) 
9.76 
0. 4735 
-0.21** 
(0.1097) 
0.005 
(0.0088) 
0.57*** 
(0.2124) 
 
 
-0.006*** 
(0.0020) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.0029) 
 
 
0.005 
(0.0061) 
28.5a
0.7241 
-0.17** 
(0.1021) 
0.03*** 
(0.0079) 
0.07 
(0.2129) 
 
 
-0.002* 
(0.0016) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004* 
(0.0025) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.0047) 
8.88 
0.5093 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a one sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard 
errors. “a” indicate that the instrument pass the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for weak instruments with a maximal bias of 0.05 of the 2SLS estimator relative to the OLS 
at 5% level of significance. The critical value of F is 13.97 for Model (1), (3) & (4) and 12.2 for Model (2). Since, all the instruments of average rule of law are highly 
correlated, we only report the first stage regressions for settler mortality. All the other instruments except constructed openness pass the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for 
weak instruments with the same level of bias. The standard errors reported in the regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried 
out with an intercept. 
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Table 4.6B. Determinants of the Level of Development: Partial R2 (First Stage Regressions) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Average 
Rule of 
Law Index 
Log of 
Trade 
Share 
Average 
Rule of 
Law Index 
Malaria Risk 
 
Log of 
Trade Share 
Average 
Rule of Law 
Index 
Log of 
Trade Share 
Average 
Rule of Law 
Index 
Log of 
Trade Share 
Dependent 
Variables 
obs=41 obs=42 obs=41 obs=41 obs=41 obs=40 obs=40 obs=40 obs=40 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
Constructed 
Openness 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Distance 
 
Catholicism 
 
Malaria Ecology 
 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
Land Area within 
100km of Ocean 
or Ocean-
Navigable River 
 
Enrolment Ratio 
in 1900 
0.088** 
 
0.056* 
 
0.089** 
 
0.078** 
 
0.078** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.044 
 
0.145*** 
 
0.433*** 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0026 
 
0.019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
 
0.108** 
 
0.021 
 
0.169*** 
 
 
 
0.115** 
 
0.015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
 
0.082** 
 
0.027 
 
0.142** 
 
 
 
0.005 
 
0.12** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.018 
 
0.034 
 
0.481*** 
 
0.0005 
 
 
 
0.055** 
 
0.057* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.008 
 
0.137** 
 
0.074* 
 
0.081** 
 
 
 
0.088* 
 
 
 
0.031 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.053 
 
0.129** 
 
0.369*** 
 
0.003 
 
 
 
0.032 
 
 
 
0.012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013 
 
0.110** 
 
0.007 
 
0.178*** 
 
 
 
0.200*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.029 
 
 
 
 
0.029 
0.087** 
 
0.244*** 
 
0.003 
 
 
 
0.034 
 
 
 
 
 
0.079* 
 
 
 
 
0.022 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a one sided alternative.  The partial R2 indicates the proportion of variation in 
the dependent variable that is explained by the explanatory variables when other things are held constant.  Multiplying them by 100% will give percentages.
 
 
The first stage regressions of Model 2 show similar pattern. Log settler mortality 
and Catholicism are negatively associated with institutions whereas the partial correlation 
with initial income is positive. In the case of the malaria regression, malaria ecology 
instrument is positively associated with current measure of malaria whereas initial 
income is negatively associated. Log settler mortality is also positively associated with 
the current measure of malaria. Finally, the trade share regression shows that log trade 
share is positively associated with its instrument constructed trade share and negatively 
associated with Catholicism. It also shows that high malaria incidence is associated with 
low levels of trade.  
The first stage regressions of Models 3 & 4 show similar patterns as the 
institutions and trade share regressions of Models 1 & 2. The general pattern that stands 
out of the first stage regressions is as follows. The instruments are associated with their 
target endogenous variables in a way predicted by the theory. Countries that were rich in 
the past have better current institutions and they suffer less from malaria now. Catholic 
countries have poor institutions and they also trade less. However, the negative 
relationship between Catholicism and trade is not robust across all specifications.      
The negative association between Catholicism and institutions, and Catholicism 
and trade obviously begs further explanation even though they are similar to the findings 
of La Porta et al. (1999). The association seems to be somewhat paradoxical. If 
Catholicism has a positive effect on economic progress then one should expect 
Catholicism to have positive effects on factors that help economic progress (like 
institutions and trade). But this is not what is observed. A possible explanation of this 
apparent paradox can be the following. The Catholic Church has opposed trade and 
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private property throughout history (Weber 1930; Landes 1998, pp. 175-177).25 This 
attitude has been adopted in the institutional structure of many of the Catholic countries 
in the past and some element of it persisted over time.  Hence, these negative attitudes are 
still prevalent in the institutional structure of these countries, but they no longer apply to 
the post Vatican II Catholic people. In short, the first stage regressions are picking up the 
negative effects of certain dimensions of the culture of regions predominantly Catholic 
that originated in the past probably due to negative influences of Catholicism and 
survived over the years in their institutional structure and not because of Catholicism per 
se now. The positive effects of possible attitudinal changes among Catholics are observed 
in the 2SLS results reported in Table 4.6. 
The instruments used in the 2SLS regressions perform well. The 
overidentification test p-values reported in Table 4.6 suggest that they are not 
endogenous. The first stage regressions reported in Table 4.6A pass the Stock and Yogo 
(2002) F statistic criteria on 5 out of 9 occasions indicating that the instruments are not 
weak. The partial R2 reported in Table 4.6B show that log settler mortality explains 8.8% 
of the variation in institutions in the case of the first stage regressions for Model 1. 
Constructed openness on the other hand explains 43% of the variation in log trade share. 
In case of Model 2, 12% of the variation in malaria is explained by malaria ecology. All 
these results are indicative of the fact that the instruments do fairly well in their task of 
providing an exogenous source of variation which is correlated with the suspected 
endogenous variables but uncorrelated with the error term.     
In order to dig deeper into the malaria result I ask a further question. Is the finding 
a reflection of the overall variation in the data or is it largely driven by the significant 
                                                 
25 This is also confirmed by our result that trade is negatively related to Catholicism. 
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presence of the Low Income Economies (LIEs) in the sample? A closer look at the 
dataset reveals that 26 out of 39 observations used in Model 2 of Table 4.6 are from 
LIEs.26 Estimating the same model using a sample of LIEs show that malaria is the only 
variable with statistically significant coefficient estimates. This is reported in Table 4.7. 
The impact of one sample standard deviation reduction in malaria (which is 0.44) on 
steady state per capita GDP is 1.7 fold. This is less than the pooled sample estimate of a 
twofold increase. However this is the only variable that can change the steady state level 
of per capita GDP in LIEs. Estimating the same regression on a sample of High Income 
Economies (HIEs) fails to yield meaningful estimates because of very few degrees of 
freedom. The regression relies on as few as 13 observations.27 The OLS estimates with 
the HIE sample however shows that diseases are no longer important. It is only 
institutions that matter. The partial R2 of the OLS estimates reported in Table 4.7A show 
that in a pooled sample 28% of the variation in per capita GDP is explained by 
institutions and about 41% by malaria. Whereas in a sample of LIEs the explanatory 
power of institutions is statistically insignificant and 43% of the variation is explained by 
malaria. In a HIE sample the situation reverses and institutions perform 34% of the 
explaining and the contribution of malaria is statistically insignificant. Based on the 
evidence therefore it is fair to conclude that the major effect of malaria on per capita GDP 
comes from the LIEs. Institutions become more important in a sample of HIEs.  
                                                 
26 The World Bank classifies economies into different income categories using Gross National 
Income per capita. We use this classification to divide our sample into two groups. The low income 
economies (which is the low and lower middle income economies according to the World Bank list) and 
the rest are taken to be high income economies. The source of this classification is the following web page. 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/aboutdata/errata03/Class.htm
 
27 Not reported because it is not meaningful anyway. 
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Therefore, one can put forward the following hypothesis with some caution to 
explain this correlation.28 Disease is the most important factor at a low level of 
development. Overcoming diseases ensures a basic minimum level of labour productivity 
and from then on institutions become important. Sachs tacitly refers to this hypothesis in 
his essay on the role of diseases. It is worth quoting from Sachs (2003b) directly: 
“The barriers to economic development in the poorest countries today are far more 
complex than institutional shortcomings. Rather than focus on improving institutions in 
sub-Saharan Africa, it would be wise to devote more effort to fighting AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria; addressing the depletion of soil nutrients; and building more 
roads to connect remote populations to regional markets and coastal ports. In other words, 
sub-Saharan Africa and other regions struggling today for improved economic 
development require much more than lectures about good governance and institutions.”    
 
28 The observed correlation in the LIE sample can be due to the small sample size or the observed 
variation is too limited.   
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Table 4.7. Determinants of the Level of Development: The Case of Low Income Economies (LIEs) 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000   
OLS 2SLS 
Dependent Variable 
Pooled Sample 
obs=66 
Restricted 
Sample 
 (LIEs) 
obs=32 
Restricted 
Sample 
 (HIEs) 
obs=34 
Pooled Sample 
obs= 39 
Restricted Sample 
 (LIEs) 
obs=26 
Log Initial Income (1960) 
 
Average Rule of Law Index 
 
Log of Trade Share 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Catholicism 
 
Enrolment Ratio in 1900 
 
R2
F test (p value) 
0.40*** 
(0.1524) 
0.45*** 
(0.0947) 
-0.04 
(0.0938) 
-1.03*** 
(0.1839) 
-2e-04 
(0.0012) 
3e-04 
(0.0029) 
0.8833 
0.0000 
0.51*** 
(0.1771) 
0.23 
(0.2050) 
-0.12 
(0.1585) 
-0.87*** 
(0.2011) 
-1.6e-04 
(0.0022) 
0.002 
(0.0083) 
0.6742 
0.0000 
0.13 
(0.1415) 
0.41*** 
(0.1103) 
0.02 
(0.1073) 
-0.05 
(0.6148) 
-0.002* 
(0.0013) 
0.003 
(0.0029) 
0.7841 
0.0000 
0.29* 
(0.1879) 
0.89*** 
(0.3173) 
-0.08 
(0.1685) 
-1.61*** 
(0.3238) 
0.004 
(0.0032) 
0.004 
(0.0049) 
 
0.15 
(0.4091) 
0.83 
(0.7267) 
-0.45 
(0.3345) 
-1.17*** 
(0.5040) 
0.001 
(0.0041) 
0.02 
(0.0139) 
 
Instruments 
 
 Log Settler Mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, Constructed 
Openness, Malaria Ecology 
Notes: ***,  ** and * indicates significance level of 1%,  5% and 10% level respectively against a one sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective 
standard errors. LIEs and HIEs signify low income economies and high income economies respectively. For the 2SLS regression on the high income economies malaria 
no longer remains significant. The 2SLS regression on the high income economies does not yield meaningful estimates due to the problem of degrees of freedom. There 
are only 13 observations for the HIEs and hence not reported here. The standard errors reported in the regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions 
reported above are carried out with an intercept. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7A. Partial R2 of OLS Estimates (Reported in Table 4.7)  
Log per Capita GDP in 2000 Dependent 
Variable 
Pooled Sample 
obs=66 
Restricted Sample 
 (LIEs) 
obs=32 
Restricted Sample 
 (HIEs) 
obs=34 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
 
Average Rule of 
Law Index 
 
Natural log of 
Trade Share 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Catholicism 
 
Enrolment Ratio 
in 1900 
0.155*** 
 
 
0.283*** 
 
 
0.004 
 
 
0.413*** 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0002 
 
0.246*** 
 
 
0.048 
 
 
0.021 
 
 
0.430*** 
 
0.0002 
 
0.002 
 
0.034 
 
 
0.344*** 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
0.0003 
 
0.088* 
 
0.034 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative.  The partial R2 indicates the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by 
the explanatory variables when other things are held constant.  Multiplying the numbers by 100% will give 
the percentages. 
 
This is also reflected in the empirical findings of Bloom et al. (2003). They show 
that the data on economic development has twin peaks which indicates that there are 
multiple equilibria. They show that the lower peak can be best explained by geography. 
They also show that this is not just geography per se, but the poverty trap emerging out of 
it. 
However, just by looking at the log settler mortality data (which is an instrument in 
the 2SLS regression) one may suspect that the strong negative correlation between malaria 
and current per capita GDP in LIEs is driven by the large proportion of high malaria and 
low per capita GDP African economies in the sample. To find out the true picture I perform 
some quick statistical analysis which in fact confirms the suspicion. There is a strong 
association between malaria and low per capita GDP when the sample size is reduced down 
to African LIEs. The next section presents this finding and discusses its possible 
implications.        
 76 
 
4.3 Is There Any Connection Between LIEs and Africa? 
A quick check of the sample that the 2SLS regression (see Table 4.7) on LIEs uses 
reveals that 10 out of 26 observations are African LIEs, which is approximately 39% of the 
sample.    
Table 4.8. Determinants of the Level of Development: The Case of LIEs in Africa  
Log per Capita GDP in 2000 Dependent Variable 
OLS 
obs=15 
2SLS 
obs=10 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Average Rule of Law 
Index 
 
Log of Trade Share 
 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Catholicism 
 
Enrolment Ratio in 1900 
 
R2
F test (p value) 
0.9*** 
(0.1827) 
0.055 
(0.2167) 
 
0.15 
(0.1981) 
 
-0.9*** 
(0.2653) 
-3e-05 
(0.0080) 
0.01 
(0.0172) 
0.9282 
0.0004 
1.19** 
(0.3228) 
-0.07 
(0.1725) 
 
0.35 
(0.2452) 
 
-0.98*** 
(0.2902) 
-0.005 
(0.0085) 
-0.04 
(0.0221) 
Instruments 
 
 Log Settler Mortality, ENGFRAC, 
EURFRAC, Constructed Openness, 
Malaria Ecology 
Notes: ***,  ** and * indicates significance level of 1%,  5% and 10% level respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The 2SLS regression may not yield 
meaningful estimates due to the problem of degrees of freedom. There are only 10 observations for this 
regression. The standard errors reported in the regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions 
reported above are carried out with an intercept. 
 
The regression estimates reported in Table 4.8 show that malaria risk is the only 
explanator that has a statistically significant coefficient estimate when the sample is 
exclusively of LIEs from Africa.  
Based on these results, is it fair to conclude that the root of Africa’s development 
problem is malaria? The answer is an emphatic no. The correlation between malaria and the 
level of GDP can be due to some omitted factor specific to Africa which moves in the same 
direction as malaria. For instance, the history of slave trade in Africa may be the true reason 
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for the continent’s lack of development. Malaria being an outcome of the lack of 
development will also share a high positive correlation with the slave trade variable. 
Therefore, running a regression of current per capita GDP on malaria without controlling 
for the correlation between slave trade and current per capita GDP will lead to the error of 
attributing the movement in per capita GDP data that is due to slave trade to malaria. A 
proper analysis of the true causes should involve estimation of a model which controls for 
all the relevant variables. This is what I intend to do in chapter 5.       
4.4 Summary 
To sum it up, this chapter shows that the levels regression strategy used by the 
recent studies suffer from omitted variable bias and identification problem. The omitted 
variable problem originates from neglecting the role of ‘transitional dynamics.’ The 
identification problem is due to the strong correlation between the historical instruments of 
institutions and schooling. As an alternative to the levels regression approach, I propose the 
transformed growth regression which I call the ‘modified levels model.’ This model 
controls for log initial income (1960) and primary enrolment in 1900 reducing the degree of 
omitted variable bias and eliminating the possibility of an identification problem. The 
regressions show that ‘institutions don’t rule.’ Malaria and Catholicism are important 
correlates of development. The correlation between Catholicism and development however 
is not robust. Catholicism is associated with poor institutions and is not good for trade. The 
explanatory power of institutions and malaria are almost equal in the pooled sample. 
Malaria however is the most important factor for the LIEs. The results also show that the 
malaria result in a LIE sample is driven by the large proportion of African economies in the 
sample. This certainly makes sense given the enormity of the malaria problem of that 
continent. Malaria kills 1-2 million Africans every year, out of a continent-wide total of 
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roughly 9 million deaths per year.29 However, this does not convincingly reject all the other 
competing theories which may be correlated with both malaria and the current level of 
development. In order to present a more convincing evidence of cause and effect I construct 
a model which controls for all the variables relevant to Africa’s development or lack of 
development. I estimate this model to confirm that malaria does matter when a host of other 
relevant factors are controlled for. This is to be investigated in chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 See Bloom and Sachs (1998). 
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CHAPTER 5  
COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS, GERMS OR FORCED MIGRATION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF AFRICAN 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
“. . . In Africa, especially in tropical Africa, which a capitalistic imperialism threatens and 
has, in part, already devastated, man is incapable of reacting against unnatural conditions. 
In those regions man is engaged in a perpetual struggle against disease and an exhausting 
climate, which tells heavily upon childbearing; and there is no scientific machinery for 
salving the weaker members of the community.”- Edward Morel (1903), The Black Man’s 
Burden, republished in Snyder (1962), p.163. 
Even though the continent of Africa is endowed with vast reserves of natural 
resources, it has struggled perpetually to deliver material goods to its populace. This is 
perhaps the most puzzling and yet the most sought after question of our time which has 
intrigued statesmen, activists, academics and many others. The comparative growth studies 
of the 1980s and the 1990s have consistently reported negative influence of Africa dummy 
on development. What is it about Africa that restricts economic development there? Is it the 
long history of slave trade, or the legacy of extractive colonial institutions, or malaria - a 
precise answer still eludes us.  
In the previous chapter I have shown that malaria is an important correlate of lack 
of development in Africa. However, the model that I have used does not control for factors 
that can be correlated with both malaria and the level of development. This can actually 
inflate the coefficient estimates on malaria - showing it to be much bigger than what it 
actually is. In this chapter I estimate a more complete reduced form model which controls 
for all the relevant omitted factors which are often Africa specific. The aim is to contribute 
to an answer to the question that I posed in the previous paragraph.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first section I review different 
theories of African underdevelopment. I exclude human capital (which was included in the 
model presented in chapter 4) as a possible explanator because of two reasons. The first is 
the lack of data on primary enrolment ratio in 1900. Including primary enrolment ratio in 
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1900 as an explanator reduces the sample size to 12. The second is the lack of statistical 
support for enrolment ratio as an explanatory variable. In none of the regressions reported 
in chapter 4, primary enrolment ratio in 1900 turns out to be statistically significant – be it 
the pooled sample, the LIE sample or the Africa sample. The theories of deep factors 
relating to Africa are not always economic as they are drawn from various other disciplines. 
However, the economic implications of them are not out of context and therefore discussed 
in quite detail. In the second section I lay out the structure of the empirical model, discuss 
the data and related issues, and report the regression results. The third section concludes. 
5.1 Theories of African Underdevelopment 
5.1.1 The Institutions Theory 
A great deal of research in recent years suggests that institutions are the key for 
economic development. Institutions shape the incentive structure for factor accumulation 
and technology development which is critically important for a country’s economic 
progress. Therefore, success or failure in development can be traced back to the success or 
failure in institution building. I have reviewed the relevant literature that deals with this 
view in section 3.1. This view however is also relevant for Africa (Easterly and Levine 
1997; Herbst 2000; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2002). The institutions school 
argue that the weak institutions in Africa largely explain her state of underdevelopment.  
Following is a discussion of this literature.    
Easterly and Levine (1997) use several indicators of public policy which can also be 
categorised as institutional measures even though they were not explicit about this in their 
study. They argue that the lack of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is associated with poor 
public policy such as low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, 
high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. They link the choice of poor 
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public policies on the part of the African governments to Africa’s high ethnic 
fragmentation.  In other words, they argue that high ethnic fragmentation increases 
polarization and the degree of social conflict in terms of policy choice in African societies. 
This increases the cost of conflict resolution. The government often fails to internalise these 
costs and selects socially sub-optimal policies. This is perhaps the first systematic attempt 
to explore African institutional weaknesses and the reason behind it in our profession. Even 
though Easterly and Levine (1997) were the first to apply this idea in Africa, it is older than 
this. Alesina and Tabellini (1989) and Alesina and Drazen (1991) theoretically modelled 
this idea almost a decade before their article was published. 
Herbst (2000) also seeks an explanation for institutional weakness in Africa. 
Robinson (2002) provides an excellent review of Herbst’s book. Herbst’s work 
predominantly focuses on the following questions. Why states are so ineffective in Africa? 
Why African states are often plagued by chaos and lawlessness? He comes up with an 
interesting answer.30 He argues that in Africa, labour was scarce and not land which is 
reflected by the low population density figures across the continent. Therefore, the pre-
colonial states in the continent did not fight over land but they fought over people. This 
explains why property rights over people were so well defined in the form of slavery 
whereas property rights over land were not as many of the lands were held communally. 
This implies that it was not necessary for the pre-colonial states to defend a well defined 
territory as there was no fierce competition over land. In other words, there was less need to 
invest in defence and maintain bureaucracies. Therefore, tax collection in these states were 
poor and often absent. This allowed African states to survive without having to engage in 
institution building (tax collection, invest in defence, maintain bureaucracies, and provide 
                                                 
30 Herbst’s thesis is not standalone. Bates (1983) and Stevenson (1968) also provide some tentative 
evidence within Africa which is in agreement with the population density argument of the thesis.  
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rule of law) which made them very fragile. The trend of almost no external threat coupled 
with low population density persisted during the colonial period. Therefore the colonizers 
had little incentive to develop institutions either. After independence the situation did not 
change. The United Nations decision to enforce the colonial boundaries as national 
boundaries and the Cold-War politics reinforced this trend. Hence, what we observe now is 
the weak institutions of contemporary Africa. Herbst’s argument is an extension of the 
work done by Max Weber on the development of European states. 
Even though Herbst’s thesis has received kudos for its intuitive appeal, it is still not 
free from criticism. Robinson (2002) criticises Herbst for not emphasizing the impact of 
colonialism on institutions and state formation in Africa. He also adds that the relationship 
between population density and institution building gets a bit unclear particularly in case of 
Africa when one takes into account the ‘reversal of fortune’ effect and the impact of 
colonialism (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2002). The following paragraph deals 
with this theory in more detail. 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) observes that the relatively prosperous and densely 
populated areas of the world outside Europe prior to 1500 are relatively poorer now 
whereas the less prosperous and sparsely populated regions outside Europe before 1500 are 
relatively prosperous at present. This empirical fact is termed by Acemoglu et al. (2002) as 
the ‘reversal of fortune.’ They argue that this is because of the nature of colonial policy 
pursued by the European colonizers. In colonies with high population density prior to 1500, 
the European colonizers faced relatively more resistance from the natives which ruled out 
the possibility of settlement and hence they erected extractive institutions without bothering 
about the overall protection of private property.  On the other hand, in colonies with low 
population density prior to 1500 the European colonizers faced less resistance from the 
natives and decided to settle and erect institutions with better protection of private property. 
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This argument may not be true in case of Africa. The African continent has always been a 
place with low population density. In spite of the low population density the colonizers 
decided not to settle in Africa and build ‘institutions of plunder’ instead.31  The answer to 
this apparent paradox perhaps lies in the argument of Acemoglu et al. (2001). Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) argues that one of the key factors that influenced the decision of not settling in 
Africa by the European colonizers was the continent’s disease environment which is well 
reflected by the settler mortality figures from the colonial records. They use settler 
mortality data mostly constructed out of the historian Philip Curtin’s work on the disease 
environment of the European colonies to establish a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between the disease environment and institutional quality. As Robinson (2002) 
puts it, these factors are not taken into account in Herbst’s story. 
5.1.2 The Slave Trade Theory 
The theories of the impact of slave trade on Africa’s current development can be 
classified into two broad categories. They are as follows; the depopulation view, and the 
socio-political view. 
The strong proponents of the depopulation view are the historians Joseph Inikori 
and Patrick Manning. Gemery and Hogendorn (1979) also adds an alternative dimension to 
the view basing their argument on trade theory. Following is a discussion of the theories. 
Inikori (1992) argues that the slave trade out of Africa during the period 1450 to 
1870 resulted into massive depopulation of the continent. The population all throughout 
this period remained way too low to trigger division of labour, growth in internal trade, 
specialisation and diversification, transformation of the technology and organisation of 
production in the manufacturing sector. As a result, manufacturing in pre-colonial Africa 
                                                 
31 The exceptions are the settler colonies of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Kenya. 
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could not develop beyond the handicraft stage. In the agricultural sector, the effects were 
more immediate. The low ratio of population to cultivable land encouraged dispersed 
settlements all throughout the continent particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The population 
moved towards extensive rather than intensive form of agriculture which made subsistence 
and local self-sufficiency predominant. This had a dampening effect on technology 
adoption and production organisation in the long run. African agriculture largely remained 
primitive and under commercialised during this period.  
Fage (1978) and Lovejoy (1982) strongly disagree with Inikori’s view. They argue 
that Inikori’s claim of an absolute decline in the African population due to slave trade is 
unfounded. Fage (1978) also adds that the trade had a minimal impact demographically. 
However, Manning (1981, 1982) and Thornton (1980) show that the demographic effects 
are significant no matter what the absolute totals are. 
Manning (1981, 1982) adds another dimension to the depopulation view. He shows 
that the African continent faced with an increasing demand for slaves from the new world 
reacted by increasing the supply of slaves. This increase in availability of slaves also raised 
the African demand for slaves. Africans preferred female slaves whereas young age male 
slaves were exported across the Atlantic to work in the plantations. This engendered huge 
imbalance in African sex ratios which had a long term impact on the continent’s 
demographic structure. According to his estimates, the continent’s population was held in 
check during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century by the slave trade restricting 
economic progress. 
Finally, Gemery and Hogendorn (1979) adds that the mass removal of working age 
population from the continent caused an implosion of the African production possibility 
frontier as the lost labour input affected virtually all production choices. This resulted into 
unambiguous reduction in welfare of the continent. The secular decline in welfare 
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continued over more than two centuries plunging the continent into economic 
backwardness.  
The major contributors to the socio-political view are Inikori (1977, 1992), 
Manning (1981, 1982), and Miller (1988). 
Inikori (1992) argues that a vast majority of slaves that were exported were free 
individuals captured by force. The capture took a number of forms notably kidnapping, 
raids organised by the state, warfare, pawning, via the judicial procedures, tributes etc. 
Firearms were imported from the Europeans in exchange for slaves particularly during the 
period 1750 to 1807 which were used for capturing more slaves (Inikori 1977). Rodney 
(1966) and Meillassoux (1976) show that increase in the Atlantic salve trade led to more 
capturing and expansion of the African salve trade often marred by violence. Lovejoy 
(1994) shows that warfare, raiding and kidnapping were the means of enslavement for more 
than three quarters of the slaves captured during 1805 to 1850 from Central Sudan. The 
judicial process became a tool for enslaving people within the community (Klein 2001). 
Klein (2001) observes that judicial penalties in the form of compensation, exile or beatings 
were converted to enslavement. Inikori (2000) argues that the increase in the trade for 
captives institutionalised banditry and corruption for more than three hundred years in the 
continent which retarded socio-economic development.  
Curtin (1975) partially disapproves of Inikori’s view. He argues that it is improper 
to view conflicts that arose from political causes in Africa in the same light as those that 
originated from purely economic motives such as the slave trade. Inikori (1992) however 
questions the usefulness of this dichotomy as these relationships were far more complex. 
According to his view, “attempts to establish any form of simplistic relationship are 
therefore misleading” Inikori (1992, pp. 26).  
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Manning’s work focuses on Dahomey which is roughly the area around the Bight of 
Benin during the period 1640 to 1860 (Manning 1981, 1982). He observes that the 
immense increase in slave prices with a price elasticity of supply of 1.5 created the 
incentive for capturing more slaves. Institutions were set up during 1640 to 1670 in this 
area which was conducive to capturing slaves. The institutions included warfare, raiding, 
kidnapping, judicial procedures, and tributes. Manning (1982) writes, “These structures 
further reinforced a willingness to tolerate or justify the enslavement of one’s enemies or 
even one’s own” (pp.9). In case of Dahomey, the state became an active participant in the 
collection and delivery of slaves which is an evidence favouring Inikori’s argument. 
Miller (1988) gives an account of the deadly nature of the process of capture in 
Angola. He writes that warfare and violence stimulated the capture of slaves in West 
Central Africa often capturing slaves in exhausted, shaken or physically wounded 
condition. Populations were raided consistently by stronger neighbours and harassed and 
driven out from their homes and land. Gemery and Hogendorn (1979) adds that the culture 
of raiding and warfare created a distinct minority class in the African society who became 
far more powerful than the rest of the population both in economic as well as political 
terms. The slave traders of Africa started enjoying European goods, currency, and guns in 
return for slaves. They made significant gains from trade at least in the short run even 
though everyone was unambiguously worse off in the long run due to the implosion of the 
production possibility frontier (Gemery and Hogendorn 1979). The extreme inequality of 
wealth distribution tilted the existing institutions in favour of the slave traders which 
created the foundation for further inequality in the future. This is consistent with the theory 
of institutions, inequality and growth proposed by Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) with respect to the new world. These institutions persisted all 
throughout the pre-colonial period further intensifying the problem. After colonisation, the 
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colonial powers did not interfere with the existing extractive institutions of the natives. It 
was reinforced by them instead (Robinson 2002). Persistence of weak institutions had a 
negative impact on the long run economic development of the continent.  
5.1.3 The Malaria Theory 
The malaria view can be categorised into two broad categories. The first deals with 
the economic burden of malaria in contemporary Africa, and the second deals with the 
historical impact of malaria and diseases on the continent’s long run economic 
development.  I call the former the ‘contemporary malaria view’ whereas the latter the 
‘historical malaria view.’  
The ‘contemporary malaria view’ is due to Sachs (2003b). According to this view, 
malaria dramatically lowers labour productivity, the return on foreign investment and raises 
transaction cost of international trade limiting development which is typically observed in 
sub-Saharan Africa. I have discussed this view in sections 3.3 and 4.2.5.                  
Sachs (2003a) in a cross-country empirical study shows that institutions do matter 
but not exclusively.32 He highlights the prevalence of malaria as another important factor 
which should not be underestimated. In a series of studies Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup 
et al. (1998), and Gallup and Sachs (2001) show that infectious malaria has a debilitating 
effect on human productivity and directly affects economic performance. Sachs et al. 
(2004) argue that with malaria and subsequent low productivity of labour an agricultural 
labour in sub-Saharan Africa cannot generate enough marketable surpluses which also 
limits the prospect of market development. Markets even if it develops remain concentrated 
at a very local level. This is indicative of a situation of ‘low level equilibrium trap’ in these 
economies.  
                                                 
32 Section 3.3 also reviews these studies. 
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Acemoglu et al. (2003) strongly disagrees with Sachs’ view. They argue that disease 
environment influence the balance of power between previously isolated populations when 
they come into contact.  The local disease environment influence the colonization strategy 
and settlement decision which sets up the path for future institutional development 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002). Therefore, disease environment affect the level of 
development indirectly through institutions. I call this the ‘historical malaria view.’ This 
view is also closely related to the historian Phillip Curtin’s work on epidemiology of the 
new world and Africa (Curtin 1968). In this article, Curtin shows that epidemiological 
factors have influenced economic decisions and economic patterns of the new world 
(particularly tropical America) and Africa.    
Another angle within the ‘historical malaria view’ is a line of argument that is 
strongly pursued by a section of the historians. Miller (1982) uses Portuguese traveller 
records, missionary and church documents to show that frequent epidemics of malaria and 
yellow fever caused massive depopulation in the agriculturally marginal zones of West-
Central Africa. Dias (1981) in a similar study of nineteenth and twentieth century Angola 
argues the same. They observe that the effect of disease, epidemics and famines were far 
more powerful than the slave trade in depopulating the region. According to their view, the 
increase in slave trade was an outcome of local epidemiology and poor agriculture rather 
than strong Atlantic demand.  
Miller (1982) writes, “The slave trade appears in some ways less a cause of 
depopulation than a consequence of it when viewed in terms of droughts and demographic 
changes in West-central Africa.”  
Hence according to his view disease environment had direct effects on the 
demography and economic development of the region. Inikori (1992) and Manning (1981, 
1982) however provides evidence to show that these effects were not strong enough to have 
 90 
 
a larger impact on the African population compared to the strong Atlantic demand for 
slaves.  
5.2 The Model and the Empirics 
5.2.1 The Model 
I estimate the following reduced form model to test the strength of the theories that I 
have discussed above. 
  LOGGDPPCi=α1 +α2Y0i +α3INSi +α4LOGSLVXi +α5MALi +α6RELi +α7INTi + εi       (5.1)  
Where LOGGDPPC, Y0, INS, LOGSLVX, and MAL are log per capita GDP in 
2000, log initial income (1960), institutions, log slave export, and malaria variables 
respectively. I also control for religion (REL) and trade openness (INT). This model is an 
extension of the model 4.3. Slave export is the additional Africa specific variables. I leave 
out primary enrolment ratio as a control because it drastically reduces the sample size and it 
also never comes out to be statistically significant when estimated using a full cross-
country sample (see result tables in chapter 4).  
I use average rule of law index as a measure of institutions. The slave exports 
measure is reconstructed following Nunn (2004). Inclusion of malaria is due to Sachs 
(2003a). The following subsection presents a more detailed discussion of the data. 
5.2.2 The Dataset 
The analysis is based on a dataset which consists of per capita GDP levels, measure 
of institutions, measure of slave export, and measure of malaria risk in (up to) 49 countries 
in Africa. The definitions and sources for all the variables used in this study is summarised 
in the Data Appendix. Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of each of the variables 
used in the study. I divide the dataset into seven major parts depending upon the variable 
that they are measuring. They are as follows: measure of economic development, measure 
of institutions, measure of slave export, measure of malaria risk, measure of religion, 
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measure of trade openness, and the instruments. The sources of the economic development 
measure, institutions measure, malaria risk measure, religion measure, and trade openness 
measure are the same as the variables used in chapter 4. This section provides a brief 
description of each of these measures. 
Economic development is measured by the level of per capita GDP in 2000 and in 
1960. The data is from Penn World Table 6.1. The data for Angola, Zaire, and Sudan is 
from the World Development Indicator (WDI). For Sudan the initial income data is the 
1975 level. This is done to avoid losing these countries as observations in the cross-section 
regression. These nations actively participated in the slave trade and therefore leaving them 
out would amount to throwing away crucial information which can explain the cross-
national variation in the current level of development.  According to these figures, Tanzania 
is the poorest country in Africa in 2000 whereas Botswana is the richest. 
I use the average rule of law index as a measure of institutional quality. The average 
rule of law index measures the overall institutional quality and the quality of governance in 
a particular country. The range of this index varies from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values 
implying better institutional quality. An average value of this index from 1998 through to 
2000 is used for each country as it was the case in chapter 4. The data shows that Somalia 
has the weakest institutions and Tunisia has the strongest institutions in Africa.  
Slave exports data is reconstructed using the Nunn (2004) methodology. Nunn 
(2004) uses ‘shipping records’ and ‘ethnicity records’ of slaves to construct the cross-
country series of slave exports. The ‘shipping record’ is typically the number of slaves 
exported to the new world and other destinations from African ports. The ‘shipping record’ 
for the Atlantic Slave trade is available from Eltis et al. (1999) CD-ROM and Elbl (1997). 
Eltis et al. (1999) CD-ROM covers the period 1527 to 1866 whereas Elbl (1997) covers the 
period 1450 to 1521. Data on Indian Ocean slave trade is obtained from Austen (1979) for 
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the period before 1769, Martin and Ryan (1977) for the period 1770 to1799, and from 
Austen (1988) for the period 1800 to 1899. Data on Trans-Saharan slave trade comes from 
Austen (1992) and for Red Sea slave trade comes from Austen (1988). These figures are 
also listed in Nunn (2004)’s data appendix. Nunn also looks at several historical records to 
make a conjecture about the ethnicity and country of origin of these slaves. This is what he 
calls the ‘ethnicity record.’ Ethnicity record gives the information on ethnic and country 
origins of some of the slaves exported to the Americas and other parts during this period. 
Out of this slave sample, Nunn (2004) generates estimates of proportional representation of 
each country. He then distributes the sample from ‘shipping records’ to each country using 
these proportions. The information on the proportions is also available from his data 
appendix. I follow the same procedure and end up with a distribution which has a similar 
ordering as Nunn (2004). Nigeria comes out as the highest exporter of slaves. I have to 
reconstruct the data since Nunn’s numbers are yet to be published. This data is also a 
natural candidate of measurement error which is also discussed in section 5.2.4.  
Malaria risk measures the share of population at risk from malaria in a particular 
country in the year 1997. I use data from 49 countries with a higher value indicating greater 
risk for the population. This series is the same as the one used in the previous chapter. Most 
of the countries in the sample registers high malaria incidence except Algeria, Tunisia and 
Mauritius. 
Religion measures are the same as in chapter 4. The numbers show that the 95.9% 
of the population in Cape Verde Island are Catholic and 99.8% of the population in Somalia 
are Muslim. 
The trade openness measure is also the same as in chapter 4. Lesotho is the country 
with highest trade share and Mozambique trades the least.   
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Table 5.1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Number of 
obs. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Measures of Economic Development 
Log per Capita GDP in 
2000 
43 7.48 0.831 6.19 9.24 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
43 5.74 0.592 4.72 6.98 
Measure of Institutions 
Average Rule of Law 
Index  
49  -0.596  0.619         -2.19  0.853 
Measure of  Slave Export 
Log Slave Export  42  -1.83        2.78  -9.21  1.66 
Measure of Malaria 
Malaria Risk 49  0.808  0.353  0  1  
Measures of Religion 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
47 
 
47 
24.06 
 
34.16 
25.99 
 
36.98 
0 
 
0 
95.9 
 
99.8 
Measure of Openness and Trade 
Log of Trade Share 46 4.06 0.58 2.91 5.03 
Instruments for Institutions 
ENGFRAC 
 
EURFRAC 
 
Log Population Density 
in 1500 
47 
 
47 
 
45 
0.005 
 
0.024 
 
0.888 
0.019 
 
0.103 
 
1.30 
0 
 
0 
 
-1.97 
0.09 
 
0.7 
 
4.61 
Instrument for Malaria 
Malaria Ecology 49    10.59 8.28 0   31.55 
Instrument for Slave Exports 
Distance from the coast 46 502.13 374.27 35.29 1319.58 
Instrument for Trade Openness 
Constructed Openness 46 22.50 14.48 8.68 70.97 
Notes: For a detailed discussion of the definition and source of these variables, see Data Appendix. 
 
I use three instruments for institutions - ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, and log population 
density in 1500. They are picked from the standard set of instruments used for institutions. 
The reason for not using the log settler mortality instrument is the small sample size of the 
regression when it is included in the set of instruments. For malaria risk, I use malaria 
ecology as an instrument. Distance from the coast is used as an instrument for slave 
exports. 
The pairwise correlations between these variables are reported in Table 5.2. It 
shows that better institutions, less malaria, less slave exports, more trade, and Islam are all 
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positively associated with current level of development in Africa. This however is the 
unconditional correlation between these variables. 
5.2.3 Endogeneity Issues 
Coefficient estimates of a regression model with two way causality or endogeneity 
problem are biased. In the above model (equation 5.1), one cannot rule out the possibility of 
two way causality between the dependent variable per capita GDP in 2000 and the 
explanatory variables institutions, malaria and openness to trade. It is also possible that a 
third factor is driving the changes in both the dependent as well as the explanatory variable 
leading to a problem of identification. Following is a discussion of these issues. The 
arguments here are similar to the ones discussed in section 4.2.3. 
The average rule of law index which is a measure of overall institutional quality is 
expected to be endogenous. A reasonably developed economy is expected to develop better 
institutions rather than better institutions causing development (Rodrik et al. 2002). In other 
words, economic development is a cause of institutional development rather than an effect.  
Malaria risk is also a possible candidate for endogeneity. One of the arguments that 
favour reverse causality is as follows. The rich economies can afford to invest in the 
research and development of drugs that cures or minimises the effect of malaria. They can 
also invest in public health programs to destroy mosquito habitat and wipe out malaria 
altogether. Singapore is a good example of this. Therefore, I consider malaria risk to be 
endogenous. 
Rich countries trade more and the countries that trade more become rich – the 
causality can run both ways. Therefore the openness to trade variable is also endogenous. 
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Table 5.2. Pairwise Correlation of the Major Variables (obs=36) 
 
 Log per 
Capita 
GDP in 
2000 
 
Log Initial 
Income (1960) 
Average Rule 
of Law Index 
 
Log Slave 
Exports 
 
Malaria Risk Log Trade 
Share 
 
Catholicism Islam 
Log per Capita GDP 
in 2000 
 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
 
Average Rule of 
Law Index 
 
Log Slave Exports 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Log Trade Share 
 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
 1.0000 
 
 
0.7364                  1.0000 
 
 
 0.3862                0.3420                  1.0000 
 
 
-0.3686               -0.3650                 -0.1558                 1.0000 
 
-0.6646               -0.3412                 -0.3937                 0.4222               1.0000 
 
 0.3647                 0.3105                  0.2091                -0.1405              -0.1157                  1.0000 
 
-0.1817               -0.1783                 -0.3812                -0.1638               0.3590                 -0.1303               1.0000 
 
 0.1645               -0.0102                  0.1897                  0.2893              -0.3102                  0.1442              -0.7246              1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the other explanatory variables religion (both Catholicism and Islam) and 
initial income (1960) can be treated as exogenous.    
Formal statistical tests following Hausman (1978) are used to check for endogeneity 
of these variables. However Hausman test is not full proof because of the shortcomings that 
I have discussed in the previous chapter. The Technical Appendix provides a detailed 
description of the test. 
5.2.4 Measurement Error and Unobserved Country Characteristics 
Another potential source of bias in the coefficient estimates is the unobservable 
country characteristics. If a country chooses slave trade and demonstrates extreme reliance 
on warfare and violence because of some unobserved characteristics inherent in its culture 
and if these characteristics are still persisting, then it is impossible to identify 
econometrically the partial effects of the trade on its current level of development. The size 
of the estimates will be biased away from zero as the coefficient will account for the 
unobserved country effect plus the true effect of slave trade (Nunn 2004).  
The other potential source of bias is the measurement error. In Nunn’s (2004) 
methodology, it is assumed that the slaves exported from a particular port in Africa are 
coming from the country where the port is plus from the close neighbouring countries 
inland. This method always leaves a possibility of under-representation of slaves from the 
inland (Nunn 2004). This under-sampling of slaves from the interior will lead to OLS 
estimates that are biased towards zero (Nunn 2004).  
Given these two potential biases, it is unclear which way the aggregate bias will 
affect the coefficient estimate. The best possible way to tackle this ambiguity is to use 
instrumental variables (IV). I use distance from the coast as instrument for slave trade. This 
is discussed in detail in the following section. 
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5.2.5 The Instruments 
The endogeneity issues discussed in section 5.2.3 can be tackled empirically by 
using the instrumental variable technique which I have discussed in details in section 4.2.4. 
The first stage regressions for this exercise are as follows. 
         INSi=β1+β2 INIi +β3 MEi + β4 DCi + β5 RELi + β6 CONSTi + β7 Y0i + ε1             (5.2)      
         LOGSLVXi=θ1+θ2 INIi +θ3 MEi + θ4 DCi + θ5 RELi + θ6 CONSTi + θ7 Y0i + ε2 (5.3) 
         MALi= λ1+λ2 INIi + λ3 MEi + λ4 DCi + λ5 RELi + λ6 CONSTi + λ7Y0i + ε3         (5.4) 
         INTi= φ1+ φ2 INIi + φ3 MEi + φ4 DCi + φ5 RELi + φ6 CONSTi + φ7Y0i + ε4       (5.5) 
Where INIi refers to instruments for institution, DCi refers to distance from the 
coast, CONSTi refers to constructed openness, and MEi refers to the malaria ecology for 
country i. They are used as instruments for institutions, slave trade, trade openness and 
malaria risk respectively.  
I use three instruments for institutions. They are: ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, and log 
population density in 1500. I exclude European settler mortality from the set since it 
drastically reduces the sample size. I also use malaria ecology as an instrument for malaria 
risk. The logic behind using these variables as instruments are discussed in chapters 3 and 
4. 
I use distance from the coast as an instrument for log slave exports. The rational 
behind this is the following. It is expected that greater the distance from the coast, the lower 
is the volume of slave exports. The obvious reason being the cost of capturing and 
transporting slaves to the coast increases with distance (Nunn 2004). 
I use formal statistical tests following Hausman (1978) to check for the validity of 
the instruments.33
 
                                                 
33 See Technical Appendix TA3 (p. 174) for further information on these tests. 
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5.2.6 Regression Results 
The ordinary least square estimates of the model reported in Panel A of Table 5.3 
shows that malaria has a negative coefficient estimate and initial income has a positive 
coefficient estimate. Both the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. It also 
shows that log trade share and Catholicism are positively related to the current level of 
development. The relationship however is statistically significant only at the 10% level. 
The coefficient estimates on institutions and slave trade are insignificantly different from 
zero. In a separate specification replacing Catholicism by Islam I find that the effect of the 
Islamic faith on current development is insignificantly different from zero. This 
specification is reported in the second column of the table. 
The 2SLS estimates34 show similar pattern35 as its OLS counterpart except log trade 
share is no longer statistically significant. The effect of a one sample standard deviation 
(0.353) decline in malaria risk is a 1.8 fold increase in current per capita income. This 
effect is almost equal in magnitude to the standardised coefficient estimate of malaria (2, 
see page 64) in a pooled sample (see Model 2, Table 4.6 of chapter 4). This implicitly 
shows how much the effect of malaria in a pooled sample is driven by Africa. The partial 
R2 calculations show that 55% of the variation in log GDP per capita in Africa is explained 
by malaria. The only difference between Model 2 of chapter 4 and this model is that 
institutions are no longer statistically significant. 
The impact of one standard deviation (26%) increase in catholic faith is a 1.3 fold 
increase in the current per capita GDP. This is close to the 1.2, the value of standardised 
coefficient reported in chapter 4 (see Model 1, Table 4.6 of chapter 4).    
                                                 
34 The robustness and sensitivity analysis of these estimates are reported in the Technical Appendix 
TA2 (p. 173). 
35Malaria and initial income are the only statistically significant variable. Institutions and slave 
export are statistically insignificant.   
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I replace Catholicism by Islam and re-estimate the model. The standardised 
coefficient on malaria increases to 2.35. I also find evidence of conditional convergence 
since the coefficient estimate on the initial income (1960) variable is statistically 
significant, positive, and less than 1.  
The empirical evidence is in sharp contrast to the Nunn’s (2004) baseline model 
estimates. Nunn reports a negative and statistically significant relationship between slave 
exports and current per capita GDP. He also shows that this effect disappears once he 
controls for institutions leading him to believe that the effect of slave trade works via 
institutions. His story is the following. In Africa, the long history of slave trade has 
systematically weakened its institutional structure. Many of these weaknesses have 
persisted over time and influenced institutional performance till date which also determines 
economic outcome. In other words, the legacy of slave trade and conflict is discernible in 
current African institutions and takes its toll on the current economic performance. Nunn’s 
story however is not supported by the data once the effects of malaria, trade openness, and 
religion are controlled for. It turns out that malaria is the only variable that can explain the 
lack of development in the continent and the relationship is robust. 
The first stage regressions reported in Panel B shows that log population density in 
1500, malaria ecology, and Catholicism are good predictors of current institutions. High 
population density regions in 1500 tend to have bad current institutions. This supports 
Acemoglu et al. (2002)’s theory.36  
Conducive environment for the malaria vector produces poor institutional outcome. 
This also supports Acemoglu et al. (2001)’s theory.  
 
                                                 
36 They argue that that these places were colonized for extractive purposes which led the colonizers 
to set up extractive institutions. These institutions have persisted over time and have high level of influence 
on current institutions.  
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Table 5.3. Determinants of African Development  
Panel A: The Model 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000 Dependent Variable 
 OLS estimate 
obs= 36 
OLS estimate 
obs= 36 
2SLS estimate 
obs= 36 
2SLS estimate 
obs= 36 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
Average Rule of Law 
Index 
 
Log Slave Export 
  
Malaria Risk 
 
Log Trade Share 
 
Catholicism 
 
Islam 
 
R2
Endogeneity test (p) 
F test (p-value) 
0.69*** 
(0.1254) 
0.18 
(0.1295) 
 
0.03 
(0.0250) 
-1.35*** 
(0.1707) 
0.20* 
(0.1160) 
0.007* 
(0.0049) 
 
 
0.8393 
 
0.0000 
0.66*** 
(0.1244) 
0.10 
(0.1056) 
 
0.02 
(0.0239) 
-1.20*** 
(0.1530) 
0.19* 
(0.1294) 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.0021) 
0.8112 
 
0.0000 
0.66*** 
(0.1079) 
0.38 
(0.4160) 
 
0.06 
(0.0485) 
-1.64*** 
(0.5734) 
0.18 
(0.2946) 
0.01* 
(0.0065) 
 
 
 
0.2776 
0.54*** 
(0.2043) 
-0.35 
(0.7779) 
 
0.11 
(0.1048) 
-2.43** 
(1.369) 
0.53 
(0.5913) 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.0063) 
 
0.1948 
 
Instruments  ENGFRAC, EURFRAC, Log Population Density 
in 1500, Malaria Ecology, Distance from the 
coast, Constructed openness. 
Panel B: The First Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variables Average Rule of Law 
Index 
obs= 39 
Malaria Risk 
obs= 39  
Log Slave Export 
obs= 36 
Log Trade Share 
obs= 39 
Log Population Density in 
1500 
Distance from the coast  
 
Malaria Ecology 
 
Constructed Openness 
 
Log Initial Income (1960) 
 
Catholicism 
 
R2
F value 
-0.08*    
(0.0635) 
-3e-05 
  (0.0002) 
-0.02** 
  (0.0101) 
0.01 
(0.0073) 
0.02 
(0.1333) 
-0.01*** 
(0.0039) 
0.3847 
2.93               
-0.01    
(0.0396) 
2e-05 
  (0.0001) 
0.03*** 
  (0.0055) 
0.003 
(0.0037) 
-0.06 
(0.0936) 
0.008*** 
(0.0019) 
0.5953 
7.33           
0.50**    
(0.2816) 
-0.004*** 
  (0.0009) 
0.22*** 
  (0.0394) 
-0.01 
(0.0282) 
-1.23** 
(0.6179) 
0.01 
(0.0190) 
0.6435 
9.7           
-0.2***    
(0.0608) 
3e-04 
  (0.0003) 
-0.01 
  (0.0099) 
0.03*** 
(0.0071) 
0.16 
(0.1371) 
-0.004 
(0.0038) 
0.4116 
6.0            
       Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The standard errors reported in 
the regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an 
intercept. None of the first stage regressions pass the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for weak instruments 
with a maximal bias of 0.05 of the 2SLS estimator relative to the OLS at 5% level of significance.   
 
A large proportion of the population practicing Catholic faith also produces poor 
institutional outcome which is what I reported in chapter 4. 
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Malaria ecology is a strong predictor of malaria. The coefficient estimate is positive 
and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is not a surprising result. One would 
expect that the proportion of population exposed to malaria should be correlated with the 
two principal components of the malaria ecology measure - the abundance of malaria 
carrying mosquito species and the appropriate temperature conditions for their survival.  
Catholicism also predicts malaria risk. The regression shows that the population of 
predominantly catholic countries in Africa are more at risk of having malaria. However, 
this correlation may not be indicative of a causal relationship. 
The log slave export regression shows that it is positively correlated with log 
population density in 1500 and malaria ecology and negatively correlated with distance 
from the coast and initial income. All the relationships are statistically significant. The 
positive correlation with the population density is indicative of the fact that the high 
population density areas in 1500 experienced more intensive slaving than the low 
population density areas.  
One can interpret the positive correlation between slave export and malaria with a 
view strongly advocated by historians Joseph Miller and Jill Dias.37 They argue that 
protracted rainy season after long droughts always brought malaria and severe food 
shortages in West Central Africa especially Angola. Malaria and food shortages made the 
local population vulnerable to the attacks of slave raiders. Therefore it is not surprising that 
there is a positive correlation between malaria ecology and slave trade. 
The negative correlation between slave export and distance from the coast is quite 
intuitive. The further a country is from the coast the less is the probability of it being 
affected by slave raids. However this average relationship should not be interpreted as 
                                                 
37 See Miller (1982) and Dias (1981). 
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counter evidence to the historically well documented episodes of inland slave raids in the 
West and West Central Africa which started taking place during the 18th and 19th century. 
The negative correlation between log per capita GDP in 1960 and slave trade 
implies countries that have less per capita GDP in 1960 exported more slaves in the past. 
The regression however does not establish any causal relationship. 
Finally, the log trade share regression shows that constructed openness can predict 
log trade share. The relationship between constructed openness and log trade share is 
positive and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms Frankel and Romer 
(1999) findings. 
Log population density in 1500 also predicts log trade share. High population 
density areas in 1500 trade less now. This is in conformity with the intuition put forward by 
the ‘gravity model.’ Areas with high population density in 1500 are expected to have high 
population density till the present date. The ‘gravity model’ suggests that areas with high 
population density tend to trade more internally than externally. Therefore, areas with high 
density population should trade less if one is solely considering external trade. Since the 
high density population areas in the past are positively correlated with the high density 
population areas of the present, therefore there should be a negative correlation between the 
population density of the past and the trade share of the present. 
The partial R2 of the first stage regressions reported in Table 5.3A shows that log 
population density in 1500 which is an instrument for institutions explain approximately 
5% of the variation in institutions. However, it is statistically significant and has the right 
sign as predicted by the theory.  
Malaria ecology which is an instrument for malaria risk explains 49% of the 
variation in malaria risk. It is also statistically significant and posses the right sign. 
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The other instruments such as distance from the coast and constructed openness 
explains 33% of the variation in log slave export and 27% of the variation in log trade share 
respectively. They are also statistically significant and posses signs as predicted by the 
theory. 
Table 5.3A. Partial R2 of the First Stage Regressions (Reported in Table 5.3)  
Dependent 
Variables 
Average Rule of 
Law Index 
obs= 39 
Malaria Risk 
obs= 39 
Log Slave Export 
obs= 36 
Log Trade Share 
obs= 39 
Log Population 
Density in 1500 
 
Distance from 
the coast  
 
Malaria 
Ecology 
 
Constructed 
Openness 
 
Log Initial 
Income (1960) 
 
Catholicism 
0.0482*    
 
 
0.0437 
   
 
0.1299** 
 
 
0.0374 
 
 
0.0007 
 
 
0.1900***         
0.0028    
 
 
0.0009 
   
 
0.4902*** 
 
 
0.0196 
 
 
0.0196 
 
 
0.2941***          
0.0955**    
 
 
0.3246*** 
   
 
0.5063*** 
 
 
0.0058 
 
 
0.1205** 
 
 
0.0205               
0.2336***    
 
 
0.0361 
   
 
0.0614 
 
 
0.2700*** 
 
 
0.0388 
 
 
0.0333          
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative.  The partial R2 indicates the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by 
the explanatory variables when other things are held constant.  Multiplying the numbers by 100% will give 
the percentages. 
                       
These correlations definitely make them eligible to be valid instruments. However, 
applying a stricter criterion to determine weak instruments developed by Stock and Yogo 
(2002) reveal that the instruments jointly fail the test.  
Based on the OLS and 2SLS estimates it is perhaps fair to conclude that malaria has 
a strong negative effect on current level of development in Africa and the relationship is 
robust across different specifications. This relationship however is conditional on controls. 
The coefficient estimates on institutions and slave export are insignificantly different from 
zero which rules out the presence of any direct effects of these two variables on current per 
capita GDP.  Catholicism is positively related to development however the relationship is 
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statistically significant only at the 10% level. There is evidence in favour of transitional 
dynamics and the data also shows that predominantly catholic countries have poor 
institutions in Africa. There is no evidence of indirect effects of slave trade and institutions 
on the current level of development. 
5.3 Summary 
Finally, the question remains- what does this all mean? The evidence confirms my 
initial conjecture38 that the dominance of malaria in a sample of LIEs is driven by the 
African economies. In this chapter I show that this holds even when I control for log slave 
trade (which is a historical factor specific to Africa), institutions, log trade share, religion 
and log initial income.  
One interpretation of this result is the poverty trap argument developed by Jeff 
Sachs and other which I have already discussed in section 5.1.3. The data definitely shows 
strong support in favour of this argument. However, the precise mechanism through which 
diseases affect development is yet to be sorted out. This is an area which needs further 
work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 See chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 6  
FROM ‘INSTITUTIONS RULE’ TO ‘DISEASES 
DOMINATE’: WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN? 
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The evidence that I have presented so far does identify the most important deep 
factors that can explain the difference in living standards across nations. But this does not 
tell us anything about the mechanism through which these factors influence living 
standards.  When Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004)39 argue that institutions 
are the fundamental determinant of living standards then the obvious question is via which 
channel it had or continues to have an impact. They may argue that the settler mortality 
story40 provides some explanation about the mechanism. But perhaps it is too simplistic an 
explanation for a full picture story of such a complex process. When Sachs (2003a) asserts 
that malaria ecology and disease environment are the most important determinant based on 
his empirical result, one may ask the question is the result showing historical influence or 
current influence. These questions are also relevant for the results that I have presented in 
chapters 4 and 5. Unfortunately there are no easy ways to answer these questions. But 
unless we answer them, we won’t be able to make sense out of the empirical results. 
This chapter attempts to give meaning to the results using a method which may not 
satisfy the empiricists because of its somewhat speculative nature. The strategy is as 
follows. First, I put forward a unifying structure which describes the process of 
development in Western Europe. Then I compare and contrast the Western European 
trajectory with the trajectories in Africa, China, India, and the Americas. The African 
trajectory is explained using an overlapping generation model. The purpose of this exercise 
is to find out how the deep structural factors have influenced the process of development or 
lack of development in these regions. In the end, I make an attempt to relate these 
theoretical observations with the empirical evidence of chapters 4 and 5. 
                                                 
39 Rodrik et al. (2004) claims ‘institutions rule’ whereas Acemoglu et al. (2001) stresses on the 
importance of institutions without claiming dominance.   
40 This story is reviewed in chapter 3, section 3.1. 
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The organisation of this chapter is as follows. The first section lays down the 
unifying structure for Western Europe. The second section compares and contrasts the 
structure with the trajectories of Africa, China, India, and the Americas. The third section 
relates the structure with the empirical results. The fourth section concludes. 
6.1 A Unifying Structure for Western Europe   
It is perhaps not inappropriate to divide the process of economic development in 
Western Europe into four different stages. The first stage is the era of Malthusian cycle in 
which geography and epidemic diseases played a crucial part in determining food 
production. The widely known economic as well as social impact of the ‘Black Death’ and 
other epidemic diseases that hit Western Europe during the fourteenth century is a 
testimony of the power of geography and germs. The second stage is characterised by 
conflict, militarism and increase in food production and population density. The third stage 
is the period of an increased demand for wealth. This epoch is characterised by state 
investments into daring expeditions to acquire wealth and resources from foreign lands to 
finance the soaring costs of war. Finally, the fourth stage is the stage of change in the 
nature of the state leading to rapid technological progress, industrial revolution, mass 
production, and the rise of the capitalist system. 
In this section I will illustrate each of these stages using historical examples from 
Western Europe. I will provide simple economic intuition wherever applicable. I will try to 
link each of these stages using simple economic intuition. I will avoid using what 
economists love most – models. The reason is somewhat obvious as these stages may well 
have taken place because of historical accidents.  
In order to describe the first stage, one can think of a food production function 
which makes use of land, labour, human capital, technology, and climate. Land is fixed and 
is owned by the small state or group. The entire population supplies labour except the elite. 
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Human capital is defined as the knowledge required to make use of the existing technology 
successfully. Technology signifies the development of new tools and it is spasmodic. 
Climate is exogenously given. Labour supply is affected by the disease environment with 
high incidence of diseases resulting into less labour supply. In this kind of world, an 
increase in food production because of the positive effects from all of these factors results 
into an increase in the population. Increased population raises the demand for food. 
However, there is a limit to what a fixed amount of land can yield given technology, 
climate, and diminishing returns to labour and human capital. Therefore, a food crisis 
ensues and eliminates a large proportion of the population. This cycle repeats itself in the 
absence of technological progress. In addition to this natural cycle, food production is also 
constrained by geography. Frequent epidemic diseases reduce labour supply constraining 
food production. The use of very simple and climate dependent technology also constraints 
food production. This is what Thomas Malthus described as the principle of population in 
his famous essay in 1750. This process took place in Western Europe approximately during 
the thirteenth and the fourteenth century when it was ruled by the small and medium sized 
feudal states. Robbins (1928) provides evidence of a Europe which is close to what I have 
described above. In her paper on the impact of Black Death in France and England, she 
records that France was hit by famine on at least fifteen occasions during the fourteenth 
century.41  
In stage two, the production of food may rise due to technological progress. New 
technology may evolve due to indigenous effort or due to technology transfer or can be 
completely serendipitous. At least in case of Western Europe we know that most of the 
early technologies were acquired from the Chinese or the Arabs or from ancient Rome 
(Mokyr 1990). There is support for this in Diamond (1997) as well.  
                                                 
41 See Robbins (1928), p. 453. 
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He writes, “Until the proliferation of water mills after about A.D. 900, Europe west 
or north of the Alps contributed nothing of significance to Old World technology or 
civilization; it was instead a recipient of developments from the eastern Mediterranean, 
Fertile Crescent, and China. Even from the A.D. 1000 to 1450 the flow of science and 
technology was predominantly into Europe from the Islamic societies stretching from India 
to North Africa, rather than vice versa.”42  
The Western Europeans acquired irrigation and water supply technologies from 
Persia and the Arab world. Thomas Glick in his book entitled Irrigation and Society in 
Medieval Valencia argues that many of the early irrigation techniques arrived in Spain with 
the Islamic invasion.43 The Spaniards adopted this technology which spread to the other 
parts of Europe later. Dams were also built by the Arabs in Spain for the purpose of 
irrigation during this period. This is evident from Donald Hill’s work on the history of 
technology. Hill (1984) writes, “Many dams were built by the Muslims in southern Spain, 
mainly for irrigation but also for water supply and water power. There was, for example, a 
series of dams in the region of Valencia.”44 The arrival of new technology increases 
agricultural production by manyfold and creates a situation of food surplus. The food 
surplus also increases fertility and reduces mortality raising the total population. Rising 
population puts pressure on land and other resources inducing the state to get involved into 
territorial conflicts. This is what we observe during the age of the Crusades when Europe 
engaged herself into repeated conflicts and wars. The state also gained more in terms of tax 
revenue in the event of an increased agricultural yield. A significant proportion of this 
revenue is spent into the development of new weapons and the military. The logic is 
simple. More lethal weapons and a well nourished army can win battles and winning battles 
                                                 
42 See Diamond (1997), pp. 409-410. 
43 See Glick (1970), p. 176, the section on the diffusion of irrigation techniques.  
44 Hill (1984), p. 58. 
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was crucial to the very existence of the state. The state investment in military technology 
creates positive externality for civilian R&D leading to more breakthroughs in technology 
for agriculture and crafts. New technology in agriculture and craft results into steady 
growth in output and population causing more territorial conflict. This pattern is observed 
till the fifteenth century in Western Europe when the states become stronger and stronger. 
However, the increased frequency of military conflict did put enormous pressure on the 
state’s exchequer forced her to look for alternative and richer sources of revenue. Perhaps, 
this is what led Western Europe to the stage three.         
Stage three signifies a state in which investments in maritime expeditions in order to 
hunt for alternative sources of wealth and resources become extremely important. Michael 
Beaud (2000) describes this process in his book. He writes, “Monarchs greedy for greatness 
and wealth, states battling for supremacy, merchants and bankers encouraged to enrich 
themselves: these are forces which inspired trade, conquests, and wars.”45 These 
investments lead to the discovery and conquest of new land. The prevailing mercantilist 
philosophy46 induces explorers to search for bounty in these newly discovered lands and 
bring them back to their motherland. This is what Hernan Cortez did when his band of 
conquistadors came in contact with Montezuma’s Aztecs in the new world. Similar was the 
fate of Atahualpa’s Inca when Francisco Pizzaro’s army of two hundred conquistadors 
defeated them in Cajamarca in 1532. The Capture of Atahualpa by Pizzaro’s men yielded 
the largest ransom recorded in human history. The ceaseless pillage of wealth and precious 
stones from the new land triggers inflation in the home country as too much money chase 
too little goods. To counter inflation, the state imposes restrictions on imports but 
encourages exports so that the state does not run out of wealth. This policy leads to the 
                                                 
45 See Beaud (2000), p. 14. 
46 The major argument of the mercantilist philosophy is that a nation’s wealth depends on the amount 
of precious metal it has.   
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expansion of maritime trade and commerce. The ‘no import’ ideology also boosts domestic 
manufacturing providing it with a large domestic as well as overseas market. Outward 
orientation and trade in manufacturing leads to specialisation, division of labour and 
increased gains from trade. The nature of the distribution of gains from trade changes the 
structure of the political economy. Two distinct patterns emerge. The first is an absolutist 
state which takes control of all types of accumulation. The second is a type of state which 
allows private accumulation by the bourgeoisie such as money lending, trading of precious 
metals, real estate etc. In an absolutist state no change occurs in the institutional structure. 
However, in the second type of state institutional changes take place which are favourable 
to capitalism. The increase in wealth of the bourgeoisie due to private accumulation 
provides them with de facto political power. The bourgeoisie invests in private 
manufacturing and trade which generates more wealth for the future. This further 
strengthens their de facto political power. The bourgeoisie with their new found political 
power starts demanding institutional change by challenging the authority of the monarchs. 
They demand protection of private property and a more equitable distribution of political 
power. If the de facto political power of the bourgeoisie is greater than the de jure political 
power of the monarchs then the will of the bourgeoisie prevails over the will of the 
monarchs. This leads to the establishment of institutions which protects private property 
and political rights of the bourgeoisie. Democratic institutions are established to cement the 
power of the bourgeoisie and also to make sure that the monarch cannot take over power in 
the future. 
This pattern of institutional development is observed in Western Europe from 
sixteenth century onwards. The Spanish and Portuguese monarchs were absolutist in nature 
and they centralised the process of manufacturing and trade discouraging private enterprise 
(Acemoglu et al. 2005). This prevented the development of institutions which provides 
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incentive to private investment. However, in Britain and in the Netherlands, the state 
allowed private enterprise which led to the Civil War in 1642 and Glorious Revolution in 
1688 in Britain and the Dutch war of independence which began in the 1570s. Describing 
the events in Britain and the Netherlands Acemoglu et al. (2005) writes,  
“The victory of Parliament in the Civil War and after the Glorious Revolution introduced 
major checks on royal power and strengthened the rights of merchants. After the Civil War, 
the fraction of MPs who were merchants increased dramatically.”47  
“Dutch merchants always had considerable autonomy and access to profitable trade 
opportunities. Nevertheless, prior to the Dutch Revolt, the Netherlands (in fact, the entire 
Duchy of Burgundy) was part of the Habsburg Empire, and the political power of Dutch 
merchants was limited…. The critical improvement in Dutch political institutions was 
therefore the establishment of the independent Dutch Republic, with political dominance 
and economic security for merchants, including both the established wealthy regents and 
the new merchants immigrating from Antwerp and Germany.”48
The stage four signifies more private as well as state investments in technology 
which leads to the development of the factory system and industrial revolution. The 
institutional changes of stage three creates the ideal incentive structure for private 
investments in technology development and fixed capital. This induces rapid technological 
progress. The rapid improvement in technology increases the cost of moving information 
relative to the cost of moving people (Mokyr 2001). This leads to the rise of the factory 
system and a consequent breakdown of the cottage industry. Such pattern is observed in 
Britain during the period of Industrial Revolution (1760-1830). The period of Industrial 
Revolution is signified by rapid improvements in technology and sustained economic 
                                                 
47 See Acemoglu et al. (2005), p. 564. 
48 See Acemoglu et al. (2005), p. 566. 
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growth. Even though the revolution started in Britain, the new ideas and technology soon 
migrated to the other parts of Western Europe. However, the economic benefits remained 
contingent on the nature of the states. The benefits for the states with absolutist institutions 
were lot less than the benefits for the states with non-absolutist institutions. Powered with 
capitalist institutions Britain remained the top gainer and the gap between Britain and the 
rest of Western Europe increased over time. Maddison (2004) figures show that the 
difference between GDP per capita of Britain and Spain increased from 397 Geary-Khamis 
dollars to 698 Geary-Khamis dollars49 over the period 1700 to 1820. 
Therefore, in sum the story that I want to get across is as follows. Western Europe 
managed to beat the constraints imposed by its geography on food production early on and 
started her journey on an independent growth trajectory. Availability of food increased 
population density which caused territorial conflicts and war. Ceaseless conflicts induced 
more investment in military technology. The conflicts also put enormous pressure on the 
finances of the state. The state commissioned daring naval expeditions to search for bounty 
so that it can finance its military expenditure and avarice. These expeditions brought wealth 
from overseas which also caused inflation. In order to remedy inflation and also to abide by 
the principles of mercantilist philosophy, the state restricted imports of foreign goods and 
promoted exports of domestically manufactured goods. This induced specialisation and 
division of labour in the domestic economy. Institutional changes followed depending upon 
the initial distribution of the gains from trade. A non-absolutist state allowed bourgeois 
accumulation which increased the power of the bourgeoisie resulting into major 
institutional changes favourable to capitalism. In contrast, an absolutist state allowed very 
little or no bourgeois accumulation which arrested the prospect of any institutional change. 
The states with capitalist institutions attracted private investments into production and 
                                                 
49 These are measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars.  
 114 
 
technology building. This led to rapid technological progress, the rise of the factory system, 
and industrial revolution. 
6.2 What was Different in Africa, China, India, and the Americas? 
Africa  
Africa has a long history of diseases. Epidemic diseases such as small pox, measles, 
yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis, malaria, typhus were always been a part of African life. 
Many of these diseases and some new killers50 play a significant role in African life till 
date. Africa has also been a subject of huge climatic variations. Long dry seasons were 
followed by considerably humid periods with strong rain (Miller 1982). These factors have 
impacted in the past and still continue to impact Africa’s growth trajectory. If one seeks an 
explanation in terms of the broad structure that I have outlined in the previous section, the 
obvious question to ask is at what stage the African economics went wrong? My answer is 
stage one. How it happens to be stage one? The intuitive explanation is as follows. 
Geography has always constrained food production in Africa. Long stretches of 
drought causing major reductions in cultivation has always weakened African population 
making them a subject of malnutrition. Malnutrition made them vulnerable to epidemic 
diseases. A return of the rain also brought diseases along with it further weakening the 
labour force an important input for food production.  
Miller (1982) writes, “Outbreaks of diseases paralleled the chronology of drought in 
an epidemiological sequence familiar from many other regions. Africans weakened by 
malnutrition and exhausted by dispersal into the bush or by flight into lowland became 
particularly vulnerable to endemic pathogens.”51  
                                                 
50 HIV AIDS is an example. 
51 See Miller (1982), pp. 22-23. 
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A Portuguese observer in eighteenth century Angola commenting on the increase in 
disease incidence after the rain writes, “Rain brings food in abundance but leaves no one 
alive to eat it.”52 This situation was further complicated by the African involvement in the 
slave trade. Africa had a long history of slavery as a social institution. However, it was 
never commercialised in such a large scale prior to the European engagement.53 Slave trade 
led to depopulation of the continent reducing food production further (Inikori 1992).54 
However, the fact is even without depopulation Africa struggled to produce more than 
subsistence level of food grains. This restricted Africa from attaining stages two, three and 
four and move towards the development of a fully home grown capitalist system. The 
engagement with the Europeans during the sixteenth century and formal colonization 
during the nineteenth century aborted the independent trajectory of institutional 
development in Africa. In the colonies with high European mortality rate the colonizers 
erected extractive institutions. The slave trade encouraged the African elites to go for 
violent slave raids inland which institutionalised the culture of violence and lawlessness in 
certain parts of the continent. Many of these institutional features have persisted over time 
and still exist in the economic and political institutions of modern Africa. These weak 
institutions continue to influence the economic performance of the continent. Coupled with 
diseases and geographic constrains, poor institutions perhaps explains the bulk of the 
African growth tragedy. 
Let me introduce an overlapping generation model to explain the story that I have 
laid down above. The idea in this model is that the direct relationship between the rate of 
time preference and diseases at the representative household level is perhaps the best 
                                                 
52 Cited in Miller (1982), p.23. 
53 The Islamic slave trade started in A.D. 700. But it never reached the epic proportion of the Atlantic 
slave trade.  
54 The historians are yet to reach any agreement on this. For alternative views see Lovejoy (1982).  
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explanator of the African situation. In other words, households living in an environment 
where malaria incidence and death rate is typically high will choose to save less for the 
future and this affects economic progress adversely. The following is the model. 
I consider a closed overlapping generation economy consuming and producing a 
single homogeneous product. This can be thought of as a representative economy in the 
continent of Africa or the whole continent itself. A typical household in this economy 
comprises of both young and old members and each member of the household lives for 
only two periods. The young members of the household work in the first period and retire 
in the second period when they are old, and then they die. The members of this household 
consume in both periods and the consumption in the second period is supported by their 
savings in the first period. Therefore at each point in time, members of only two 
generations are alive. Each individual within the household maximises their lifetime utility 
which depends on consumption in the two periods of life. In order to maintain simplicity of 
the structure, I assume away the possibility of bequests or any altruistic behaviour.  
The lifetime utility of a representative individual of generation t can be expressed as 
follows: 
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where and  are the consumption of generation t when young and old 
respectively and 
1tc 2 1tc +
ρ  is the exogenously determined pure rate of time preference. 
The survival probability to the old age φ  of the representative individual depends 
on the unfavourable geography vector, Γ .55  
                                                 
55 One argument made by Chakraborty and Das (2005) in a recent paper is that the households can 
influence φ  by investing in health. However, in this case we assume that increase in φ  requires huge 
investment which is often beyond the scope of a private investor or a household. This is because malaria is 
predominantly geographic in nature and its reduction would require considerable public health intervention.  
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                                                   ( ) [0,1]φ φ= ∈Γ                                                (6.2) 
Γ is exogenous to the model and shares an inverse relationship withφ .  If Γ is too 
high then φ can be too low. 
Using equation (6.2) one can rewrite the lifetime utility of the representative 
individual as follows: 
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where ( )( )
1
φσ ρ
ΓΓ = +  is the effective rate of time preference. If Γ is too high then 
σ is too low. 
The representative individual supplies one unit of labour inelastically when young 
and receives a wage income . Therefore the budget constraint faced by this individual in 
period t is given by the following expression. 
tw
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Where is the amount of grain saved in period t. The saved grain also grows at a 
rate when planted. Therefore in period t+1the individual consumes the amount saved in 
period t plus the growth in the grains. So the consumption in the second period is as 
follows. 
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Using (6.5) one can rewrite the budget constraint as  
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Each individual treats andtw 1tr + as given and maximises their lifetime utility subject 
to the budget constraint. This yields the following Euler equation. 
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Using (6.6) and (6.7) and solving for and 1tc 2 1tc + yields 
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I assume that the representative household uses a Cobb-Douglas technology to 
produce the grains and the factors of production are paid according to their marginal 
product. The production function is represented as follows. 
                                         ty Akt
α=                                                             (6.9) 
Where &t ty k  are per capita output and per capita capital stock respectively. In this 
economy, net investment has to be equal to total income less consumption. Therefore, 
capital stock in this economy evolves as follows. 
                             11t t t t t t t t1 2 1tK K AK L K c L c L
α α δ−+ −− = − − −                      (6.10) 
I assume that the economy starts off with an initial capital stock that is owned by 
the elderly in period 1. Also each individual want to end up with no assets when they 
die. This yields the result that the savings of the young this period is equal to the next 
period’s capital stock. Hence we have the following relationship. 
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In this economy, the population grows at a rate n . Then using the above relationship 
and logarithmic preferences56 I get the steady state value of per capita capital stock as  
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56 Logarithmic preference implies 1θ =  
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It is evident from the above equation that a high value of σ  increases the steady 
state level of per capita capital stock and hence enhances growth. In Africa due to the high 
incidence of killer malaria and other diseases, one would expect to be very high and Γ σ  
to be fairly low. The economy in this case is in danger of getting trapped into a low income, 
low capital stock equilibrium which I have described as stage one in section 6.1. This result 
is also in line with the empirical findings of Bloom et al. (2003). They show that economies 
experience lack of growth not due to geographical bottlenecks per se but due to the poverty 
trap situation emerging out of the bottleneck. This perhaps explains the situation in Africa 
which is supported by the empirics in chapter 5. 
Another observation is that if contemporary Africa is stuck at stage one due to 
diseases and other geographic constraints then the data is going to show a strong correlation 
between the current level of development and these factors. The correlation between 
institutions and other factors will not be visible if it is a poverty trap situation similar to 
stage one. This is precisely what the data shows.    
China 
The case of China is somewhat surprising. The Chinese were at the forefront of the 
Old World technology and knowledge till the mid fifteenth century. Cast iron, compass, 
gunpowder, paper, printing, and many others were first invented in China. The Chinese also 
invented sophisticated irrigation canals which increased rice production by many fold 
(Diamond 1997). Despite this long list of technological breakthroughs why do the Chinese 
failed to achieve the same heights as Western Europe? Why did they waste their early 
technological advantage? Why is it Britain and not China progressed towards building an 
industrial society? The answer lies with Chinese institutions. The following paragraph 
attempts to provide an intuitive explanation in terms of the broad structure. 
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Food production developed in China as early as 7500 B.C. (Diamond 1997, p. 100). 
By the start of the millennium, Chinese agriculture was able to support large population and 
the hierarchical structure of the Chinese society was comparable to the social institutions of 
stage two and three of the proposed broad structure. One can claim that by the fourteenth 
and the fifteenth century China has taken significant steps towards reaching stage four. The 
treasure fleets of the early fifteenth century, the discovery of gunpowder and compass 
suggests that the Chinese were incredible close to make it to stage four. However, the 
question remains what went wrong. The fate of the treasure fleet after it returned in 1433 
gives us a clue to the answer.57 After the return of the fleet in 1433, the composition of the 
Chinese state changed significantly. The previously powerful eunuchs were overthrown by 
their opponents within the Chinese court. The eunuchs were in favour of technology, 
scientific discovery, and daring expeditions. The commander of the treasure fleet Cheng Ho 
was himself a eunuch. When their opponents assumed power, they aborted all the activities 
that the eunuchs were involved in, either directly or indirectly. Gradually they dismantled 
the entire infrastructure that was put in place to encourage these activities. The absolutist 
nature of their regime also did not allow private initiatives into these activities. In this way 
the absolutist regime destroyed all the institutional incentives for technological research 
and China went backwards in the next five hundred years. This is a perfect example of the 
theoretical claim that bad institutions can destroy all the incentives for economic progress 
even when the region is endowed with the right geography. 
Again in terms of the regression results this shows that escaping the poverty trap is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. The Chinese case fits well with 
the pooled sample estimates in chapter 4. Institutions do have a positive impact on 
development. 
                                                 
57 For a more comprehensive account of this event see Diamond (1997) or Landes (1998).  
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India 
India was an exporter of industrial goods and an importer of primary and 
intermediate goods when Sir Thomas Roe visited the court of the Mughal emperor Jahangir 
in 1615.58 The structure of the Mughal Empire was already very hierarchical with power 
concentrated in the hands of the minority elites. It also generated enormous amount of 
wealth. In support of this fact Landes (1998) writes,  
“India also had a large and skilled industrial workforce, whose products circulated 
throughout the region. As a result, the Indian yielded a substantial surplus that supported 
rulers and courts of legendary opulence.”59  
Therefore, it is perhaps fair to say that the Mughal Indian society achieved living 
standards and institutional structure comparable to the stage three of the proposed broad 
structure. However, this pattern reversed as the British started gaining more political 
control during the late eighteenth century. The obvious question that one would like to ask 
is why?  
The answer is not as complicated as it may seem. Acemoglu et al. (2002) talks 
about an institutional reversal that brought about this change. Their definition of 
institutional reversal however is very broad. They argue that the British colonizers never 
considered India and other tropical colonies as possible settlements and therefore they 
erected extractive institutions in these colonies. These extractive institutions reversed the 
trend of economic performance. In case of India however it wasn’t only the lack of 
settlement opportunities that persuaded the British colonizers to erect extractive 
institutions. It was also a direct result of the then prevailing political economy in both the 
countries. Dutt (1992) argues that strong parliamentary lobbying by the British cotton 
                                                 
58 Sir Thomas Roe was the emissary of King James I and he gained for the British the right to 
establish a factory at Surat, a port city where the British East India Company’s ships first arrived in India.  
59 See Landes (1998), p. 156. 
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manufacturers against the import of Indian textile forced the East India Company to resort 
to policies which led to a systematic destruction of the Indian textile industry. He writes, 
“Even in 1813, witness after witness in the Select Committee of the House of Lords 
testified that free Indian textile imports (of both finer and coarser varieties) would damage 
British industry.”60 The British East India Company resorted to policies of imposing 
internal tariffs and transit duties on Indian goods, dislocation and direct exploitation of the 
artisans, and forceful reduction of market demand to destroy the industry.61 Indian textile 
also lost their overseas market due to the imposition of high import tariffs in Britain. 
The Company had an influence on the land tenure system and property rights during 
that time. In many areas the existing landlords received proprietary rights in land. The 
Company extracted rents from them without caring much about investment. The landlords 
passed on this burden of rent to the farmers and the poor farmers struggled to make 
investments in capital and technology. This system of rent seeking significantly reduced 
agriculture productivity and trapped farmers into a vicious cycle of poverty. One such 
institution is the Permanent Settlement concluded by the Cornwallis administration in 1793. 
It was a grand contract between the Company government and the Bengal landlords. Under 
the contract, the landlords were admitted into the colonial state system as the absolute 
proprietors of landed property and the government was barred from enhancing its revenue 
demands from the landlords. This arrangement institutionalised the alliance between the 
landlords and the colonial rulers. It also legitimised rent seeking. In a recent study, 
Banerjee and Iyer (2006) show that these institutional arrangements had and continue to 
have a significant impact on economic outcome within India. Areas where proprietary 
                                                 
60 See Dutt (1992), pp. 148-149. 
61 According to Dutt (1992), many artisans were subjected to flogging, imprisonment, and worse 
(cutting off the thumbs of winders of raw silk has been documented). The domestic demand for textile also 
reduced significantly due to the decline of the Indian royal courts, as they were the major buyers of the quality 
products.   
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rights were given to the landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and 
productivity than areas where rights were given to the cultivators. 
Therefore, colonisation by the British led to institutional reversal which prevented 
India from reaching the stage four and develop a home grown efficient capitalist system. 
The progressive forces within the Indian society which had the capacity (at least 
theoretically) to push the economy towards large scale industrialisation were systematically 
destroyed by the existing polity. The domestic extractive institutions were allowed to 
continue and it strengthened the feudal landlords both economically and politically. These 
institutional changes systematically destroyed the incentives for private investments into 
land, capital, and technology. As the incentives changed, so do the comparative advantage. 
India soon became a net exporter of raw materials and primary products and a net importer 
of industrial goods. What ensued is two centuries of deindustrialisation and economic 
slowdown. 
It is true that not all of this is reflected in the regression results of chapter 4. What 
this shows however is the importance of institutions once the economy manages to escape 
the geographical constraints. This fits perfectly with the positive correlation between 
institutions which is a product of the institutional history of the country and economic 
development. 
The Americas 
When the Europeans first arrived to the Americas in the late fifteenth century, the 
indigenous American civilization of the Incas and the Aztecs were quite developed both 
economically and politically. The Incas and the Aztecs developed agriculture which was 
capable of supporting large population. Their political structures were also very advanced 
and somewhat similar to the Europeans. The majority of the political power was 
concentrated in the hands of the minority elites and the ruling nobility. If one wants to 
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make a comparison between the then states of the Europeans and the indigenous 
Americans, one would be able to point out that there were certain things that the indigenous 
Americans were able to achieve and there were certain things that they failed to achieve. 
Whatever it may be, it is secondary to my focus. The important issue is that the European 
arrival stalled the independent process of development in the Americas. The indiscriminate 
massacre of the indigenous population and epidemic diseases such as small pox contracted 
from the Europeans rapidly reduced the indigenous population to an inconsequential level. 
This allowed the Europeans to grab more indigenous land and erect institutions which are 
along the lines of institutions in Western Europe. However, in case of the Spanish colonies 
in South America, the Spanish colonial rulers continued with the Inca tribute system and 
other rent seeking institutions for their own benefit. Engerman and Sokoloff (2001) argue 
that the institutional differences between the North and the South Americas after the 
European conquest stems from the factor endowment of the two continents. The following 
is their theory. 
They argue that the factor endowment in the South supported resource extraction 
and rent seeking. Huge reserves of precious metals supported mining. The climate in many 
of the southern colonies was suited for growing sugar which can be efficiently produced in 
large plantations. To enjoy economies of scale and extract maximum value, the owners of 
mines and plantations employed large population of slave labour. These labourers had no 
rights and no assets. This contributed to the extreme differences in the distributions of 
landholding, wealth, and political power which shaped future institutions in the South. In 
contrast, the factor endowment in the Northern colonies supported small family-sized farms 
and farming of grains and livestock. This led to the development of a society with relatively 
equitable distribution of wealth and political power and institutions which honours private 
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property rights. Better institutions of the North contributed to her development as an 
advanced capitalist society whereas for the South it was always a struggle thereafter.  
This shows that two different style of colonization policies and hence institutions 
created two different types of capitalist societies in the Americas after the European 
conquest. Many of the old indigenous institutions were replaced after the conquest. The 
economic performance of the two continents thereafter depended on the new institutions. 
The Engerman and Sokoloff (2001) theory shows that the difference in living standards of 
the two continents can be explained by institutional differences which have its root in the 
respective factor endowments. In the regression analysis I do not take into account the 
effects of factor endowments in institutions building. But the results show that there is 
positive correlation between institutions and the level of development on the average when 
I consider a sample which includes countries from both the Americas. 
6.3 Does These Observations Match with the Cross-Country Empirics?  
Asking the above question in itself may horrify historians as they may find the 
research strategy extremely oversimplified. There is no doubt that basing ones judgement 
on the historical process of development on a single cross-section regression is dangerously 
oversimplified. However, relating the partial correlations with the historical facts can give 
us an extra insight or two when there is an urgent need to make the extra step to resolve the 
causality issues. Therefore, it is worth asking this question even though it may not yield a 
precise answer.  
In this section I try to relate the outlined broad structure which I have presented in 
the previous section with the regression results. Can the results explain the dynamics of the 
process? The answer is no but the historical facts and the broad structure can give me some 
hint on why there is correlation in the data in the way it is. 
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The results reported in chapters 4 and 5 shows that both institutions and diseases are 
important explanators in a sample of former European colonies. However when we restrict 
the sample into African economies, malaria becomes the only significant explanator. This is 
consistent with the historical evidence and the broad structure.  
The human population in Western Europe, China, India, and the Americas 
experienced relatively less geographical constraints on agriculture which enabled them to 
escape Malthusian cycles (which I have called stage one in the broad structure) and move 
towards capitalism. Once the Malthusian cycle was broken, it became more important to 
have the right institutions which would help the progress towards capitalism. Western 
Europe was more successful than China, India, and South Central America in this regard 
and the data shows this pattern. Lack of appropriate institutions created high level of 
inequality in the distribution of wealth and political power in the society which in turn 
destroyed the incentives for future investments in physical and human capital. These 
institutions persisted over time and still affect the economic performance of these regions. 
All this is reflected by the pooled sample estimates.  
In contrast the disease environment constrained agricultural production by much 
more in Africa and it remained trapped into the Malthusian cycle of stage one for a long 
time. Even today Africa suffers from high disease incidence and chronic poverty. It reduces 
the years of healthy life expectancy and the productivity of labour. It may also affect 
growth indirectly by delaying the process of demographic transition. With high infant 
mortality and low life expectancy economic agents may focus more on the quantity of 
babies produced rather than their quality. This slows down human capital accumulation 
which has a high growth cost in the long-run. The lack of rule of law and ceaseless conflicts 
complicates the situation of poverty trap even further. However the data does not show any 
systematic effect of rule of law on income. 
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Of course not all of this mechanism is explained by the regressions. The regressions 
only show the net effect of these factors on income. To untangle the mechanism empirically 
one needs to develop better datasets with more historical information. One also needs to 
apply better estimation techniques linking multiple factors. This is something that has 
received some attention lately.62 However, there is a lot that remains to be done in this area.   
Finally, to summarise it is perhaps fair to say that the colonies which escaped the 
stage one either did well or stagnated depending on the quality of their institutions. 
Countries with high disease incidence struggled to escape the poverty trap. Weak 
institutions also added to their problem. Hence, it is not just ‘institutions rule’ or ‘diseases 
dominate.’ The conclusion depends on the continent’s institutional history and geography.  
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter I try to marry the empirical results with historical evidence. I try to 
describe the development of Western Europe by using a broad structure. I divide the 
process of development of Western Europe into four different stages. I compare and 
contrast the European development process with the development processes in Africa, 
China, India, and the Americas using the broad structure. I also formalise the African 
development process using an overlapping generation model. Then I show that the 
historical evidence roughly matches with the empirical findings. Therefore, the outcome of 
the empirics is not just ‘institutions rule’ or ‘diseases dominate.’ It depends on the history 
and geography of the continent that the country belongs to. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 See Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
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WHICH INSTITUTIONS MATTER MOST FOR GROWTH?  
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“The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it.”- Karl Marx (1888), Theses on Feuerbach 
Chapters 4 and 5 show the importance of institutions and malaria in explaining a 
large proportion of the variation in economic development. However, it does not say 
exactly which institutions matter. To find out we need to go beyond the framework of using 
the rule of law index as an overall measure of institutions.63  
The first attempt in this direction is Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). They 
distinguish between ‘property rights institutions’ and ‘contracting institutions’ and test the 
relative contributions of each of these institutions on long-run economic development. 
Using the instrumental variable approach similar to their earlier work (Acemoglu et al. 
2001) they find that the ‘property rights institutions’ have a first order effect on economic 
development whereas the ‘contracting institutions’ impact indirectly. However, it appears 
that their study suffers from identification problems. The log settler mortality instrument 
used to identify the contribution of ‘property rights institutions’ is also correlated with 
human capital and the correlation is independent of the correlation between the first two 
variables. 
In this chapter I revisit the debate over the relative contribution of different types of 
institutions in economic growth. Instead of adopting Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) 
narrow classification of ‘property rights institutions’ and ‘contracting institutions’ I adopt 
Rodrik and Subramanian’s (2003) much broader and exhaustive classification of market 
creating, market regulating, market stabilising, and market legitimising institutions. I 
identify a proxy measure of each of these institutions and test their relative contribution to 
growth. In contrast to the commonly used instrumental variable method of estimation, I use 
                                                 
63 Rodrik et al. (2004) also uses the rule of law index as an overall measure of institutions.  
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the GMM.64 The advantage of using panel data is that it can exploit the time variation in 
the data. It also can be interpreted as a method which takes into account the role of history.  
The results show that strong ‘market creating institutions’ characterized by the 
adequate protection of private property and contract enforcement are growth enhancing. 
The ‘market stabilising institutions’ that ensures macroeconomic stability and does not 
undertake distortionary policies boosts investor confidence and are also good for growth. I 
also notice that there is a growth maximizing level of ‘market regulation’ beyond which it 
increases red tape and kills the incentive for investment. The effect of ‘market legitimising 
institutions’ is statistically insignificant.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section presents the growth model 
which includes four different institutions as the variables of interest and schooling, trade 
and initial income as control variables. The exclusion of malaria from this set is due to the 
lack of relevant time series information on the variable. The four different institutions are 
market creating, market regulating, market stabilizing, and market legitimizing institutions. 
This classification is adopted from the following review articles - Rodrik (2000) and Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2003). The second section discusses a recently published related article 
by Acemoglu and Johnson. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) examine the relative impact of 
property rights institutions and contracting institutions on income levels in 1995 using the 
instrumental variable strategy as they have done in their earlier works. I show that this work 
suffers from identification problem. In the third section I propose the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) strategy to estimate the dynamic panel data model and discuss the data. 
Section 4 presents the regression results and section 5 concludes.    
                                                 
64 It is perhaps appropriate to clarify at this point that econometrically the instrumental variable 
method using a cross-section dataset is a special case of GMM. However, what we refer to here is a method of 
estimation using a cross-section dataset (instrumental variable method) vis-a-vis a method of estimation of a 
dynamic model using panel dataset (GMM).  
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7.1 The Model  
I start with equation (2.7), the growth specification that I derived in chapter 2. The 
only difference between equation (2.7) and this model is iη , the unobserved country 
specific effect which I do not include in the cross-section equation (2.7). The following is 
the model:     
                          ˆiT it iT i iTy yα γ η ε= + + +Z                                      (7.1)  
Where 1ˆ [iT iT ity yT t
≡ −− ]y , the term ity represents log GDP per capita in some 
initial year t, is a vector of ‘deep determinants’ which includes trade, institutions, and 
schooling. Malaria is excluded from this set due to the non availability of relevant time 
series data on the variable. 
iTZ
One can decompose  into a vector of institutions (variables of interest) and a 
vector of other controls and rewrite the model as follows: 
iTZ iTI
iTX
                      ˆiT it iT iT i iTy yα β φ η ε= + + + +I X                           (7.2) 
Where )(γ β φ= . 
Most empirical work linking institutions and economic development implicitly or 
explicitly assumes that the institutions persist. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), and Banerjee 
and Iyer (2005) all identify extractive colonial institutions as the root cause of the current 
economic plight of the former colonies using this assumption.  Even though these studies 
strongly argue in favour of this assumption65, evidence showing otherwise is not rare. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) shows that many of the institutions measures used by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) are highly volatile which leads them to believe that they are 
                                                 
65 See Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
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outcome measures rather than measures of deep determinants.66 Real world examples of 
this volatility are not difficult to find. Haiti has swung between democracy and dictatorship 
over the last three decades frequently changing its constitution and other institutions. The 
situations in Afghanistan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are not too different either. This 
volatility however cannot be solely attributed to the current institutional performance. Some 
component of it certainly has its roots in the colonial past and colonial institutions. 
Therefore, to explain this phenomenon one needs to develop a framework which takes 
account of both volatility and persistence in institutions. 
One way to handle this is to divide the data generating process of institutions into 
two components – the time invariant country specific component which is deep, and the 
time varying component which is also an outcome of the time invariant component. In 
notational terms this implies has two subcomponents - a time invariant and country 
specific component
iTI
iI , and a time varying component which is the outcome of
o
iTI iI . I 
assume that all standard measures of institutions can be theoretically subdivided into these 
two components even though it may be practically impossible to identify them separately. I 
also assume that iI  and are correlated even though it may not be possible to determine 
the degree of correlation.  
o
iTI
Therefore, by incorporating oiT i iT= +I I I we can rewrite the model as 
                    ˆ oiT it iT i iT i iTy yα β β φ η ε= + + + + +I I X                    (7.3) 
Combining iβ I  and iη we get  
                                                 
66 Glaeser et al. (2004) shows that Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) uses measures of 
institutions from the ICRG and PRS database and these measures do not reflect anything permanent or 
durable features of the institutions. They are rather measures of policy outcome. It is important to note that the 
permanency or the depth of the deep factors, in particular institutions, has been relied on to justify the use of 
historical instruments like log settler mortality, log population density in 1500 etc.  
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                      ˆ oiT it iT iT i iTy yα β φ μ ε= + + + +I X                            (7.4) 
Where i i iμ β η= +I  
The institutions vector  includes market creating, market regulating, market 
stabilising, and market legitimising institutions.  
iTI
Market creating institutions are those that protect property rights and ensure that the 
contracts are enforced. Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) calls them market creating since, in 
their absence, either the markets do not exist or they perform very poorly. In a recently 
published article Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) also uses these two variants of institutions. 
They however call them property rights institutions and contracting institutions. The theory 
behind these institutions is also associated with North (1981). North argues that good 
institutions simultaneously provide checks against expropriation of private property by the 
government or other powerful political groups and supports private contracts. This ensures 
that a broad cross section of the society have incentives to invest and take part in economic 
life. This is essential for the creation of a market.  
Market regulating institutions are those that prevent market failure and help to 
sustain the growth momentum over the long-run. These institutions aim to stop any market 
participant from engaging in fraudulent or anti-competitive behaviour, to reduce the risk of 
imperfect information, and to minimise the overall transaction costs of economic exchange 
in a market. From a firm’s point of view, these institutions help them to internalize 
technological and other non-pecuniary externalities by reducing transaction costs. Anti-trust 
laws, financial and securities regulatory authorities are good examples of regulatory 
institutions. Rodrik (2000) argues that one of the preconditions of a successful market 
economy is effective regulatory vigilance. Otherwise, the growth momentum can easily be 
lost over the long-run.  
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Market stabilizing institutions are those that build resilience towards shocks, reduce 
inflationary pressure, minimise macroeconomic volatility and avert financial crises. The 
recent experiences in Latin America and in South East Asia indicate that financial markets 
are inherently volatile and financial instability can easily transmit into the real economy 
resulting into a larger crisis in the absence of appropriate and effective stabilisation 
institutions. A high inflation rate and increased macroeconomic volatility not only affects 
the living standard of the household, but it also affects the firm by limiting credit 
availability and increasing the cost of credit. Therefore, the role of the central bank is 
paramount in terms of stabilising the economy in the event of a shock. 
Market legitimising institutions are those that handle redistribution, manage social 
conflict, and provide social protection and insurance in the event of a shock. In a modern 
market economy idiosyncratic risk to income and employment are widespread. An 
economy experiencing sustained economic growth coupled with rapid technological 
progress is often observed to change its focus from a low skilled sector to a high skilled 
one. This is also accompanied by obvious changes in the labour demand. The demand for 
high skilled workers dominates over the demand for low skilled ones resulting into massive 
job cuts in the low skilled sector. This affects income and welfare of low skilled workers. 
Redistribution, social protection and insurance are critically important in this situation to 
avoid social conflict. This redistributive role is being performed by market legitimising 
institutions in order to make market economy compatible with social stability and social 
cohesion. Examples of market legitimising institutions include democracy, free election, 
pension systems, unemployment insurance schemes, and other social funds. 
7.2 Recently Published Related Work  
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) examine the relative impact of property rights 
institutions and contracting institutions on long-run economic growth. They estimate a 
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model with log GDP per capita in 1995 as the dependent variable and property rights 
institutions and contracting institutions as explanatory variables using the cross-section 
instrumental variable approach. They use log settler mortality as an instrument for property 
rights institutions and British legal origin as an instrument for contracting institutions. Their 
results show that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic 
growth. Contracting institutions however does not have direct effects. They also show that 
the result is robust even when they control for religion, latitude, and log inflation. 
Table 7.1:  Identification Problems in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
Log per Capita GDP in 1995 Dependent Variable 
Model (1) 
obs=41 
Model (2) 
obs=43 
Model (3) 
obs=39 
Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS  
Legal Formalism 
 
Constraint on 
Executive 
 
Average Protection 
against 
Expropriation  
 
Total Years of 
Schooling (1995) 
0.06 
(0.1735) 
0.77*** 
(0.1869) 
0.40** 
(0.1712) 
 
 
 
1.12*** 
(0.2159) 
0.18** 
(0.0880) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.42*** 
(0.0583) 
Panel B: First Stage for Property Rights Institutions (Protection against Expropriation or Executive 
Constraint) and Total Years of Schooling (1995) 
Total Years of Schooling (1995) 
 
Dependent Variables Constraint on Executive 
obs=41 
Average Protection against 
Expropriation  
obs=43 obs=55 obs=51 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
  
English Legal Origin 
 
 
Constraint on 
Executive 
 
Average Protection 
against 
Expropriation  
 
R2
-0.91*** 
(0.2104) 
 
-0.28 
(0.4617) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3285 
-0.70*** 
(0.1467) 
 
0.46* 
(0.3237) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4238 
-1.51*** 
(0.2339) 
 
0.26 
(0.4925) 
 
0.27** 
(0.1501) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.6356 
-1.32*** 
(0.2241) 
 
-0.43 
(0.4896) 
 
 
 
 
0.72*** 
(0.1892) 
 
 
0.7016 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. All the regressions reported above 
are carried out with an intercept. English Legal Origin is used as an instrument for Legal Formalism. 
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This study like Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) also suffers from 
identification problem. A regression analysis similar to what I have done in Table 4.2 
shows that the log settler mortality instrument is correlated with the total years of schooling 
in 1995 and the correlation is independent of the correlation between total years of 
schooling and property rights institutions. 
The specification in Model (1) of Table 7.1 is identical to the specification reported 
in column (1) of Table 4 in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).67 They use Legal formalism 
and constrained on the executive as measures of contracting institutions and property rights 
institutions respectively. The instruments used for contracting and property rights 
institutions are English legal origin and log settler mortality respectively. By re-estimating 
the model using their definition of the variables I find a similar answer. Constraint on the 
executive has a strong positive effect and the coefficient estimate is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Estimating the same model using an alternative measure of property rights 
institutions (protection against expropriation) also confirms findings in column (5) of Table 
4 in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). But if I replace property rights institutions with total 
years of schooling and re-estimate the model using the same set of instruments, then 
schooling comes out to be statistically significant (see Model (3) in Table 7.1). This implies 
that the instruments can predict schooling as good as they predict property rights 
institutions. One may argue that this is happening because of the strong correlation between 
schooling and property rights institutions. A closer look at the first stage regressions 
involving total years of schooling reveal otherwise. The correlation between schooling and 
log settler mortality is independent of the correlation between schooling and property rights 
institutions (see the 3rd and 4th column of Table 7.1, Panel B). The partial R2 calculations of 
these first stage regressions also show that the 45% of the variation in schooling is 
                                                 
67 See p. 972 of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
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explained by log settler mortality whereas 6% of the variation is explained by executive 
constraints and 23% by expropriation risk. 
Therefore this gives us a clear message. Their result suffers from identification 
problems and does not reveal the true contribution of property rights institutions and 
contracting institutions to economic development. This is largely due to the use of the log 
settler mortality instrument. 
7.3 Estimation Strategy and Data 
7.3.1 Estimation Strategy 
To estimate equation (7.4) I use the Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel data 
estimation method. This method takes into account the time series variation in the data 
which helps to explain the dynamics. The endogeneity problems are taken care of by using 
lagged values of institutions and other control variables as instruments. It also takes into 
account the role of history without using any historical instruments and yields consistent 
estimates.  
In order to demonstrate how this method takes care of history, let’s rewrite equation 
(7.4) as follows: 
           (( ) 1) ( ) ( )oiT it iT iT i iTy T t y T t T tα β φ μ= − + + − + − + +I X ε                    (7.5) 
Estimating the above equation using the pooled cross-section method will yield 
biased estimates since ity is correlated with the composite error term.
68 One may argue why 
not eliminate the country specific fixed effect by differencing the data. However, 
differencing the data has its own problems.  
                                                 
68 To be more accurate ity is correlated with iI  and hence iμ .   
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Let us assume that t =T-1.69 Now by first differencing equation (7.5) I get the 
following: 
                 1( 1)
o
iT iT iT iT iTy yα β φI X−Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δε
1]ε −
             (7.6) 
Expanding this yields 
    (7.7) 1 1 2 1( 1)[ ] [ ] [
o o
iT iT iT iT iT iT iT iT iTy y y yα β φ εI I X− − − −− = + − + − + Δ + −
The terms 1iTy − and 1iTε − are clearly not independent from each other implying 
that 1iTy −Δ and 1iTε −Δ are correlated. Hence, least square estimation of this equation will 
yield biased estimates. Therefore, some sort of instrumental variable approach is required 
so that the instrument is correlated with 1iTy −Δ but uncorrelated with iTεΔ . One such 
approach is the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. The estimator 
exploits the following theoretical moment conditions. 
                    ( ) ( ) 0, ( ) 0,& ( ) 0 2i iT i iT iT iT sE E E E sμ ε μ ε ε ε −= = = = ∀ ≥            (7.8) 
In other words, it uses lagged levels of iTy , , and as instruments. However, 
when the explanatory variables are persistent over time then the lagged levels of these 
variables are weak instruments for first difference. Blundell and Bond (1998)
iTI iTX
70 mitigate 
this problem by using an additional moment condition. This also becomes necessary when 
the sample size is small. The additional moment condition is the following:  
                              1[ ( )] 0i iT iTE μ ε ε −− =                                                        (7.9)  
In other words, the Blundell and Bond (1998) method uses current differences and 
lagged levels of explanatory variables as instruments. Since it uses lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables as instrument, therefore, the instrument matrix should include iI  
                                                 
69 In fact in my data t =T-5. I am assuming t = T-1 to simplify the algebra.   
70 For a detailed discussion on Blundell and Bond (1998) estimation, see Technical Appendix TA6 
(p. 175). 
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which is a component of iT k−I where .1k ≥ 71 This implies that , the outcome component 
of the current measures of institutions are instrumented by
o
iTI
iI  , the deep historical 
component of the current measures of institutions. This takes into account the role of 
history in the evolution of these deep factors over time. The advantage of this method over 
the cross-section instrumental variable method is that it manages to overcome the 
identification problem. The lagged institutions identify the current institutions whereas the 
lagged schooling identifies the current schooling.    
The consistency of this GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. 
There are two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) which can check the validity of the instruments.  
The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which checks whether 
the instruments as a group appear exogenous. The Sargan test statistic is not robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. An alternative is Hansen’s J statistic which is robust 
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and hence I use this variant of the test.  
The second test examines the hypothesis that the error terms are not second-order 
serially correlated. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the lags of the dependent 
variables are endogenous and hence bad instruments. The outcomes of these tests are 
reported in the results table. 
Therefore, it appears from the above discussion that the growth regression model as 
opposed to the levels framework of Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
can take care of both institutional persistence and institutional volatility. The Blundell and 
Bond (1998) estimation method also overcomes the identification problem of the 
commonly used cross-section instrumental variable method. 
                                                 
71 For a more general discussion on the instrument matrix of the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, 
see Technical Appendix TA6. For a more detailed review of GMM estimation in empirical growth models see 
Bond et al. (2001). 
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7.3.2 The Dataset 
 The dataset for the analysis include measures of per capita GDP growth and levels, 
measures of institutions, measure of schooling, and trade share. The data covers the period 
1980 to 2004 and approximately five year averages are calculated to smooth out business 
cycle fluctuations. The 1980 data point is the average over the period 1980-82, the 1985 
data point is the average over the period 1983-87, the 1990 data point is the average over 
the period 1988-1992, the 1995 data point is the average over the period 1993-97, the 2000 
data point is the average over the period 1998-2001, and the 2004 data point is the average 
over the period 2002-2004. There are missing observations in the dataset and hence the 
panel is unbalanced. But the problem of missing observations is fairly minor.         
The GDP per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) measured at constant 2000 
international dollars data is obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI) online 
database. This gives information for 127 countries. The reason behind using WDI data 
instead of Penn World Table is the larger time coverage of the former. WDI data allows me 
to extend the study to 2004. Annualised growth rates are calculated using the 
formula 5
1ˆ (
5iT iT iT
y y y −≡ − ) . In the process of calculating growth rate, I lose the 1980 
observation. Otherwise the data on growth rates are fairly complete.  
I use four measures of institutions. The Law and Order index measures the 
effectiveness of market creating institutions. A high Law and Order score implies better 
protection of private property and efficient enforcement of contracts. The assessment is 
made on a six point scale with a high score implying better law and order. The index is 
available from 1984 so I can only compute five data points for Law and Order.    
An index which takes into account regulation in the credit market, labour market, 
and business in general measures the effectiveness of market regulating institutions. It 
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comes in five year intervals and covers the period 1980 to 2004. The effectiveness is 
measured on an eleven point scale ranging from 0 to 10 with a high score implying fewer 
regulations. One can debate whether fewer regulations imply better regulatory institutions. 
It can very well be the case that fewer regulations imply more foul play eventually leading 
to a market failure. However, the publishers of the data claim that fewer regulations can 
increase transparency in the system and reduce the amount of red tape which will allow 
regulatory institutions to function efficiently. In fact the regression analysis shows that 
there is an optimal level of regulation for growth. This measure is obtained from Gwartney 
and Lawson. (2005).  
An index which takes into account: a) average annual growth of the money supply 
in the last five years minus average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years, b) 
standard inflation variability in the last five years, and c) recent inflation rate measures the 
effectiveness of the central bank is the measure of market stabilising institution. This 
measure also ranges from 0 to 10 with a high score implying more sound money. It comes 
in five year intervals and covers the period 1980 to 2004. The source of this measure is 
Gwartney and Lawson. (2005). 
Finally, democracy index from the Polity IV dataset measures the effectiveness of 
market legitimising institutions. Similar to the regulation and stabilization index, this 
measure also ranges from 0 to 10 with a high score implying more democratic system. 
Democracy data covers the period 1980 to 2004.  
The schooling measure is from the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset. It measure the 
average schooling years in the total population. The schooling data spans the period 1980 to 
2000 and therefore the 2004 data point is missed out in this case.  
The trade share measure that I use for this chapter is from WDI except a few 
exceptions which I have mentioned in the Data Appendix. This is done to maintain parity 
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with the GDP per capita data. It is one of the simplest measures of trade openness where 
trade is expressed as a share of GDP. 
Table 7.2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Number of 
obs. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Economic Growth and Development 
Growth  ( ˆ )iTy  
Log Initial 
Income  5( )iTy −
629 
 
629     
0.014 
 
8.4     
0.031 
 
1.13        
-0.10 
 
6.01      
0.35 
 
10.88 
Trade Openness 
Log Trade Share of GDP 
(LTRS) 
754 
 
4.19 
         
0.59 
 
2.43 
 
6.01 
 
Market Creating Institutions 
Law and Order (LO) 507 3.7 1.5 0.3 6 
Market Regulating Institutions 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labor, Business (MR) 
616 
    
5.6         1.1           2.5    8.8 
Market Stabilizing Institutions  
Sound Money Index 
(SM) 
634 7.5 2.5 0   9.8           
Market Legitimizing Institutions 
 Democracy Index 
(DEMOC) 
659 
 
5.0 
 
4.1 
 
0 
 
10 
 
Schooling 
Total Years of Schooling 
(TYS) 
482     5.4     2.9          0.4     12.3 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 7.3. The pairwise correlation shows that 
all the institution measures, schooling, and log trade share are positively correlated with 
growth. 
Notes: For a detailed discussion of the definition and source of these variables, see Data Appendix. 
More detailed description of the dataset including sources is available from the Data 
Appendix. Table 7.2 presents the descriptive statistics for all of these variables. 
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Table 7.3. Pairwise Correlation (obs=323) 
 Growth 
ˆ( )iTy  
  
Log Initial 
Income 
 5( )iTy −
 
Law and 
Order 
(LO) 
 
Democracy 
(DEMOC) 
 
Sound 
Money 
Index  
(SM) 
Regulation of 
Credit, Labor, 
Business 
 (MR) 
Total Years of 
Schooling 
(TYS) 
Log Trade Share of 
GDP  
(LTRS) 
Growth ˆ( )iTy  
 
Log Initial 
Income  5( )iTy −
 
Law and Order 
(LO) 
 
Democracy 
(DEMOC) 
 
Sound Money 
Index (SM) 
 
Regulation of 
Credit, Labor, 
Business (MR) 
 
Total Years of 
Schooling (TYS) 
 
Log Trade Share 
of GDP (LTRS) 
 1.0000 
 
 
 0.1887             1.0000 
 
 
 0.3631             0.7243             1.0000 
 
 
 
 0.1639             0.6824             0.5321         1.0000 
 
 
0.3075              0.2753             0.3770         0.1796             1.0000 
 
 
0.1812              0.4437             0.4287         0.5066             0.4089               1.0000 
 
 
 
 0.3071            0.8511              0.7217         0.6237            0.2746                0.4899                  1.0000 
 
 
 0.1729            0.1250              0.1969          0.0626           0.2707                0.2740                  0.1497                      1.0000 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Regression Results 
Main Results: 
The model is estimated by using the Blundell and Bond (1998) generalised method 
of moments (GMM). In columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Table 7.4 the institutions measures 
are used one at a time. Column (1) shows that market creating institutions (law and order) 
has positive and statistically significant effects on growth. However, the specification fails 
the Hansen test and hence the estimates are not reliable.  
The specification presented in column (2) shows that there is no direct relationship 
between market regulating institutions and growth when the effect of other institutions are 
not controlled for.  
The specification in column (3) uses strong money index (market stabilising 
institutions) as a proxy measure of institutions and finds it to be statistically significant. The 
specification however fails the Hansen test and the test for AR (2) in the residuals. 
Column (4) uses democracy (market legitimising institutions) as a proxy measure of 
institutions showing democracy has no direct effect on growth.  
Column (5) presents the preferred specification. In this specification I control for all 
the four different types (market creating, market regulating, market stabilising, and market 
legitimising) of institutions. The regression shows that law and order (market creating 
institutions), strong money index (market stabilising institutions), and total years of 
schooling positively impacts growth and the coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant. A one sample standard deviation (1.5 point) increase in law and order on its 
own increases annual growth on the average by 0.8% approximately.72 Holding all other 
factors constant a similar increase (2.5 point) in strong money index increases annual 
                                                 
72 The coefficient estimates relate exactly to equation 7.4 with the dependent variable 5
1ˆ ( )
5iT iT iT
y y y −≡ − .  
 145 
 
growth by 0.8%. The coefficients on the regulation of credit, labour, and business (market 
regulating institutions) and democracy index (market legitimising institutions) are 
statistically insignificant. The institutions measures are jointly significant at the 1% level 
(see p-value of the joint F test).   
This shows that the ‘market creating institutions’ (protection of private property and 
contact enforcement) and the ‘market stabilising institutions’ matters the most among all 
other institutions when it comes to economic growth. 
Poor quality of property rights protection and contract enforcement dampens the 
incentive to invest and often crowds out investment from the domestic economy. The lack 
of private property protection raises the cost of foreign investment discouraging foreign 
investors to invest. The complete absence or the presence of a weak contract enforcement 
mechanism causes organisational inefficiency (Williamson 1985) and raises the operating 
costs of investments eating up re-investable surpluses. The risk related to asymmetric 
information also gets bigger if the contract enforcement mechanism is weak. 
The positive coefficient on strong money index (market stabilising institutions) 
implies that the overall macroeconomic environment is crucial for growth. In an integrated 
world economy - both economically and financially - the real dangers from a shock are 
more potent than ever before. In the event of a shock a well functioning market stabilising 
institution resorts to policies which minimise the cost to the economy without affecting 
investor confidence. It also refrains from undertaking distortionary macroeconomic policies 
such as high inflation, large budget deficits, and overvalued exchange rate which can 
destroy incentives for investment in the long run. Therefore it is important for the central 
bank, treasury and other market stabilising institutions to get things right at least on the 
average to generate economic growth. Acemoglu et al. (2003) argues that these institutional 
performances can be traced back to the colonial institutions. Countries that were settler 
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colonies inherited better institutions from their colonial past and delivers better 
macroeconomic policies. Whereas countries that were non-settler colonies inherited 
extractive institutions from their colonial past and delivers poor and distortionary 
macroeconomic policies. They use the 2SLS strategy and the log settler mortality 
instrument to establish causality. This has obvious problems of identification similar to 
what I have demonstrated in section 7.2.73 In contrast, this exercise takes care of history by 
using the lagged values of ‘market stabilising institutions’ as instruments.74 However, the 
role of history cannot be separately identified from good policy. Therefore, ideally it should 
be interpreted as the effect of the institutional change over the last two decades which has 
its origin both in history and in current policy. 
 
 
73 For a summary of the shortcomings of this study see Technical Appendix TA7 (p.177). 
74 This refers to iI in the model. 
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Table 7.4. Relative Contribution of Institutions to Economic Growth: Blundell and Bond GMM Estimates 
ˆ( )Dependent Variable: Annualised Growth  iTy   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institutions 
Law and Order (LO) 
 
Regulation of Credit, Labour, 
Business (MR) 
 
Sound Money Index (SM) 
 
Democracy Index (DEMOC) 
 
Other Controls 
Log Initial Income  5( )iTy −
 
Total Years of Schooling (TYS) 
 
Log Trade Share  
 (LTRS) 
 
MR2
 
DEMOC2 
 
Specification tests (p values) 
Joint F test (Institutions) 
Hansen test 
Test for AR(1) in residuals 
Test for AR(2) in residuals 
Observations/Countries 
 
0.004** 
(0.0020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.0080) 
 
0.004 
(0.0029) 
0.028** 
(0.0109) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.060 
0.001 
0.291 
348/87 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.0029) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.0080) 
 
0.007** 
(0.0034) 
0.029** 
(0.0111) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.109 
0.001 
0.325 
363/93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
 
 
 
-4e-04 
(0.0070) 
 
0.005* 
(0.0028) 
0.015** 
(0.0077) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.009 
0.000 
0.032 
369/93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4e-04 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.011 
(0.0084) 
 
0.01** 
(0.0038) 
0.017** 
(0.0082) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.157 
0.001 
0.251 
370/95 
 
0.005** 
(0.0020) 
-0.003 
(0.0024) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
-3e-04 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.01* 
(0.0063) 
 
0.006** 
(0.0026) 
0.008 
(0.0058) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0027 
0.351 
0.001 
0.174 
323/83 
 
0.005** 
(0.0020) 
0.023 
(0.0153) 
 
0.002** 
(0.0009) 
-0.001 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.012** 
(0.0059) 
 
0.007*** 
(0.0024) 
0.005 
(0.0058) 
 
-0.002* 
(0.0013) 
 
 
 
0.0079 
0.670 
0.002 
0.166 
323/83 
 
0.005*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.003 
(0.0025) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
0.001 
(0.0021) 
 
-0.008 
(0.0063) 
 
0.005** 
(0.0025) 
0.008 
(0.0055) 
 
 
 
-1e-04 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0030 
0.776 
0.001 
0.175 
323/83 
 
0.005*** 
(0.0018) 
0.023 
(0.0148) 
 
0.002** 
(0.0009) 
3e-04 
 (0.0021) 
 
-0.01* 
(0.0059) 
 
0.006*** 
(0.0024) 
0.005 
(0.0053) 
 
-0.002* 
(0.0013) 
-1e-04 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0044 
0.966 
0.002 
0.174 
323/83 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Hansen 
test is the test of the H0: the instruments as a group are exogenous. Hansen test statistic from two step Arellano & Bond estimations is reported which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. Arellano and Bond AR(1) & AR(2) tests in residuals are also reported. Note that to pass these tests, one has to reject the null of no 
AR(1) and fail to reject the null of no AR(2). 
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Regulation of credit, labour, and business (market regulating institutions) do not 
matter for growth. This is what comes out of the linear specification reported in column (5). 
However, when nonlinearity is introduced in the model in column (6), I observe that the 
coefficient estimate on the market regulating institutions squared is negative and 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the linear term is positive. This implies that there 
is a particular level of regulation that maximises growth. That level turns out to be 4.93 
which lie well within the sample range of the market regulating institutions variable (which 
is 0 to 10). The optimal level of regulation is obtained by equating the partial derivative of 
growth with respect to MR to zero. This implies that too much or too little regulation is not 
good for growth. Too little regulation encourages anti-competitive behaviour among the 
firms and can lead to market failure. Too much regulation on the other hand can lead to red 
tape which has tangible costs to the economy. The nonlinear effect of regulation on growth 
is preserved even when I control for nonlinearities in democracy index in column (8).  
Observing that democracy (market legitimising institutions) does not matter in the 
linear specification we try to check for nonlinearity in a similar fashion as in the case of 
‘market regulating institutions’. Column (7) estimates show that there is no evidence of 
nonlinearity as far as democracy is concerned. This implies that democracy is not a 
necessary condition for economic growth. An economy can generate steady economic 
growth even without a democratic polity if the dictatorial state honours private property 
right, enforces contracts, and handles the macroeconomic situation judiciously. The 
Chinese case is perhaps a good example of this. I will discuss more about this in the next 
section. 
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Table 7.5. Robustness Check: Estimating the Model using Alternative Methods 
Dependent Variable: Annualised Growth  ˆ( )iTy   
Cross-section OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effect GMM Arellano & 
Bond 
GMM Blundell & 
Bond 
Log Initial Income  5( )iTy −
 
Law and Order (LO) 
 
Regulation of Credit, Labour, 
Business (MR) 
Sound Money Index (SM) 
 
Democracy Index (DEMOC) 
 
Total Years of Schooling 
(TYS) 
Log Trade Share  
 (LTRS) 
Specification tests (p values) 
Hansen test 
Test for AR(1) in residuals 
Test for AR(2) in residuals 
F test that all μi=0 
F test for overall significance 
R2
Observations/Countries 
-0.01*** 
(0.0046) 
 
0.005** 
(0.0023) 
-0.003 
(0.0028) 
0.003** 
(0.0013) 
0.001 
(0.0008) 
0.003* 
(0.0016) 
0.002 
(0.0032) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
0.4011 
--/80 
-0.01*** 
(0.0025) 
 
0.005*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.001 
(0.0015) 
0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
3e-04 
(0.0005) 
0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
0.003 
(0.0024) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
0.2211 
323/-- 
-0.05*** 
(0.0059) 
 
0.004*** 
(0.0013) 
0.001 
(0.0018) 
8.5e-04 
(0.0006) 
4e-04 
(0.0005) 
0.003* 
(0.0017) 
0.024*** 
(0.0057) 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 
 
 
323/83 
-0.08*** 
(0.0117) 
 
0.004** 
(0.0015) 
0.004** 
(0.0021) 
1e-05 
(0.0007) 
8e-05 
(0.0007) 
0.002 
(0.0029) 
0.022*** 
(0.0070) 
 
0.0004 
0.0191 
0.344 
 
 
 
240/83 
-0.01* 
(0.0063) 
 
0.005** 
(0.0020) 
-0.003 
(0.0024) 
0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
-3e-04 
(0.0009) 
0.006** 
(0.0026) 
0.008 
(0.0058) 
 
0.351 
0.001 
0.174 
 
 
 
323/83 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Hansen 
test is the test of the H0: the instruments as a group are exogenous. Hansen test statistic from two step Arellano & Bond estimations is reported which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. Arellano and Bond AR(1) & AR(2) tests in residuals are also reported. Note that to pass these tests, one has to reject the null of no 
AR(1) and fail to reject the null of no AR(2). Also note that I have used annualized growth rate as the dependent variable in case of the cross-section OLS which is 
calculated by the formula 2004 1980
1 ln( / )
24
y y . 
 
 
Robustness: 
To check the robustness of the preferred specification reported in column (5) of 
Table 7.4, I re-estimate the model using cross-section OLS, pooled OLS, fixed effects, and 
GMM Arellano and Bond methods. This is reported in Table 7.5. The motivation behind 
doing this is from the recent Monte Carlo findings of Hauk and Wacziarg (2004). They 
show that in the presence of measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity fixed-effect 
estimator will tend to inflate the ‘conditional convergence’ coefficient (the coefficient on 
initial income) and bias the other coefficients towards zero. When the measurement error is 
random and there is unobserved heterogeneity then the cross-section OLS performs the best 
in a Monte Carlo experiment. One likely reason can be that it forces the errors to zero on 
the average if the time dimension of the sample is relatively large. Many of the variables 
used in this study are likely candidates of measurement error as there is a possibility of 
‘halo’ effect (see Dollar and Kraay 2003),75 data misreporting, problems related to index 
numbers etc.  Therefore, it makes perfect sense to check how the estimates behave when 
alternative estimation techniques are used. 
The coefficient on law and order is identical in cross-section OLS, pooled OLS, and 
GMM Blundell and Bond. The fixed effect estimate biases it towards zero. This is also 
consistent with the Monte Carlo findings. However in all the cases the estimates are 
statistically significant. 
The effect of strong money index is identical in both the cross-section OLS and the 
GMM Blundell and Bond. The fixed effect estimate suffers from attenuation bias and is 
                                                 
75The ‘halo’ effect implies that countries with higher income are more likely to be deemed by 
assessors to have better institutions and other macroeconomic indicators as they are observed to be rich.  This 
may lead to a systematic bias in the measures in favour of the world’s rich economies. 
 
 151 
 
insignificantly different from zero. The coefficient estimates are statistically significant 
except in the case of fixed effects and GMM Arellano and Bond estimators. 
Democracy index and regulation index are statistically insignificant across all the 
methods of estimation except the Arellano and Bond GMM case in which the latter is 
statistically significant.  
The coefficient estimate on initial income remains identical in case of cross-section 
OLS, pooled OLS, and GMM Blundell and Bond. The GMM Arellano and Bond estimates 
are not reliable as they fail the specification tests. This may be due to the weak instrument 
problem that this estimator faces in a small sample.76 The fixed effect estimate is inflated as 
predicted by the Monte Carlo findings of Hauk and Wacziarg (2004).  
Therefore, in sum the results show that market creating and market stabilising 
institutions are important for growth. Too much or too little regulation is not good for 
growth and there exists a growth maximising level of regulation. Democracy does not seem 
to matter. The main result is also robust across different estimation methods. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter estimates the relative contribution of ‘market creating’, ‘market 
regulating’, ‘market stabilising’, and ‘market legitimising’ institutions using the GMM. 
‘Market creating institutions’ protect property rights and ensure contract enforcement; 
‘market regulating institutions’ deal with externalities, economies of scale, and imperfect 
information; ‘market stabilising institutions’ ensure low inflation and macroeconomic 
stability; and ‘market legitimising institutions’ manage redistribution and minimise social 
conflict. I find that strong ‘market creating institutions’ and ‘market stabilising institutions’ 
are growth enhancing. Protection of private property creates incentives for investment 
                                                 
76 It is also worth noting that if the Arellano and Bond moment conditions are rejected by a Sargan or Hansen 
test, then the Blundell and Bond estimator is also invalid since it uses the same moment conditions, as well as 
extra ones.  
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whereas strong contract enforcement mechanism raises the organisational efficiency in the 
economy and both boosts growth. Strong ‘market stabilising institutions’ minimises 
macroeconomic volatility and policy distortions and attracts more investments which 
generates growth. It appears that too much or too little regulation is not good for growth. 
The inevitable fallout of too little regulation is anti competitive behaviour whereas too 
much regulation leads to red tape. ‘Market legitimising institutions’ does not seem to 
matter for growth. This is perhaps because the ‘market legitimising’ functions can also be 
performed by non-democratic institutions.   
A panel data approach is used rather than a cross-section approach because the latter 
suffers from identification problems.  The identification problem happens because of the 
correlation between the oft used log settler mortality instrument and current schooling and 
this correlation is independent of the correlation between institutions and current schooling. 
The identification problem is taken care of by controlling for schooling in a growth 
regression model. The GMM strategy also allows me to make use of the time variation in 
the data. 
The instrumental variable method relies heavily on the assumption of institutional 
persistence. Even though this appears to be a plausible assumption, examples of 
institutional volatility are not uncommon. Therefore, one needs to account for both features 
of institutions in a framework. The GMM method allows me to do that. The use of lagged 
levels of explanatory variables as instruments for current differences of the same accounts 
for the role of history on current institutional outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The major results that come out of the analysis are as follows. The empirical results 
in chapters 4 and 5 shows that institutions, market proximity, malaria, and Catholicism 
have direct effects on development. Catholicism is associated with poor institutions and is 
not good for trade. Malaria is the most important factor for the African economies. Malaria 
impacts African development through discouraging economic agents to save for the future. 
High discount rate on future consumption due to malaria and the resulting lack of saving 
translates into a situation of poverty trap.  
Among the institution variables, strong ‘market creating institutions’ and ‘market 
stabilising institutions’ are growth enhancing. I also observe that there is an optimal level of 
regulation that the ‘market regulating institutions’ can impose in order to maximise growth. 
‘Market legitimising institutions’ does not seem to matter. It also appears from the analysis 
that the levels regression technique adopted by most of the existing studies suffers from 
omitted variable bias and identification problems.    
Even though we learn more about which institutions matter and which doesn’t for 
growth, the results should not be interpreted as a recipe for economic growth. They are 
indicative of the average relationship which does not necessarily mean that they can predict 
individual cases. Therefore designing macroeconomic policy based on these results may not 
yield the desired result for each and every country. Policies have to be tied to the first order 
economic principles and recognise the local conditions of the region. Two perfect examples 
of these contrasting features are China and India. China’s conscious policy of opening the 
economy may be well grounded in first order economic principles (protection of property 
rights, contract enforcement, effective regulation, sound money, rule of law and democracy 
and so on), but the Chinese way of doing things is quite different from the rest of the world. 
Even though the communist state did not change its laws to allow private property rights, it 
devised novel institutional arrangements such as the Township Village Enterprises (TVEs) 
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to substitute the formal property rights institutions and perform the same tasks.77 These 
types of quasi capitalist institutions are helping China to grow as fast as 10% per annum 
over the last two decades. India’s institutions on the other hand are much closer to the 
mainstream with constitutional protection of private enterprise, contract enforcement etc. 
However, India’s growth has been steady but moderate in comparison to China over the 
same period. This tells us that Washington Consensus type policies may not be as 
successful as policies which are based on the first order economic principles but at the same 
time takes into consideration local history and culture.   
The Africa result does make a strong case for aid. However, resorting to big push 
style policy of aid may not be as effective as a micro level policy. Any big push style policy 
relies on planning and any planning exercise disregards the often unsolvable information 
and incentive problems attached with it (Easterly 2006). In particular, the incentive of the 
aid worker and the information problems associated with the aid infrastructure are often 
overlooked in a macro level planning. Therefore, these aspects need to be looked at while 
designing a policy and in order to make it effective. A step by step approach seems to be a 
way to go rather than a holistic approach.  
Like any other research, this thesis also raises many questions for the future. Even 
though the empirical results show that institutions are one of the root causes of economic 
development, it is based on the assumption that they persist over time. This part of the story 
is yet to be established. Even though quite a few influential studies (Banerjee and Iyer 
(2005), Acemoglu et al. (2001)) report evidence of institutional persistence, evidence of 
lack of persistence is not hard to find.78 Further research is needed to explain under what 
                                                 
77The TVEs are owned by the local communities and they are keen to ensure prosperity of the TVEs 
as their equity stake generates direct revenues for them (Rodrik 2003, Qian 2003). Qian (2003) observes that 
the TVEs were the growth engine of China until the mid 1990s.  
78 See Glaeser et al. (2004). 
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condition institutions persist and under what condition they don’t. It also remains to be seen 
how much of the institutional persistence or lack of persistence can be explained by culture, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, and inequality. It also begs an explanation why institutions 
differ. Is it because of the influence of tradition and culture or is it because of inequality 
and its impact on the political economy of the country? These are questions that can be 
thought of as possible extensions of the topic that I have dealt with in the thesis. 
Finally, going back to the fundamental question that any piece of research has to 
face – what is the significance of this work? Of course it does not provide us with a magic 
formula to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor and not to mention the Holy Grail. 
However, it does flag the importance of history, geography, politics, and culture in 
economic development. A better understanding of the interconnection between these 
factors may increase our knowledge of how countries grow. The work presented here 
suggests that this is perhaps the way to go. 
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TA1. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of Model 2 in Chapter 4 
I check the sensitivity of the Model 2 estimation results to outliers. I take out one 
observation at a time and estimate the model 39 times and evaluate the statistical 
significance and the range of the coefficient estimates. Following is the result of this test. 
Table TA1. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of Model 2 in Chapter 4 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000 
Truncated Sample (obs=38) 
Dependent 
Variable Estimates with Full 
Sample (obs=39) Maximum Minimum Statistical 
significance 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
 
Average Rule of 
Law Index 
 
Malaria Risk 
 
Natural log of 
Trade Share 
 
Enrolment Ratio in 
1900 
 
Catholicism 
 
0.29* 
(0.1879) 
 
0.89*** 
(0.3173) 
 
-1.61*** 
(0.3238) 
-0.08 
(0.1685) 
 
0.004 
(0.0049) 
 
0.004 
(0.0032) 
0.37 
 
 
0.95 
 
 
-1.78 
 
-0.04 
 
 
0.005 
 
 
0.004 
0.22 
 
 
0.84 
 
 
-1.55 
 
-0.088 
 
 
0.003 
 
 
0.003 
At least at 10% 
level in 31 out of 
39 times 
At least at 5% in 
all the cases 
 
At least at 5% in 
all the cases 
Not statistically 
significant 
 
Not statistically 
significant 
 
Not statistically 
significant  
 Notes: ***,  ** and * indicates significance level of 1%,  5% and 10% level respectively against a one sided 
alternative. The standard errors of all the regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions 
reported above are carried out with an intercept. 
 
Therefore the above results show that the major conclusions coming out of Model 2 
in chapter 4 is not dependent on the outliers and is fairly robust. In the pooled regression I 
report that malaria risk has a negative effect and institutions have a positive effect on 
current GDP level and the relationships are statistically significant at the 1% level against a 
two sided alternative. In all the robustness regressions this pattern holds and the coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The maximum and minimum 
estimates are also close to the full sample estimate. Initial income is statistically significant 
at the 10% level in 31 out of 39 regressions which gives fairly robust evidence in favour of 
transitional dynamics.  
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TA2. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of the Model in Chapter 5 
I check the sensitivity of the core specification estimated in chapter 5 in this section. 
I take out one observation at a time and estimate the model 36 times and evaluate the 
statistical significance and the range of the coefficient estimates. Following is the result of 
this test. 
Table TA2. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of the Model in Chapter 5 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000 
Truncated Sample (obs=35) 
Dependent 
Variable Estimates with Full 
Sample (obs=36) Maximum Minimum Statistical 
significance 
Log Initial Income 
(1960) 
 
Average Rule of 
Law Index 
 
Log Slave Export 
  
Malaria Risk 
 
Log Trade Share 
 
Catholicism 
0.66*** 
(0.1079) 
 
0.38 
(0.4160) 
 
0.06 
(0.0485) 
-1.64*** 
(0.5734) 
0.18 
(0.2946) 
0.01* 
(0.0065) 
0.71 
 
 
0.43 
 
 
0.11 
 
-1.52 
 
0.089 
 
0.012 
0.61 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
0.05 
 
-1.71 
 
0.23 
 
0.01 
At least at 5% 
level in all cases 
 
Not statistically 
significant  
 
Not statistically 
significant  
At least at 5% 
level in all cases 
Not statistically 
significant 
At least at 10% 
level in 28 out of 
36 cases 
 Notes: ***,  ** and * indicates significance level of 1%,  5% and 10% level respectively against a one sided 
alternative. The standard errors of all the regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions 
reported above are carried out with an intercept. 
 
The tests show that the major conclusions coming out of the preferred specification 
in chapter 5 is not dependent on the outliers and is fairly robust. In the full sample 
regression I report that malaria risk has a negative effect on current per capita GDP in 
Africa and the relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level against a two sided 
alternative. Institutions, trade openness, and log slave exports are insignificantly different 
from zero. In all the robustness regressions this pattern holds and the coefficient estimate 
on malaria is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The maximum and minimum 
estimates are also close to the full sample estimate. Initial income is statistically significant 
at the 5% level in all the 39 robustness regressions which provides robust evidence in 
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favour of transitional dynamics. This shows that the malaria result of chapter 5 is robust 
and not dependent on the outliers.   
TA3. The Hausman Test for exogeneity 
Step (i): Estimate the following first stage regressions and get the residuals. 
          INSi=β1+β2 INIi +β3 CONSTi + β4 MEi + β5 RELi + β6 ERi + β7 Y0i + r1        (T1)      
          INTi=θ1+θ2 CONSTi +θ3 INIi + θ4 MEi + θ5 RELi + θ6 ERi + θ7 Y0i + r2         (T2) 
          MALi= λ1+λ2 MEi + λ3 INIi + λ4 CONSTi + λ5 RELi + λ6ERi + λ7Y0i + r3      (T3) 
Where Y0, INS, INT, MAL, REL, and ER are initial income (1960), institutions, openness, 
malaria, religion, and enrolment ratio variables respectively. INIi refers to the instruments 
of institutions, CONSTi refers to constructed openness and MEi refers to the malaria 
ecology for country i. They are used as instruments for institution, openness and malaria 
risk respectively. 
Step (ii): Estimate the following regression and test 0 8 9 10: 0H α α α= = =  against the 
alternative that at least one of them is not equal to zero. Failing to reject the null implies 
that INS, INT, and MAL are not endogenous.  
LOGGDPPCi=α1+α2Y0i+α3INSi+α4INTi+α5MALi+α6RELi+α7ERi+α8r1+α9r2+α10r3+ξ (T4) 
LOGGDPPC here is the log per capita GDP in 2000. 
TA4. The Overidentification Test 
Step (i): Estimate the following regression using 2SLS estimation method. 
LOGGDPPCi=α1+α2Y0i+α3 INSi+ α4 INTi+ α5MALi + α6 RELi + α7ERi + r1                (T5) 
Step (ii): Estimate the following regression using OLS and calculate nR2. 
r1=ψ1+ψ2SMi+ψ3ENGFRACi+ψ4EURFRACi+ψ5CONSTi+ψ6MEi+ψ7Y0i+ψ8RELi+ 
ψ9ERi+v                                                                                                                       (T6) 
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Step (iii): nR2 ~ χ2 with N degrees of freedom where N = [number of instruments – number 
of exogenous variables].  If  then we reject  that all the instruments are 
jointly exogenous.   
2 2
criticalnR χ> 0 :H
TA5. The Test for Weak Instruments (F statistic test) 
This test is due to Stock and Yogo (2002). This test checks the maximum bias that a 
2SLS estimator can afford relative to OLS when a particular instrument is used at the 5% 
level of significance. We fix the desired level of bias as 5% in this paper. We look at the 
first stage F statistic and compare it with Table 1 in Stock and Yogo (2002). The first stage 
F statistic exceeding the tabulated value implies that the null of weak instrument is rejected. 
Failing to reject the null implies that the bias is too big and the instrument used is weak. 
This test is an extension of Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb which suggests that in 
case of a 2SLS regression with one endogenous variable, the instruments are deemed to be 
weak if the first stage F is less than 10. 
TA6. Blundell and Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
This appendix provides a brief description of the Blundell and Bond GMM 
estimator. For more details see Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell et al. (2000). 
Consider  
                            it it i ity x β μ ε′= + +  where 1, 2,....,t T=                         (T7) 
i and t are country and time indices, ity is the dependent variable and itx is the row 
vector of order k of explanatory variables including the lagged dependent variable, β is a 
column vector of parameters of order k, μi is a country specific fixed effect potentially 
correlated with itx and εit is a residual potentially correlated with itx . To eliminate the fixed 
effect I take first differences which yield the following: 
                          it it ity x β ε′Δ = Δ + Δ where 2,3,...., .t T=                          (T8) 
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If itxΔ is correlated with itεΔ , the standard OLS estimator will be biased and 
inconsistent. However, if one assumes that there exists a set of instruments which satisfies 
the following vector of moment conditions of order q, defined as: 
                         ( )it itE z ε′ 0Δ =  provided                                       (T9) q k≥
Then one can obtain a consistent GMM estimator of β by minimizing the following 
quadratic form. 
                          1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) (GMM GMM N GMMJ g W gβ β β−′= )                                 (T10) 
Where (.)g is the sum over the sample moment conditions of the form in (T9) and 
1
NW
− is a weight matrix. The Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure is to use lags of itx as 
instruments for the differenced equation (T8). The instrument matrix in this case is: 
1
1 2
1
0 0 ... 0 ... 0 1
0 ... 0 ... 0 2
. . . ... . ... . .
0 0 0 ... ...
i
i i
i iT l
x t l
x x t l
x x t T−
= +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ = +⎢= ⎢⎢ ⎥ =⎣ ⎦
iz ⎥⎥
0
                                       (T11) 
Where l is the lag length in use. As discussed in the text, the resulting differenced 
GMM estimator often performs poorly because of weak instruments. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) proposed combining the differenced equation (T8) with the levels equation (T7), for 
which lagged differences of the explanatory variables may serve as valid instruments. The 
vector of moment conditions is then defined as: 
                where ( )E + =iz u
ε
ε
Δ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
i
i
i
u                                                   (T12) 
and 
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12
,
0 0 ... 0 .
0 0 ... 0 1
0 0 ... 0 .
. . . ... . .
0 0 0 ...
i
i
i T l
x t l
x
x t T
+
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Δ = +⎢ ⎥⎢ Δ= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Δ =⎣ ⎦
i
i
z
z ⎥                                                (T13) 
The GMM estimates are then obtained by minimizing (T10). 
TA7.  Identification Problems in Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that the fundamental cause of post-war instability in 
many of the LDCs is institutional. They show that the volatility in per capita GDP growth 
and other macroeconomic indicators have a strong negative relationship with institutions. 
They argue using the settler mortality instrument that this negative relationship has its roots 
in the colonial institutions. They also show that this finding is robust when they control for 
religion, latitude, initial income, log inflation etc. 
However this finding also suffers from the identification problem that I have 
documented before. In the following table I outline the problem using a particular measure 
of volatility – the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth (1970-1998). In column I of 
panel A it is observed that initial executive constraint which is a measure of institutions in 
1950, 1960, and 1970 negatively impacts volatility in output growth in the following two 
decades. This implies that institutional weaknesses in the past lead to higher volatility in the 
current growth rate. This result holds when I control for latitude. But if I replace initial 
constraint on the executive by total years of schooling in 1960 then the same negative 
relationship is observed even though this time between schooling and volatility. This is 
indicative of the identification problem similar to Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. 
(2004), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) which I have discussed before. The first stage 
regressions in panel B show that the log settler mortality instrument is not only correlated 
with initial constraint on the executive but it is also correlated with schooling. The 
 177 
 
correlation between schooling and log settler mortality is independent of the correlation 
between schooling and initial constraint on the executive.     
Table TA3:  Identification Problems in Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
Standard Deviation of GDP per Capita Growth (1970-1998) Dependent Variable 
Model (1) 
obs=71 
Model (2) 
obs=52 
Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS  
Initial Constraint on 
Executive 
 
Total Years of 
Schooling (1960) 
 
Latitude 
 
 
-0.46** 
(0.1941) 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.0214) 
 
 
 
-0.56*** 
(0.1603) 
 
0.03 
(0.0231) 
Panel B: First Stage for Initial Constraint on Executive and Total Years of Schooling (1960) 
Total Years of Schooling (1960) Dependent Variables Initial Constraint on Executive 
obs=71 
obs=52 obs=49 
Log Settler 
Mortality 
  
Latitude  
 
 
Initial Constraint on 
Executive 
 
R2
-0.85*** 
(0.1957) 
 
-0.003 
(0.0216) 
 
 
 
 
0.2590 
-1.2*** 
(0.2208) 
 
0.05** 
(0.0223) 
 
 
 
 
0.5387 
-0.94*** 
(0.2685) 
 
0.05** 
(0.0224) 
 
0.23* 
(0.1339) 
 
0.5718 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. All the regressions reported above 
are carried out with an intercept. Log Settler Mortality is used as an instrument for Initial constraints on 
executive. 
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Chapter 4 
Measures of Economic Development 
Variable name Description Source 
Log per Capita GDP 
in 2000   
Natural log of real GDP per capita in 
2000. Real GDP figures are measured 
in US $ in current prices and the 
figures are PPP converted. For 
Botswana, Cambodia, Fiji, Guyana, 
Mauritania, Namibia and Papua New 
Guinea I use 1999 values as an 
approximation. For Central African 
Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico and 
Taiwan I use 1998 values. 
Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Log Initial Income 
(1820)   
Natural logs of per capita GDP (1820) 
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis  
dollars 
Maddison (2004) 
Log Initial Income 
(1870)   
Natural logs of per capita GDP (1870) 
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis  
dollars 
Maddison (2004) 
Log Initial Income 
(1900)   
Natural logs of per capita GDP (1900) 
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis  
dollars 
Maddison (2004) 
Log Initial Income 
(1950)   
Natural logs of per capita GDP (1950) 
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis  
dollars 
Maddison (2004) 
Log Initial Income 
(1960)   
Initial Level of per capita GDP (1960) 
in natural logs and PPP figures 
Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Stage dummy =1 for Low Income Economies (LIE) 
=0 for High Income Economies (HIE) 
World Bank classification 
 
Measure of institution 
Variable name Description Source 
Average Rule of Law 
Index 
 
 
This variable measures the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the 
civil service from political pressures, 
and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies. The main 
focus of this index is on “inputs” 
required for the government to be able 
to produce and implement good 
policies and deliver public goods. This 
variable ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 where 
higher values equal higher government 
effectiveness. This variable is 
measured as the average from 1998 
through 2000.  
Kaufman et al. (2003) 
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Measures of religion 
Variable name Description Source 
Catholicism Identifies the percentage of population 
of each country being Catholic in 
1980. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Islam Identifies the percentage of population 
of each country being Muslim in 1980. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
 
Measure of openness and trade 
Variable name Description Source 
Log of Trade Share Natural log of Trade share calculated 
by taking log values of figure obtained 
by dividing volume of trade with GDP  
Frankel and Romer (1999) 
 
 
Measure of human capital 
Variable name Description Source 
Enrolment Ratio in 
1900 
It is the ratio of the number of students 
enrolled at the primary level and the 
relevant school age population.   
Benavot and Riddle (1988) 
 
 
Measures of geography 
Variable name Description Source 
Distance Absolute distance from the Equator 
measured in Latitude 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
Malaria Risk Percentage of the population at risk of 
malaria transmission in 1994. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) 
Land Area within 
Tropics 
The proportion of country’s land area 
within the geographical tropics.  
Gallup et al. (1998) 
Soil Suitability Soil suitability is an estimate of the 
percentage of each soil type that is 
very suitable, moderately suitable and 
unsuitable for each of six rainfed 
crops.  
Center for International Development, 
Geography Data sets.  
Land Area within 
100km of Ocean or 
Ocean-Navigable 
River 
Proportion of countries total land area 
within 100 km of the ocean or ocean-
navigable river, excluding coastline 
above the winter extent of sea ice and 
the rivers that flow to this coastline. 
Gallup et al. (1998) 
Instrument of openness 
Variable name Description Source 
Constructed Openness Natural log of constructed openness 
calculated by filtering actual trade 
share from the influence of geographic 
factors using a bilateral trade equation 
which is also known as the gravity 
model. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) 
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Instruments of institution 
Variable name Description Source 
Log Settler Mortality Natural log of  estimated European 
Settler Mortality Rate in colonies and 
settlements 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
 
ENGFRAC It is one of the "first" language 
variables, corresponding to the 
fraction of the population speaking 
English 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
EURFRAC It is one of the "first" language 
variables, corresponding to the 
fraction of the population speaking 
one of the major languages of Western 
Europe: English, French, German, 
Portuguese, or Spanish. 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
Log Population 
Density in 1500 
Total population divided by total 
arable land in 1500 A.D. Source: 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) as cited in 
Acemoglu, et al. (2002). 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) 
Instrument of malaria 
Variable name Description Source 
Malaria Ecology Malaria Ecology (ME) pop-weighted, 
Sept 2003 version. This variable 
provides an instrument for malaria 
risk that controls for the fact that 
causation may run not only from 
malaria to income but also from 
income to malaria. The basic formula 
for ME includes temperature, species 
abundance, and vector type (the type 
of mosquito). The underlying index is 
measured on a highly disaggregated 
sub-national level, and then is 
averaged for the entire country. 
Because ME is built upon 
climatological and vector conditions 
on a country-by-country basis, it is 
exogenous to public health 
interventions and economic 
conditions.  
Kiszewski et al. (2004) 
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Chapter 5 
Measures of Economic Development 
Variable name Description Source 
Log per Capita GDP 
in 2000   
Natural log of real GDP per capita in 
2000. Real GDP figures are measured 
in US $ in current prices and the 
figures are PPP converted. For 
Botswana, Mauritania and Namibia 
we use 1999 values as an 
approximation. For Central African 
Republic I use 1998 values. For 
Angola, Zaire, and Sudan I use log 
per capita GDP (PPP adjusted and 
measured in current US$) from World 
Development Indicator (WDI). 
Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Log Initial Income 
(1960)   
Initial Level of per capita GDP (1960) 
in natural logs and PPP figures. Data 
on Sudan is from WDI and is 
approximated by the 1975 level. 
Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
 
Measure of institutions 
Variable name Description Source 
Average Rule of Law 
Index 
 
 
This variable measures the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the 
civil service from political pressures, 
and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies. The main 
focus of this index is on “inputs” 
required for the government to be able 
to produce and implement good 
policies and deliver public goods. This 
variable ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 where 
higher values equal higher government 
effectiveness. This variable is 
measured as the average from 1998 
through 2000.  
Kaufman et al. (2003) 
 
Measures of religion 
Variable name Description Source 
Catholicism Identifies the percentage of population 
of each country being Catholic in 
1980. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Islam Identifies the percentage of population 
of each country being Muslim in 1980. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
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Measure of openness and trade 
Variable name Description Source 
Log Trade Share Natural log of Trade share calculated 
by taking log values of figure obtained 
by dividing volume of trade with GDP  
Frankel and Romer (1999) 
 
 
Measure of slave exports 
Variable name Description Source 
Log Slave Exports This is natural log of the normalised 
estimate of total number of slaves 
exported from Africa during the period 
1400-1899. The number of slave 
exports are normalised by the country 
size. The figure includes the Atlantic 
slave exports, the Indian ocean slave 
exports, the Trans Saharan slave 
exports, and the Red sea slave exports. 
I use Nunn (2004)’s methodology 
outlined in its data appendix to back 
out the numbers. The other sources 
that I have used following Nunn 
(2004) is Elbl (1997); Eltis et al. 
(1999); Austen (1979); Austen (1988); 
and Austen (1992). I have divided 
each of these numbers by the 
corresponding country size measured 
in km2. The country size data is from 
CID geography dataset.   
Nunn (2004) 
 
Instruments of institutions 
Variable name Description Source 
ENGFRAC It is one of the "first" language 
variables, corresponding to the 
fraction of the population speaking 
English 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
EURFRAC It is one of the "first" language 
variables, corresponding to the 
fraction of the population speaking 
one of the major languages of Western 
Europe: English, French, German, 
Portuguese, or Spanish. 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
Log Population 
Density in 1500 
Total population divided by total 
arable land in 1500 A.D. Source: 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) as cited in 
Acemoglu, et al. (2002). 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) 
Measure of malaria 
Variable name Description Source 
Malaria Risk Percentage of the population at risk of 
malaria transmission in 1994. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) 
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Instrument of malaria 
Variable name Description Source 
Malaria Ecology Malaria Ecology (ME) pop-weighted, 
Sept 2003 version. This variable 
provides an instrument for malaria 
risk that controls for the fact that 
causation may run not only from 
malaria to income but also from 
income to malaria. The basic formula 
for ME includes temperature, species 
abundance, and vector type (the type 
of mosquito). The underlying index is 
measured on a highly disaggregated 
sub-national level, and then is 
averaged for the entire country. 
Because ME is built upon 
climatological and vector conditions 
on a country-by-country basis, it is 
exogenous to public health 
interventions and economic 
conditions.  
Kiszewski et al. (2004) 
 
Instrument of slave exports 
 
Variable name Description Source 
Distance from the 
coast 
Mean distance to nearest coastline 
measured in kilometres.    
Centre for International Development, 
Geography Datasets   
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Chapter 7 
Measures of Economic Development 
Variable name Description Source 
Growth  ˆ( )iTy  
 
Calculated using the formula 
5
1ˆ (
5iT iT iT
y y y −≡ − )  for 127 
countries. The data used is GDP per 
capita PPP (constant 2000 
international $). The raw GDP per 
capita numbers are averaged first and 
then logged and differenced to obtain 
growth rates. 1980 value is the average 
over the period 1980-82, 1985 is the 
average over the period 1983-87, 1990 
is the average over the period 1988-
1992, 1995 is the average over the 
period 1993-97, 2000 is the average 
over the period 1998-2001, and 2004 
is the average over the period  2002-
04.      
WDI Online, The World Bank Group 
Log Initial 
Income  5( )iTy −
Log GDP per capita PPP (constant 
2000 international $). The numbers are 
averaged first and then logged. 1980 
value is the average over the period 
1980-82, 1985 is the average over the 
period 1983-87, 1990 is the average 
over the period 1988-1992, 1995 is the 
average over the period 1993-97, 2000 
is the average over the period 1998-
2001, and 2004 is the average over the 
period  2002-04. For Angola, Cape 
Verde, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Grenada the 1980 data is from Penn 
World Table (PWT) 6.1. For Poland, 
Sao Tome & Principe, and Tanzania 
the 1980 and 1985 data is from PWT. 
For Romania and Taiwan the 1980-
2000 data is from PWT.  
WDI Online, The World Bank Group  
Log GDP per Capita 
in 1995 
Log GDP per capita in 1995 measured 
in PPP US $. 
WDI Online, The World Bank Group 
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Measure of Trade Openness 
Variable name Description Source 
Log Trade Share (% of GDP) 
(LTRS) 
 
 
This is a direct measure of trade 
calculated by dividing the volume 
of trade by GDP and then taken 
log. They are also calculated as 
five year averages. For Angola, 
Cape Verde, Guinea, and 
Equatorial Guinea the 1980 data is 
from PWT6.1. For Poland and 
Romania the 1980 & 1985 data is 
from PWT6.1 and for Singapore 
and Taiwan the 1980-2000 data is 
from PWT6.1.       
WDI Online, The World Bank 
Group 
 
Measure of Market Regulating Institutions 
Variable name Description Source 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labor, & Business 
(MR) 
This is a composite measure that takes 
into account credit market regulations, 
labor market regulations, & business 
regulations. The measure ranges from 
0 to 10 with a high score implying 
fewer regulations. The measure comes 
as five year averages. I use 1980, 
1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 & 2004 
values. The 2004 value is averaged 
over the period 2001-03.  
 Gwartney and Lawson. (2005)  
 
 
Measure of Market Stabilizing Institutions 
Variable name Description Source 
Sound Money Index (SM) This measure takes into account 
the following. a) Average annual 
growth of the money supply in the 
last five years minus average 
annual growth of real GDP in the 
last ten years, b) Standard inflation 
variability in the last five years, 
and c) Recent inflation rate. It 
ranges from 0 to 10 with a high 
score implying more sound 
money. The measure comes as five 
year averages. I use 1980, 1985, 
1990, 1995, 2000 & 2004 values. 
The 2004 value is averaged over 
the period 2001-03. 
Gwartney and Lawson. (2005) 
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Measure of Market Creating Institutions 
Variable name Description Source 
Law and Order (LO) 
 
Law and Order are assessed 
separately. The Law 
subcomponent is an assessment of 
the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system and the Order 
subcomponent is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law. 
The assessment is made on a six 
point scale with a high score 
implying better law and order. 
The five year periodic averages 
are calculated. 1980 value is the 
average over the period 1980-82, 
1985 is the average over the 
period 1983-87, 1990 is the 
average over the period 1988-
1992, 1995 is the average over the 
period 1993-97, 2000 is the 
average over the period 1998-
2001, and 2004 is the average 
over the period  2002-04.      
PRS Group (2005) 
ICRG 
Average Protection against 
Expropriation 
Risk of “outright confiscation and 
forced nationalization" of 
property. This variable ranges 
from zero to ten where higher 
values are equals a lower 
probability of expropriation. This 
variable is calculated as the 
average from 1985 through 1995.  
PRS Group, September 1999 
Constraint on Executive 
 
A seven category scale, 1 to 7, 
with a higher score indicating 
more constraint. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) calculates average 
value from 1990 to 2000. 
Polity IV dataset 
Legal Formalism  The index measures substantive 
and procedural statutory 
intervention in judicial cases 
(check case) at lower level civil 
trial courts, and is formed by 
adding up the following indices: i) 
professional vs layman, ii) written 
vs oral elements, iii) legal 
justification, iv) statutory 
regulation of evidence, v) control 
of superior review, vi) 
engagement formalities and vii) 
independent procedural actions. 
The index ranges from 0 to 7, 
where 7 implies a higher level of 
control or intervention in the 
judicial process.   
Djankov et al. (2003) 
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Measure of Market Legitimizing Institutions 
Variable name Description Source 
Democracy Index (DEMOC) 
 
Democracy measures the 
effectiveness of democratic 
institutions. It ranges from 0 to 10 
with a high score implying more 
democratic system. The five year 
periodic averages are calculated in 
the same way as WDI. 
Polity IV dataset 
 
Measure of Schooling 
Variable name Description Source 
Total Years of Schooling (TYS) Average schooling years in the 
total population. This is measured 
at five year intervals from 1980-
2000. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Total Years of Schooling (1995) Average schooling years in the 
total population in 1995. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Total Years of Schooling (1960) Average schooling years in the 
total population in 1960. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
Instruments 
Variable name Description Source 
Log Settler Mortality Natural log of  estimated 
European Settler Mortality Rate 
in colonies and settlements 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
 
Legal Origin (British) Legal origin of the Company Law 
or Commercial Code of each 
country. The English Common 
Law dummy. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
 
Technical Appendix 7 (TA7)
Variable name Description Source 
Standard Deviation of GDP per 
Capita Growth (1970-1998) 
Standard deviation of GDP per 
capita growth rate calculated 
following Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
WDI Online, The World Bank 
Group 
Initial Constraint on Executive 
 
A seven category scale, 1 to 7, 
with a higher score indicating 
more constraint. This is an 
average of 1950, 1960, and 1970 
level calculated following 
Acemoglu et al. (2003). 
Polity IV dataset 
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Chapter 4
AGO Angola ECU Ecuador KEN Kenya ROM Romania 
ALB Albania EGY Egypt KHM Cambodia RUS Russia 
ARG Argentina ESP Spain KNA St. Kitts & Nevis  RWA Rwanda 
ARM Armenia ETH Ethiopia KOR 
Korea, Republic 
of SDN Sudan 
AUS Australia FIN Finland LBR Liberia SEN Senegal 
AUT Austria FJI Fiji LKA Sri Lanka SGP Singapore 
BDI Burundi FRA France LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone 
BEL Belgium GAB Gabon MAR Morocco SLV El Salvador 
BEN Benin GBR United Kingdom MDA Moldova SOM  Somalia 
BFA Burkina Faso GEO Georgia MDG Madagascar STP Sao Tome and Principe 
BGD Bangladesh GER Germany MEX Mexico SUR Suriname 
BGR Bulgaria GHA Ghana MLI Mali SVK Slovak Republic 
BOL Bolivia GIN Guinea MLT Malta SWE Sweden 
BRA Brazil GMB Gambia, The MNG Mongolia SWZ Swaziland 
BRB Barbados   GNB Guinea-Bissau MOZ Mozambique SYC Seychelles 
BUR Myanmar GNQ 
Equatorial 
Guinea MRT Mauritania SYR Syria 
BWA Botswana GRC Greece MUS Mauritius TCD Chad 
CAF 
Central African 
Republic GRD Grenada   MWI Malawi TGO Togo 
CAN Canada GTM Guatemala MYS Malaysia THA Thailand 
CHE Switzerland GUY Guyana NAM Namibia TTO Trinidad &Tobago  
CHL Chile HKG Hong Kong NER Niger TUN Tunisia 
CHN China HND Honduras NGA Nigeria TUR Turkey 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire HRV Croatia NIC Nicaragua TWN Taiwan 
CMR Cameroon HTI Haiti NLD Netherlands TZA Tanzania 
COG Congo, Republic of HUN Hungary NOR Norway UGA Uganda 
COL Colombia IDN Indonesia NZL New Zealand URY Uruguay 
COM Comoros IND India OMN Oman USA USA 
CPV Cape Verde IRL Ireland PAK Pakistan VEN Venezuela 
CRI Costa Rica IRN Iran PAN Panama VNM Vietnam 
CYP Cyprus IRQ Iraq PER Peru ZAF South Africa 
DEU Germany ISL Iceland PHL Philippines ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep.  
DJI Djibouti ISR Israel PNG 
Papua New 
Guinea ZMB Zambia 
DMA Dominica   ITA Italy POL Poland ZWE Zimbabwe 
DNK Denmark JAM Jamaica   PRI Puerto Rico   
DOM Dominican Republic JOR Jordan PRT Portugal   
DZA Algeria JPN Japan PRY Paraguay   
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Chapter 5
AGO Angola SDN Sudan     
BDI Burundi SOM Somalia     
BEN Benin SLE Sierra Leone     
BFA Burkina Faso STP 
Sao Tome and 
Principe     
BWA Botswana SWZ Swaziland     
CAF 
Central African 
Republic TCD Chad     
CIV Cote d'Ivoire TGO Togo     
CMR Cameroon TUN Tunisia     
COG Congo, Republic of TZA Tanzania     
COM Comoros UGA Uganda     
CPV Cape Verde ZAF South Africa     
DJI Djibouti ZAR 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.      
DZA Algeria ZMB Zambia     
EGY Egypt ZWE Zimbabwe     
ETH Ethiopia       
GAB Gabon       
GHA Ghana       
GIN Guinea       
GMB Gambia, The       
GNB Guinea-Bissau       
GNQ Equatorial Guinea       
KEN Kenya       
LSO Lesotho       
MAR Morocco       
MDG Madagascar       
MLI Mali       
MOZ Mozambique       
MRT Mauritania       
MUS Mauritius       
MWI Malawi       
NAM Namibia       
NER Niger       
NGA Nigeria       
RWA Rwanda       
SEN Senegal       
 
 
 
 
 
 192 
 
Chapter 7 
AGO Angola ETH Ethiopia LSO Lesotho SVK Slovak Republic 
ARG Argentina FIN Finland LUX Luxembourg SWE Sweden 
ATG Antigua FJI Fiji MAR Morocco SWZ Swaziland 
AUS Australia FRA France MDG Madagascar SYC Seychelles 
AUT Austria GAB Gabon MEX Mexico SYR Syria 
BDI Burundi GBR United Kingdom MLI Mali TCD Chad 
BEL Belgium GER Germany MOZ Mozambique TGO Togo 
BEN Benin GHA Ghana MRT Mauritania THA Thailand 
BFA Burkina Faso GIN Guinea MUS Mauritius TTO Trinidad &Tobago  
BGD Bangladesh GMB Gambia, The MWI Malawi TUN Tunisia 
BLZ Belize   GNB Guinea-Bissau MYS Malaysia TUR Turkey 
BOL Bolivia GNQ 
Equatorial 
Guinea NAM Namibia TWN Taiwan 
BRA Brazil GRC Greece NER Niger TZA Tanzania 
BRB Barbados   GRD Grenada   NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda 
BWA Botswana GTM Guatemala NIC Nicaragua URY Uruguay 
CAF 
Central African 
Republic GUY Guyana NLD Netherlands USA USA 
CAN Canada HKG Hong Kong NOR Norway VCT 
St.Vincent & 
Grenadines  
CHE Switzerland HND Honduras NPL Nepal VEN Venezuela 
CHL Chile HTI Haiti NZL 
New 
Zealand ZAF South Africa 
CHN China HUN Hungary PAK Pakistan ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep.  
CIV Cote d'Ivoire IDN Indonesia PAN Panama ZMB Zambia 
CMR Cameroon IND India PER Peru ZWE Zimbabwe 
COG Congo, Republic of IRL Ireland PHL Philippines  
COL Colombia IRN Iran PNG Papua New Guinea  
COM Comoros ISL Iceland POL Poland  
CPV Cape Verde ISR Israel PRI Puerto Rico  
CRI Costa Rica ITA Italy PRT Portugal  
CYP Cyprus JAM Jamaica   PRY Paraguay  
DMA Dominica   JOR Jordan ROM Romania  
DNK Denmark JPN Japan RWA Rwanda  
DOM Dominican Republic KEN Kenya SEN Senegal  
DZA Algeria KNA St. Kitts & Nevis  SGP Singapore  
ECU Ecuador KOR 
Korea, Republic 
of SLE Sierra Leone  
EGY Egypt LCA St. Lucia  SLV El Salvador  
ESP Spain LKA Sri Lanka STP Sao Tome and Principe  
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